

Countering the Islamophobia Industry

Toward More Effective Strategies

May 2018



THE
CARTER CENTER



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About The Carter Center

The Carter Center was founded in 1982 by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, in partnership with Emory University, to advance peace and health worldwide. A not-for-profit, nongovernmental organization, the Center has helped to improve life for people in 80 countries by resolving conflicts; advancing democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity; preventing diseases; and improving mental health care. Please visit www.cartercenter.org to learn more about The Carter Center.

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Foreword

By President Jimmy Carter

I have watched with concern the unprecedented rise of anti-Muslim hate crimes and hate speech. From surveillance and imprisonment, with fewer procedural safeguards against anti-Muslim legislation, Muslims have been subjected to discriminatory and unconstitutional practices. Such actions not only infringe on the freedom of Muslims to practice their faith, but also marginalize them as engaged citizens.

Respect for human rights and the elimination of discrimination are essential to advancing global peace and democracy. When we turn a blind eye to discrimination against our Muslim neighbors, we cannot claim to remain true to our American values, and if we tolerate discrimination against those of another faith, we undermine our own cherished religious freedom.

None of us can ignore the challenge that rising Islamophobia presents to our nation. We must resolve to fight fear and abuse with solidarity and a commitment to justice—especially for those

whose communities have suffered oppression and discrimination.

In September of 2017, The Carter Center convened an international symposium of scholars, journalists, civil society actors, and religious leaders to develop a strategic and sustainable response to Islamophobia. We concluded that all people of good will have a responsibility to speak out and hold accountable those who seek to divide us by derogating others. We must use the laws that enshrine human and civil rights to combat Islamophobia as they have been used to combat other forms of discrimination.

It is the Carter Center's mission to wage peace, fight disease, and build hope for all people. In this guidebook we offer strategies, best practices, and toolkits to fight the spread of Islamophobia and to build a culture of respect for universal human rights.

The Carter Center Works to Understand and Counter the Rise of Islamophobia

Houda Abadi

Carter Center Conflict Resolution Program

Hate crimes in the United States against Muslims or people who look as if they may be Muslim are at an all-time high. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, from 2015 to 2016 the number of anti-Muslim hate groups in the U.S. grew 197 percent and anti-Muslim hate crimes surged 67 percent. From January to July 2017, there were 63 attacks on mosques.

In June 2017, Nabra Hassanen, a 17-year-old Virginia girl walking back to her community mosque after visiting IHOP with her friends, was attacked and killed. The month prior, two men on the commuter train in Portland, Oregon, were stabbed and killed after trying to defend two young women in Muslim garb who were being harassed. Unfortunately, the list goes on much longer.

Since 9/11, Islam has been unfairly demonized and Muslims stigmatized. Muslim youths in the West have grown up scrutinized, shamed, and bullied because of their religion. During the 2016 U.S. electoral campaign, Islamophobic rhetoric was an accepted form of bigotry used to spread fear and garner votes. Anti-Muslim bigotry in the United States draws upon a significant network of funding. The surge in anti-Muslim violence came amid a year marked both by Daesh (aka ISIS) atrocities and by Islamophobic political rhetoric. Yet the most numerous victims of Daesh have been Muslims. Muslims are thus beset by both the hijacking of their religion by groups such as Daesh and the rise of Islamophobia.

Islamophobia is more than harsh talk; it is a systemic and institutional form of racism. It is the silencing of Muslim voices. It is selective

condemnation. It is the constant not-so-random stops at airport checkpoints. It is the recently renewed travel ban. It is FBI surveillance and policing of the Muslim community. It is when merely speaking Arabic is mistaken for an

Islamophobia is not a Muslim problem, but an affront to our common humanity. It is a fundamental violation of human rights and human dignity.

extremist threat. It is asking Muslims to apologize for crimes they did not commit. It is calling for a Muslim registry. It is a politician assuring worried voters that former President Obama is not a Muslim but is in fact “a very nice man”—as if the two were mutually exclusive.

Islamophobia is not a Muslim problem, but an affront to our common humanity. It is a fundamental violation of human rights and human dignity. It is deeply interconnected with racism, xenophobia, and other forms of dehumanization, often serving those who seek to maintain prevailing power structures. Responding to Islamophobia is vital and a moral responsibility for policymakers; civil rights advocates across religious, racial, and ethnic lines; and interfaith movements and organizations.

Experts Symposium Discussions on Countering the Islamophobia Industry

Developing effective responses to the rise of Islamophobia has been at the core of the Carter Center's project to prevent violent extremism since its inception. The Center believes that extremism knows no religious, national, or ethnic boundaries. Daesh and Islamophobia are two faces of the same coin, and combating one means combating the other. Both portray the West and the entire Muslim community as being fundamentally divided along existential fault lines. And both are wrong.

In September 2017, the Center convened a three-day Countering the Islamophobia Industry Symposium, bringing together 30 international practitioners and scholars on Islamophobia, media, and political violence. Discussions centered on three major themes: 1) manifestations of Islamophobia and its impact on the ground; 2) the symbiotic relationship between Islamophobia and radicalization; and 3) strategic and sustainable responses to Islamophobia in the U.S., Europe, and the Muslim world.

The articles in this guide are organized thematically: "The Islamophobia Industry in Focus" examines the complex of actors, networks, and institutions that make the Islamophobia industry function. "Islamophobia in Law and Policy" distinguishes between Islamophobia as mere anti-Muslim sentiment and the laws and policies embedded in state institutions that unjustly target and stigmatize Muslim communities, often in the name of national security. "Countering Islamophobia in the Media" examines the role of mainstream media in perpetuating negative images of Muslims and inciting discrimination, whose interests this serves, and what we can do about it. Many of our symposium experts are grass-roots actors and community leaders, and their contributions are divided into two sections. The first, "Grass-Roots Perspectives," describes the contours and effects of Islamophobia in and on local communities. The second, "Developing a Sustainable and Strategic Response to Islamophobia," reviews several case studies of effective responses, offering a toolbox for those engaged in combating Islamophobia.

The views expressed in the articles of this publication are those solely of the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinions of The Carter Center.

The Islamophobia Industry in Focus

Islamophobia is not just an arbitrary and uninformed fear of Muslims. Islamophobia is, in large part, the function of an anti-Muslim industry, a well-funded and well-connected network of individuals (Pamela Geller, David Horowitz), institutions (American Freedom Law Center, Jihad Watch, the Clarion Institute), and donors (Sheldon Adelson, the Bradley Foundation).

Historically, Islamophobia is rooted in colonialism and coalesces around religion only as antiquated notions of biological determinism and cultural incompatibility lose their persuasive force. It is deployed as a political tactic, peaks in the public discourse during election cycles, and serves to silence and stigmatize Muslim voices, particularly as they claim their rights and speak on behalf of their own interests in the public sphere.

Islamophobia as Law and Policy

Islamophobia is far more than simply hate speech. It is most dangerous when embedded in civil and judicial structures that unfairly stigmatize Muslims in the name of national security. Fear of terrorism has been used as a political device to justify flagrant violations of civil and human rights.

From surveillance, arbitrary arrest, and detention with fewer procedural safeguards to the mass hysteria surrounding the so-called encroachment of Shari'a law into American courts, Western Muslims have been at the receiving end of many discriminatory practices led by the security apparatuses of their respective countries. Such actions have not only infringed on the ability of Muslims to freely practice their faith, but have also sought to marginalize them as participants in their societies.

The papers in this section examine the rise of aggressive securitization tactics and the long-term consequences of such policies, the relationship between law enforcement and Islamophobia, and effective ways to balance national security with civil liberties.

Countering Islamophobia in the Media: Community Media Practices and Oppositional Politics

Orientalist representations of Islam and Muslims have permeated the media and pop culture. As the towering scholar of Islamophobia in the media, Jack Sheehan, observed, Muslims are too often reduced to the “three B’s”: billionaires, bombers, and belly dancers. This history has created an image of Muslims laden with crude and exaggerated stereotypes that have provided the illusion of the “Muslim threat” and ideological justifications for military incursions.

The papers in this section examine the interplay of culture, politics, and media. It is imperative that local Muslim leaders shift their roles from passive consumers of media to active producers of their own stories. Complex opportunities and challenges exist for Muslims navigating through media spaces and alternative platforms, such as citizen journalism and participatory media. Our authors explore mediated resistance, the relationship between online and offline activism, and how alternative media can be used for social change—specifically, strengthening grass-roots organizations and sustaining solidarity among local communities.

Voices From the Ground I: Grass-Roots Perspectives

It is important to understand the histories, strategies, groups, narratives, and policies that fuel Islamophobia, but it is perhaps more important to listen to diverse Muslim communities that experience it and resist in ways large and small. The epidemic of Islamophobia in the U.S. and Europe has very real consequences for Muslims, impacting their lives in a myriad of ways.

Muslim women college students in the United Kingdom, for example, avoid sensitive political topics and are less likely to engage in politics for fear of being labeled as terrorists and potentially surveilled. Muslim students in the U.S. are regularly bullied, at times called ISIS and terrorist. Muslims in France are closely monitored, and

routine expressions of piety (prayer, observing dietary restrictions) can be interpreted by securitized public institutions as signs of “radicalization.”

Voices From the Ground II: Developing a Sustainable and Strategic Response to Islamophobia

Continuing in the essential task of listening, the papers in this section highlight the often innovative efforts of grass-roots activists to develop strategic and sustainable responses to Islamophobia. Topics include the state of play in countering Islamophobia, and the toolbox needed for a better and stronger response. Religious and community leaders must be engaged citizens, using interreligious collaboration, including public campaigns and advocacy, education initiatives, and shared battles for social justice, in the long-term fight against Islamophobia. Intersectional and intercommunity approaches are critically important for a pragmatic and long-term solution to all forms of violent extremism. Many papers in this manual conclude with recommendations on how sustainable and strategic approaches can be skillfully theorized and implemented in practice.

Conclusion

The manual concludes with an essay from Ebrahim Rasool, former South African ambassador to the United States, who reflects on the lessons learned from South Africa’s anti-apartheid struggle. Rasool argues that defeating Islamophobia means recognizing it as a part of a larger family in a “genealogy of bigotry” that includes fear and ignorance, prejudice and discrimination, racism, sexism, and anti-Semitism. Rasool writes that “the leadership of South Africa resisted the temptation to monopolize or elevate their suffering under Islamophobia out of respect for the greater scale and depth of suffering of black South Africans under racism and mineworkers from other African states under xenophobia.” The struggle for justice must be an inclusive one, because—to paraphrase Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.—dignity, equality, and freedom denied to one group is a threat to all.

Anti-Muslim Hate Groups: A Primer

Heidi Beirich


Southern Poverty Law Center

For the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), the first step in combating hate is education, and part of that responsibility is learning about hatred's main purveyors. America's anti-Muslim movement is a relatively new phenomenon, with many such

It is often assumed the 9/11 terrorist attacks launched this movement, but that is not exactly the case. The seeds of some of today's major anti-Muslim organizations were planted in the years after the terrorist attacks, but mass activism against Muslims didn't really develop until 2010, in the wake of the battle over the so-called "Ground Zero" mosque, purposely labeled in this incendiary way by its Muslim-bashing opponents. That year, a planned Muslim community center, Cordoba House, modeled on Jewish community centers and to be situated in lower Manhattan, set off a firestorm among conservatives. Examples include former American vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin calling the project, which was not on the site but near the site of the fallen World Trade Center towers, "an intolerable mistake on hallowed ground." Many other conservatives expressed the same sentiment, such as former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, who decried the project as "an act of triumphalism."

After the outrage on the right and on media such as Fox News that erupted over the community center, anti-Muslim activism grew across the country. A campaign to stoke fears of Muslims and push anti-Muslim legislation, in particular anti-Shari'a law measures, was launched. As part of this anti-Muslim propagandizing, hate groups argued that Muslims were attempting to overthrow the U.S. democratic system by insinuating their own legal structures into the country and thereby undermining constitutional protections. (This is a completely bogus argument.) By 2017, according to

○ Anti-Muslim Groups 2010-2016



groups appearing only in the aftermath of the World Trade Center terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001. That is not to say that anti-Muslim bigotry did not exist in earlier eras, as it surely did along with hatred against black people, Jews, Catholics, immigrants and others. However, the development of a sophisticated network whose ire is directed specifically at the Muslim community is quite recent.

the Haas Institute at the University of California at Berkeley, the total number of such legislative efforts added up to 217 bills in 43 states. A handful of states, including Texas and Arkansas, have made the bills law.¹

At the same time, anti-Muslim groups began to expand, while securing political allies at the state and federal level for their efforts. By 2017, with President Donald Trump in the White House, these groups had access to the halls of power, both in the White House and in Congress.

This growing anti-Muslim agitation in the United States propelled the rise of these hate groups. The SPLC found a troubling growth in anti-Muslim groups between 2015 and 2016, when they went from 34 hate group chapters to 101 in one year. Another rise is expected in 2017. Largely, this precipitous jump was propelled by the campaign and then election of President Trump, who demonized Muslims during the campaign and moved quickly to pass a ban on refugees from Muslim-majority countries once in office (as of early 2018, the ban is tied up in the courts). Trump's endorsement of hate group ideas and bigotry against Muslims both in the campaign and since he took office fueled these organizations and led to their growth.

For the SPLC, anti-Muslim hate groups exhibit extreme hostility toward Muslims. The organizations portray those who practice Islam as fundamentally alien and attribute to its followers an inherent set of negative traits. Muslims are depicted as irrational, intolerant, and violent, and their faith is frequently depicted as sanctioning pedophilia, coupled with intolerance for homosexuals and women.

These groups also typically hold conspiratorial views regarding the inherent danger to America posed by its Muslim-American community. Muslims are viewed as a fifth column intent on undermining and eventually replacing American democracy and Western civilization with Islamic despotism, a conspiracy theory known as "civilization jihad." Anti-Muslim hate groups allege that Muslims are trying to subvert the rule of law by

imposing on Americans their own Islamic legal system, Shari'a law. The threat of the Muslim Brotherhood is also cited, with anti-Muslim groups constantly attacking Muslim civil rights groups and American Muslim leaders for their supposed connections to the Brotherhood. Many of these groups have pushed for the Brotherhood to be designated a foreign terrorist organization.

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Anti-Muslim hate groups also broadly defame Islam, which they tend to treat as a monolithic and evil religion. These groups generally hold that Islam has no values in common with other cultures, is inferior to the West, and is a violent political ideology rather than a religion. In 2017, anti-Muslim rallies put on by ACT! for America featured members of other American extremist movements, including white supremacists, neo-Nazis and armed militiamen. This represents a growing radicalization of the entire American hate movement against the Muslim population.

As the Syrian refugee crisis exploded in 2015 and 2016, the movement as a whole also became more aggressive against these newcomers to our shores, as anti-Muslim groups have increasingly directed their ire toward the American refugee program. Refugees are commonly depicted as likely terrorist infiltrators by these organizations. Small anti-refugee groups have popped up across the country and fought the relocation of refugees at a hyperlocal level, sowing anti-refugee discord in towns like Twin Falls, Idaho.

This growing anti-Muslim bigotry and agitation has come at a steep price for MASA (Muslim, Arab, and South Asian) communities: increasing

1 Elsadig Elsheikh, Basima Sisemore, and Natalia Ramirez Lee, "Legalizing Othering: The United States of Islamophobia," September 2017, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society, UC Berkeley, Berkeley, California,

http://haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/haas_institute_legalizing_othering_the_united_states_of_islamophobia.pdf, last accessed Feb. 20, 2018.

numbers of hate crimes and domestic terrorist attacks directed at them. (Attackers who target Muslims often simply look for victims of any kind that they think might be Muslim, so many other communities are affected by anti-Muslim violence and bigotry.) In 2016, the FBI's hate crimes statistics showed that crimes motivated by anti-Muslim bias jumped to 307 incidents, up from 257 in the previous year, an approximate 19 percent increase.² The number of victims increased proportionate to the general rise in incidents, from 307 in the previous year to 388 in 2016, or by about 26 percent. It is well-known that hate-crime statistics vastly undercount the number of such crimes in

In 2016, the FBI's hate crimes statistics showed that crimes motivated by anti-Muslim bias jumped to 307 incidents, up from 257 in the previous year, an approximate 19 percent increase.

the United States, so the amount of this type of crime is likely vastly higher than what is reported by the FBI. (A 2017 DOJ study estimated that hate crimes occur annually at a rate of 250,000 such incidents, much higher than the approximately 6,000 hate crimes regularly reported by the FBI.)

Then there are domestic terrorist attacks against Muslims and their religious institutions. Perhaps the most widely covered recent incident was the killing of two men and wounding of another on the Portland MAX train in May 2017. The incident began when Trump supporter and racist Jeremy Christian began hassling what he thought were two young Muslim women on the train. The men were attacked when they came to these women's defense. And we should not forget the deadly attack on the Oak Creek, Wisconsin, Sikh temple in 2012 by a racist skinhead who was likely trying to attack Muslims and left six dead. Further, American mosques have been besieged. In 2015, according to the Council on American-Islamic

Relations and the University of California at Berkeley, there were 78 attacks on mosques. In 2016, there were 46 such attacks, and 63 through July 2017.³ In general, that makes for about nine such attacks per month in recent years.

To learn more about America's anti-Muslim hate movement, here are five profiles of this movement's leaders as well as information about their organizations.

BRIGITTE GABRIEL

Organization: Founder and head of ACT! for America

In Her Own Words

"America has been infiltrated on all levels by radicals who wish to harm America. They have infiltrated us at the CIA, at the FBI, at the Pentagon, at the State Department."

— *Quoted in The New York Times, March 7, 2011*

"The difference, my friends, between Israel and the Arabic world is quite simply the difference between civilization and barbarism. It's the difference between good and evil, and this is what we're witnessing in the Arab and Islamic world. I am angry. They have no soul! They are dead set on killing and destruction."

— *From a speech delivered to the Rev. John Hagee's Christians United for Israel Convention, July 2007*

"Tens of thousands of Islamic militants now reside in America, operating in sleeper cells, attending our colleges and universities, even infiltrating our government. They are here—today. Many have been here for years. Waiting. Preparing."

— *ACT! for America website, undated*

Summary

Gabriel views Islam in absolute terms as a monolithic threat to the United States, Israel, and the West. She is prone to sweeping generalizations and exaggerations as she describes a grand, sophisticated Muslim conspiracy bent on world domination. Gabriel is notable because among

2 2016 Hate Crime Statistics, FBI, <https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2016>, last accessed Feb. 20, 2018.

3 Hate Crime Victimization, 2004-2015, Bureau of Justice Statistics, June 2017, <https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/hcv0415.pdf>, last accessed Feb. 20, 2018.

the anti-Muslim movement, she alone has focused on building a grass-roots organization, claiming thousands of members and hundreds of chapters in the U.S. and around the world. She is the author of *Because They Hate: A Survivor of Islamic Terror Warns America* (2006) and *They Must Be Stopped: Why We Must Defeat Radical Islam and How We Can Do It* (2008) and co-producer and co-host of a weekly ACT! for America television show.

PAMELA GELLER

Organizations: *President, American Freedom Defense Initiative (AFDI).*
She also runs pamelageller.com.

In Her Own Words

"Islam is not a race. This is an ideology. This is an extreme ideology, the most radical and extreme ideology on the face of the earth."

—On Fox Business' "Follow the Money," March 10, 2011

"No, no, they can't. ... I don't think that many westernized Muslims know when they pray five times a day that they're cursing Christians and Jews five times a day. ... I believe in the idea of a moderate Muslim. I do not believe in the idea of a moderate Islam. I think a moderate Muslim is a secular Muslim."

—Quoted in The New York Times, responding to a question as to whether devout practicing Muslims can be political moderates, Oct. 8, 2010

"In the war between the civilized man and the savage, you side with the civilized man. ... If you don't lay down and die for Islamic supremacism, then you're a racist anti-Muslim Islamophobic bigot. That's what we're really talking about."

—Quoted in The New York Times, Oct. 8, 2010

Summary

Geller has seized the role of the anti-Muslim movement's most visible and influential figurehead. Her strengths are panache and vivid rhetorical flourishes—not to mention stunts like posing for an anti-Muslim video in a bikini—but she also

can be coarse in her broad-brush denunciations of Islam. Geller does not pretend to be learned in Islamic studies, leaving the argumentative heavy lifting to her Stop Islamization of America (SIOA) partner Robert Spencer. She is prone to publicizing preposterous claims, such as that former President Barack Obama is the "love child" of Malcolm X, and she once suggested that U.S. Supreme Court appointee Elena Kagan, who is Jewish, supports Nazi ideology. Geller has mingled with European racists and fascists, spoken favorably of South African racists and defended accused Serbian war criminal Slobodan Milosevic. She is a self-avowed Zionist who is sharply critical of Jewish liberals. She co-produced with Spencer the film "The Ground Zero Mosque: Second Wave of the 9/11 Attacks," which was first screened at the 2011 Conservative Political Action Conference. She is co-author with Spencer of *The Post-American Presidency: The Obama Administration's War on America* (2010).

DAVID HOROWITZ

Organization: *Founder, The David Horowitz Freedom Center*

In His Own Words

"I spent 25 years in the American left, whose agendas are definitely to destroy this country. The American left wanted us to lose the Cold War with the Soviets and it wants us to lose the war on terror. So I don't make any apologies for that."

—On the "Riz Khan" show, Al-Jazeera, Aug. 21, 2008

"Some polls estimate that 10 percent of Muslims support Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida. An Al-Jazeera poll put the number at 50 percent. In other words, somewhere between 150 million and 750 million Muslims support a holy war against Christians, Jews, and other Muslims who don't happen to be true believers in the Quran according to bin Laden."

—In the Columbia Spectator, Oct. 15, 2007

"There are 150 Muslim Student Associations on American campuses. The Muslim Student

Associations were created by Hamas and funded by Saudi Arabia. ... [The associations] are Wahhabi Islamicists, and they basically support our enemies.”

—On Fox News’ “Neil Cavuto Show,”
Aug. 15, 2006

Summary

Horowitz, who spent his young years as a Marxist, has in recent years become a furious far-right antagonist of liberals and leftists. He also provides some funding support for various anti-Muslim ventures, including, the Jihad Watch website. Horowitz sees no philosophical gradations; if you’re not in total agreement with his view of Islam, you’re in favor of Muslim hegemony. He believes the Muslim Brotherhood and “Islamofascists” control most American Muslim organizations, especially Muslim student groups on college campuses. Horowitz’s center has organized “Islamofascism Awareness” weeks, which bring prominent anti-Muslim activists to college campuses. He is the author of several books, including *Unholy Alliance: Radical Islam and the American Left* (2004), which claims that American leftists support Islamic terrorists.

ROBERT SPENCER

Organization: *Runs the Jihad Watch website, a project of the David Horowitz Freedom Center. Co-founder with Pamela Geller (see above) of the American Freedom Defense Initiative.*

In His Own Words

“Osama [bin Laden]’s use of these and other [Quranic] passages in his messages is consistent ... with traditional understanding of the Quran. When modern-day Jews and Christians read their Bibles, they simply don’t interpret the passages cited as exhorting them to violent actions against unbelievers. This is due to the influence of centuries of interpretative traditions that have moved them away from literalism regarding these passages. But in Islam, there is no comparable interpretative tradition.”

—From *The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam (and the Crusades)*, 2005

“Where is moderate Islam? How can moderate Muslims refute the radical exegesis of the Quran and Sunnah? If an exposition of moderate Islam does not address or answer radical exegeses, is it really of any value to quash Islamic extremism? If the answer lies in a simple rejection of Quranic literalism, how can nonliteralists make that rejection stick, and keep their children from being recruited by jihadists by means of literalism? Of course, as I have pointed out many times, traditional Islam itself is not moderate or peaceful. It is the only major world religion with a developed doctrine and tradition of warfare against unbelievers.”

—*Jihad Watch*, Jan. 14, 2006

Summary

Spencer is entirely self-taught in the study of modern Islam and the Quran, though he has a master’s degree in religious studies from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Critics have accused him of doggedly taking the Quran literally—Spencer considers it innately extremist and violent—while ignoring its nonviolent passages and the vast interpretive tradition that has modified Quranic teachings over the centuries. Spencer believes that moderate Muslims exist, but to prove it, they’d have to fully denounce the portions of the Quran he finds objectionable. Spencer has been known to fraternize with European racists and neofascists, though he says such contacts were merely incidental. Benazir Bhutto, the late prime minister of Pakistan, accused Spencer of “falsely constructing a divide between Islam and the West” in her 2008 book, *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West*. Spencer, she wrote, presented a “skewed, one-sided, and inflammatory story that only helps to sow the seed of civilizational conflict.” Spencer co-produced with Geller the 2011 film “The Ground Zero Mosque: Second Wave of the 9/11 Attacks” and is the author of numerous books, including *The Truth About Muhammad: Founder of the World’s Most Intolerant Religion* (2007) and *The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam (and the Crusades)* (2005).

DAVID YERUSHALMI

Organizations: *Co-founder and senior counsel, American Freedom Law Center. General counsel for the Center for Security Policy, an anti-Muslim hate group.*

In His Own Words

“On the so-called Global War on Terrorism, GWOT, we have been quite clear along with a few other resolute souls. This should be a WAR AGAINST ISLAM and all Muslim faithful. ... At a practical level, this means that Shari’a and Islamic law are immediately outlawed. Any Muslim in America who adopts historical and traditional Shari’a will be subject to deportation. Mosques that adhere to Islamic law will be shut down permanently. No self-described or practicing Muslim, irrespective of his or her declarations to the contrary, will be allowed to immigrate to this country.”

—A 2007 commentary titled “War Manifesto—The War Against Islam,” as reported by *The American Muslim*

“The more carefully reviewed evidence, however, suggests that because **jihadism is in fact traditional Islam** modernized to war against the ideological threat posed by the West against Islam proper, **there is no way to keep faithful Muslims out of the war.** If this is true, any Muslim who sticks his neck out of the mosque to yell some obscenity at the West should be considered an enemy combatant and killed or captured and held for the duration of the war. If you kill enough of them consistently enough, those disinclined to fight in the first place will find a way to reform their religion.”

—Review of Mary Habeck’s book *Knowing the Enemy* on the *American Thinker* website, Sept. 9, 2006

Summary

Yerushalmi equates Shari’a with Islamic radicalism so totally that he advocates criminalizing virtually

any personal practice compliant with Shari’a law. In his view, only a Muslim who fully breaks with the customs of Shari’a can be considered socially tolerable. He waxes bloodthirsty when describing his preferred response to the supposed global threat of Shari’a law, speaking casually of killing and destroying. Ideally, he would outlaw Islam and deport Muslims and other “non-Western, non-Christian” people to protect the United States’ “national character.” An ultra-Orthodox Jew, he is deeply hostile toward liberal Jews. He derides U.S.-style democracy because it allows more than just an elite, privileged few to vote. His drafts of anti-Shari’a law statutes have spawned a wave of such bills in statehouses across the United States and have been signed into law in a handful of states. One such bill called for the imprisonment of anyone who advocates or adheres to Shari’a customs to serve up to 15 years in prison.

The SPLC’s website, splcenter.org, has many additional materials on the anti-Muslim movement as well as a comprehensive list of anti-Muslim hate groups (<https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/anti-muslim>). For those who would like to learn more about how to fight hate in their communities, including anti-Muslim bias, the SPLC produces the following guides:

Combating Anti-Muslim Bias
(<https://www.tolerance.org/magazine/spring-2011/combating-antimuslim-bias>)

Ten Ways to Fight Hate: A Community Response Guide
(<https://www.splcenter.org/20170814/ten-ways-fight-hate-community-response-guide>)

Speak Up: Responding to Everyday Bigotry
(<https://www.splcenter.org/20150125/speak-responding-everyday-bigotry>)

The Alt-Right on Campus: What Students Need to Know
(<https://www.splcenter.org/20170810/alt-right-campus-what-students-need-know>)

The Islamophobia and Israel Lobby Industries: Overlapping Interconnection and Anti-Racist Policy Recommendations⁴

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Paper Abstract

This policy paper reflects on the structural character and history of Islamophobia arguing that the Islamophobia industry corresponds to and overlaps

Islamophobia must be seen as an institutionalized, structural, and systemic war on Muslim people and anyone who is seen as associated with Islam, Muslimness, and Muslim issues. As such it constitutes a systemic form of racism and racial discrimination.

with a powerful Israel lobby industry, a network of Zionist⁵ groups that is well-funded and politically well-connected.⁶ The goal of this Islamophobia/Israel lobby industry is to utilize racism and fear-mongering, relying on their powerful funders and political connections to silence, intimidate, and

bully scholars, educators, and advocates for justice in/for Palestine in McCarthyist-style attacks against dissenting voices.

Drawing on my scholarship in Arab, Muslim, and Palestine studies and critical race theory and my lived experience as director and senior scholar of the Arab and Muslim Ethnicities and Diasporas Studies program at San Francisco State University,⁷ I offer here an anatomy of this industry, its connections and funding, as well as its goals. I do so to illustrate that this Israel lobby industry is not a grass-roots movement but rather a well-planned, well-connected, and powerful force that intentionally utilizes multiple forms in its racist and xenophobic arsenal to weaponize attacks against Muslims and Arabs, including Palestinians. I then focus on the Islamophobic, anti-Arab, and anti-Palestinian framing that grounds this industry and highlight in particular the gendered and sexualized Orientalist imagery enlisted by this industry to promote its agenda. Based on my examination of this overlapping Islamophobic/Israel lobby industry, I make some recommendations to combat

4 I am grateful to Dr. Houda Abadi, Nancy Azar, Annie Sharif, Anthony Byrd, and rest of the Carter Center team for facilitating my participation in the Islamophobia conference. I also wish to thank Jaime Veve, Salim Shehadeh, and two blind reviewers for their valuable feedback.

5 My use of the term Zionist and Zionism should not be misunderstood as a code word for Jews, Jewishness, or Judaism. I am referring to the political ideology that was launched at the end of the 19th century to create Israel as a Jewish state in Palestine. Zionists then do not have to be Jewish. Indeed, Christians United for Israel, for example, supports Israel as an exclusive Jewish state and justifies its colonial rule, occupation, and racism against the Palestinian. Such policies were evident in the recent Israeli army deployment of 100 snipers across the Gaza blockaded borders. These Israeli snipers killed 20 and injured over 1,400 Palestinians, mostly refugees, who were protesting peacefully and demanding their right of returns.

6 International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network (IJAN), The Business of

Backlash: The Attack on the Palestinian Movement and Other Movements for Justice, March 2015, <http://www.ijan.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/IJAN-Business-of-Backlash-full-report-web.pdf>. Hereafter: The Business of Backlash.

7 The Arab and Muslim Ethnicities and Diasporas (AMED) Studies, the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS), student and faculty advocates for justice in/for Palestine, and I have been a recurrent target of the Israel lobby industry. This included sanctioning GUPS in 2002; placing a moratorium on the Palestinian mural in 2006; canceling searches for our faculty positions in 2009 after Palestinian students hosted an event that discussed BDS; accusations of terrorist links, anti-Semitism, and misuse of university funds in 2014; a petition campaign against a cooperation agreement I initiated between SFSU and An-Najah National University, a leading Palestinian university; four wanted-style posters accusing me and other students and faculty of terrorism and "Jew Hatred"; a lawsuit; and continuous harassment and bullying campaigns.

structural fear-mongering, including Islamophobia, anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian racism and all forms of racism, and racial discrimination.

Islamophobia: Structural, Historical, and Systemic

Before I discuss the Israel lobby industry and its intimate relation to the Islamophobia industry, let me offer a conceptual framework for understanding Islamophobia, the phenomenon under consideration. Islamophobia is not a random, incoherent, accidental, or ahistorical set of incidents that anti-racist advocates conspiratorially stitch together under one rubric out of paranoia or in order to center Muslim concerns above and beyond other urgent and pressing issues. Rather, Islamophobia must be seen as an institutionalized, structural, and systemic war on Muslim people and anyone who is seen as associated with Islam, Muslimness, and Muslim issues. As such it constitutes a systemic form of racism and racial discrimination.

Indeed, framing Islamophobia as part and parcel of structured racism and racial discrimination eliminates the misperception that combating Islamophobia, anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian racism belongs to the basket of special-interest issues that only concerns Arabs and/or Muslims. This would be as absurd as suggesting that racism is the property of black people, anti-Semitism is the sole concern of Jewish people, or that only women need to worry about sexism and sexual harassment.

Islamophobia is also not a new phenomenon; its historical roots can be traced to the European Crusades in the 11th to the 13th centuries (1095-1291) and the expulsion of Muslim Arabs and Africans from Andalucía in the late 15th century, where 1492 becomes an important historical marker.⁸ This period witnessed two other related developments that continue to impact the world today—the inquisition against Andalusian Sephardic Jews and the beginning of the settler-colonial project in the Western Hemisphere. The settler-colonial project in the Americas

must be seen as integral to and an extension and development of the institutionalization of the Islamophobic European state-building projects.

Islamophobia is rooted in and integral to European colonial and settler colonial projects. Thus, the emergence and development of white supremacy, particularly (but not exclusively) in North America, are institutionally struc-

The intent of the Islamophobia/Israel lobby industry is to create an immutable impression of Arab and Muslim (including Palestinian) societies that are static, forever stuck in social and cultural fixity and are therefore an exception to other societies that are assumed to be dynamic and constantly undergoing social change.

tured and ideologically drawn from the cynical interpretation of the Bible to justify the genocide of indigenous nations, the kidnapping and enslavement of African people, and the colonization of Africa and Asia. By the same token, attributing the creation of the state of Israel, as an exclusivist Jewish state that is built at the expense of the Palestinian people, to a God-given command is an equally cynical claim that erases the just demands of the Palestinian people to self-determination while undermining the historical and contemporary struggle against anti-Semitism.

Islamophobia is also conceptually rooted in the paradigm of Orientalism⁹ that constructs an East/West binary in which the “West” defines the “East” as the opposite of and inferior to its self-perception. Assuming binaries of “savagery” versus “civilization,” “modernity” versus “medievalness,” “backwardness” or “prehistoric,” the discourse of the “clash of civilizations”¹⁰ is deliberately invoked by Islamophobes to be subconsciously consumed by the public at large and internalized by colonial subjects who reproduce demeaning and humiliating

8 See Ramón Grosfoguel and Eric Mielats, “The Long-Durée Entanglement between Islamophobia and Racism in the Modern/ Colonial/ Capitalist/ Patriarchal World-System,” *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge* 5, no. 1 (2006): 1-12; Junaid Rana, “The Story of Islamophobia,” *Souls - a Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and*

Society 9 no. 2 (2007): 148-161.

9 Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1978).

10 See Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of the Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (Touchstone, 1996).

perceptions of their communities.

Orientalism can be seen in the ways in which the Islamophobia/Israel lobby industry utilizes racist and colonialist constructs of gender and sexual dynamics to present Muslim and Arab (including Palestinian) men as sexist, misogynist, and bloodthirsty terrorists. By contrast, Arab and Muslim (and Palestinian) women are dichotomously constructed as oppressed, docile, illiterate, and unaware of their surroundings, needs, and rights.¹¹

The intent of the Islamophobia/Israel lobby industry is to create an immutable impression of Arab and Muslim (including Palestinian) societies that are static, forever stuck in social and cultural fixity, and are therefore an exception to other societies that are assumed to be dynamic and

By 2015, \$300 million were invested in propaganda, surveillance, and lawfare directly aimed at silencing Palestinian scholarship, pedagogy, and advocacy.

constantly undergoing social change.¹² According to this framing, Arab and Muslim societies are not only seen as being inherently and exceptionally incapable of changing from within but they are further defined as risking to never undergo social change if left to their own devices. Arab and Muslim (including Palestinian) societies are therefore perceived as permanently locked into a status of the “minor” that requires custodian guardianship from Western powers to grow and develop. Such construction produces only one reasonable and logical conclusion out of this predicament, namely the need to rescue gendered- and sexually oppressed (Arab, Muslim, and Palestinian) subjects from their own communities by agents of the more liberated, mobile, enlightened, and civilized West.¹³

Based on this analytical framework, demystifying the workings of racism, Orientalism, and

colonialism becomes neither a political nor an intellectual luxury. It assumes timely relevance and urgency. Combating hate, fear-mongering, and structural racism necessitates understanding the overlapping connection and interdependence between Islamophobia and the Israel lobby industry.

Islamophobia/Israel Lobby Industry: Anatomy, Connections, Funding, and Goals

To understand how the Islamophobia and Israel lobby industries overlap and feed into each other, this section sheds light on the anatomy, connections, funding, and goals of the Israel lobby industry.

In its report on *The Business of Backlash: The Attack on the Palestinian Movement and Other Movements for Justice* (2015), the International Jewish anti-Zionist Network (IJAN) exposes the composition, workings, connections, and funding of the Israel lobby industry. *The Business of Backlash* (from now on *IJAN Report*) stresses that “elites have intentionally obscured and even hidden much of this information from public scrutiny.”¹⁴ As a result, the *IJAN Report* uses multiple sources and relies heavily on “over 10,000 pages of publicly available tax returns (1990s), online journals, and searchable databases, such as Sourcewatch, Citizen’s Audit, Conservative Transparency, Guide Star, and the Foundation Directory.”¹⁵

The *IJAN Report* shows that by 2015, \$300 million were invested in propaganda, surveillance, and lawfare directly aimed at silencing Palestinian scholarship, pedagogy, and advocacy. The funding came from 11 major donors, including right-wing multibillionaires such as the Koch brothers, Sheldon Adelson, the Bradley Foundation, and Koret Foundation. The industry is also supported by Democratic Party megadonor Israeli financier Haim Saban, who poured \$7 million into the campaign of Hillary Clinton for president. In

11 Rabab Abdulhadi, Evelyn Alsultany, and Nadine Naber, “Introduction,” *Arab and Arab American Feminisms: Gender, Violence and Belonging* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2011): xix-xxxix.

12 Rabab Abdulhadi, “Tread Lightly: Teaching Gender and Sexuality in the Time of War,” *Journal of Women’s History*, Vol. 17 No. 4 (2005): 154-158.

13 Lila Abu-Lughod, *Do Muslim Women Need Saving?* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).

14 *The Business of Backlash*, 4.

15 *Ibid.*

return, Clinton pledged to “to make countering BDS a priority.”¹⁶ The *IJAN Report* also lists seven major intermediaries that parcel out the funds. The funders and the groups they fund employ Islamophobic rhetoric and anti-Palestinian hostility to promote their agenda. The *IJAN Report* lists 32 Islamophobia/Israel lobby industry groups and publications, the majority of which have been at the forefront of attacking Palestinian scholarship in general, and at San Francisco State University in particular.

The intimate links between Islamophobia and anti-Palestinian racism have become more evident recently. For example, Nina Rosenwald, daughter of and heir to William Rosenwald of Sears, Roebuck and Co., founded the Gatestone Institute. Rosenwald financed the Islamophobic right-wing German politician Björn Höcke of the AFD; U.S. leading Islamophobes Robert Spencer, Frank Gaffney, and David Horowitz; as well as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the main registered Israel lobby group. The board of Gatestone Institute is chaired by Alan Dershowitz and includes Rebecca Mercer and Raheem Kassam, an editor of Breitbart News.

The Jewish newspaper *The Forward* reported on April 6, 2018, that U.S. Jewish leader Ronald Lauder, president of the World Jewish Congress, gave \$1.1 million to Secure America Now, a covert group pushing anti-Muslim campaigns.¹⁷ In so doing, Lauder joins Robert Mercer, who gave \$2 million to the group. Mercer is the hedge fund investor whose family has bankrolled Breitbart News and the data company Cambridge Analytica, which has been accused of improperly using Facebook data to sway prospective voters.¹⁸

This structure of the industry also makes clear the overlapping network of Islamophobia and Israel lobby industries. This network is made up of a small number of individuals who sit on each other's boards and rotate positions. For example, Daniel Pipes, named as a leading Islamophobe by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), sat on the board of Scholars of Middle East Peace. The co-founders of AMCHA also served on that board.¹⁹ Pipes was connected to the Clarion Project, on whose board Frank Gaffney served. Pipes acted as an intermediary, parsing out funding while receiving funds from eight of the 11 major donors cited by the *IJAN Report*.²⁰ While the Islamophobia and Israel lobby industries cannot be classified as a grass-roots movement, the resources placed at these industries' disposal make their impact quite devastating in their campaigns to destroy careers and create a chilling effect among academics and campus advocates. In addition to their funding, the Islamophobia and Israel lobby industries are well-connected politically to the highest echelons of the U.S. government. For example, Sheldon Adelson is a major donor to the Israel lobby industry to the tune of \$50 million²¹ and was the largest individual donor to the Donald Trump presidential campaign to the tune of \$100 million.²² During the 2017 presidential inauguration, Adelson sat a few feet away from Donald Trump.²³ Trump has appointed several supporters of Israeli settlements and right-wing government to his administration, including his son-in-law, Jared Kushner; the U.S. ambassador to Israel, David Friedman; and his special representative to the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, Jason Greenblatt.²⁴

16 Rania Khalek, “Leaked emails show donors drive Hillary Clinton's pro-Israel positions,” *The Electronic Intifada*, October 13, 2016, <https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/rania-khalek/leaked-emails-show-donors-drive-hillary-clintons-pro-israel-positions>. BDS is the international campaign for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions of Israel launched in 2005 by over 170 Palestinian civil society organizations to pressure Israel to abide by international law and end its colonial rule over Palestinian lands and its violations of Palestinian rights.

17 Aiden Pink, “U.S. Jewish Leader Ronald Lauder Gave \$1.1 Million to Covert Group Pushing anti-Muslim campaign,” *The Forward*, April 6, 2018, <https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/ronald-lauder-gave-1-1-million-to-group-pushing-anti-muslim-campaign-1.5977658>.

18 “Cambridge Analytica, Trump and 50 Million Facebook Accounts: What You Need to Know,” *Haaretz*, March 20, 2018, <https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/cambridge-analytica-trump-and-facebook-what-you-need-to-know-1.5918231>.

19 *Ibid.*, 9.

20 *Ibid.*, 8.

21 Jewish Telegraph Agency, “Adelson raises \$20 million to fight Israel boycotts,” *The Times of Israel*, June 10, 2015, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/adelson-raises-20-million-to-fight-israel-boycotts/>; Nathan Guttman, “Secret Sheldon Adelson Summit Raises Up to \$50M for Strident Anti-BDS Push,” *Forward*, June 9, 2015, <https://forward.com/news/israel/309676/secret-sheldon-adelson-summit-raises-up-to-50m-for-strident-anti-bds-push/>.

22 TOI Staff, JTA and AP, “Adelson set to give over \$100 million to Israel-supporting Trump,” *The Times of Israel*, May 14, 2016, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/adelson-set-to-give-over-100-million-to-israel-supporting-trump/>.

23 Michael Brown, “Settler leaders find warm welcome in Trump's Washington,” *The Electronic Intifada*, January 24, 2017, <https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/michael-f-brown/settler-leaders-find-warm-welcome-trumps-washington>.

24 Loveday Morris, “U.S. ambassador breaks with policy: ‘I think the settlements are part of Israel,’” *The Washington Post*, September 29, 2017,

The backlash attack seeks to quash the growing grass-roots support for justice in/for Palestine by intimidating, smearing, and bullying scholars and students alike. Poll after poll has shown that U.S. public opinion is shifting from a business-as-usual stand on Israel to joining the rest of the world community in favor of Palestinian rights.²⁵ This was recently exemplified by the almost unanimous negative reaction to Trump's announcement in support of Israel's annexation of Jerusalem.

The negative reaction to Trump's Jerusalem decision has been the latest sign of erosion of support for Israel. Israel built on its security,

blows to Israel's public relations image, especially since its assaults on Gaza in 2008-2009.²⁶ The Israeli raid on the Turkish ship, Mavi Marmara, that was carrying medicine and food to the blockaded Gaza Strip in 2010 and the killing of nine Turkish citizens, one of whom was also a U.S. citizen, increased Israel's PR problem and contributed to broader support for the call of the Palestinian civil society for boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) against Israel. The Reut Institute, an Israeli think tank, came up with several recommendations, including a campaign to isolate and smear those whom they called catalysts, such as leading Palestinian scholars, and attack the hubs of activism such as New York and San Francisco.²⁷

More strikingly, polls with U.S. students and youth have shown a larger percentage of opposition to Israel's policies. Young Jews in particular are increasingly refusing to let Israel speak in their name or represent them.²⁸ These developments support my argument that neither Israel nor Zionism owns Jewishness,²⁹ and challenges the claim that Zionism and Israel enjoy a consensus of support among Jews. There are ample cases in Jewish history of organized opposition to Israel and its policies, including Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP), the IJAN, and If Not Now, as more recent examples, along with historical anti-Zionist groups, such as Jews Against the Israeli Massacre in

The use of law as a weapon, weaponizing law, is a tactic that the Islamophobia/Israel lobby industries have increasingly used, from suing of the American Muslims for Palestine to the American Studies Association and U.S. trade unions, such as the United Electrical Workers and UAW, Local 2865.

military, and political collusion with the U.S., especially in the post 9/11/2001 environment. However, the escalating Israeli violence against Palestinians under its colonial rule has dealt heavy

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/09/29/u-s-ambassador-breaks-with-policy-i-think-the-settlements-are-part-of-israel/?utm_term=.ce8a66f12c16; Josefin Dolsten, "Meet the Jews in the Trump Administration," *The Times of Israel*, January 28, 2017, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/meet-the-jews-in-the-trump-administration/>.

25 The Pew Research Center on U.S. Politics and Policy found (January 23, 2018) found that support for Israel has dropped from 45% in 1978 to 38% today, Pew Research Center, "Democrats about as likely to sympathize with Palestinians as with Israel," January 22, 2018, http://www.people-press.org/2018/01/23/republicans-and-democrats-grow-even-further-apart-in-views-of-israel-palestinians/012318_2/. The poll also found a wide divide between Republicans and Democrats where close to 79% of Republicans supported Israel compared with only 27% among Democrats. The gap becomes much wider among the youth. While 56% of US citizens ages 65 years and older sympathize with Israel and only 13% with Palestinians, the rate drops to 32% in favor of Israel and 23% support for Palestine among the 18 to 29 age group, according to analysis of the same Pew poll in the American Conservative, Daniel Larison, "U.S. Public Opinion on Israel and Palestine," *The American Conservative*, January 24, 2018, <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/u-s-public-opinion-on-israel-and-palestine/>. In an article in Huffington Post, James Zogby argued that in 2009 71% of Americans had a favorable view of Israelis with only 21% rating them unfavorably. In 2010 the favorable/unfavorable ratings have shifted to 65%-29%. This is largely due to a significant drop among Democrats who now hold a 42% favorable, 49% unfavorable view of Israelis. The Israeli prime minister's rating among Democrats is an even worse

20% to 63%. James Zogby, "New Poll on American Attitudes Toward the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Huffpost, accessed April 10, 2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-zogby/new-poll-on-american-atti_b_515835.html. In their Brookings Institution survey in October and November of 2016, Shibley Talhami and Rachel Statterly observe increasing erosion of U.S. support for Israel, including an almost 60% support among Democrats for the imposition of sanctions on Israel for its settlements. Shibley Talhami, "American attitudes on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict," Brookings, December 2, 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/american-attitudes-on-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict/>.

26 JPost.com Staff, "Poll: Israel Viewed Negatively Around the World," *The Jerusalem Post*, May 17, 2012, <http://www.jpost.com/National-News/Poll-Israel-viewed-negatively-around-the-world>.

27 Building a Political Firewall Against Israel's Delegitimization: Conceptual Framework, The Reut Institute, March 2010, <http://reut-institute.org/data/uploads/PDFVer/20100310%20Delegitimacy%20Eng.pdf>.

28 Judy Maltz, "Young American Jews Increasingly Turning Away From Israel, Jewish Agency Leader Warns," *Haaretz*, January 22, 2018, <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/premium-jewish-agency-chief-warns-young-u-s-jews-more-turned-off-to-israel-1.5751616>.

29 See my talk at the annual conference of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs http://israellobbyandamericanpolicy.org/transcripts/Rabab_Abdulhadi.html and my statement criticizing SFSU President Leslie Wong's welcome of Zionists to our campus <https://www.facebook.com/rabab.abdulhadi/posts/10155388256458123>.

Lebanon (JAMIL), American Jewish Alternatives to Zionism (AJAZ) founded by Rabbi Elmer Berger with the help of Neiman Marcus, the anti-Zionist Bund during the October Revolution, Eisenstein and Hannah Arendt, and several Holocaust survivors such as Israel Shahak, Felicia Langer, Hajo Mayor, and Hedy Epstein, to name a few.³⁰

The Israel lobby industry, however, employs a variety of tactics to undermine the rising support of the U.S. public for Palestinian rights. The cynical use of anti-Semitism is intended to smear, isolate, destroy careers, and make individual scholars personae non grata. For example, Truth Revolt, a website created by Ben Shapiro and David Horowitz, demanded that San Francisco State University fire me,³¹ while AMCHA Initiative persisted in its smear campaign, despite established and critical Jewish opposition to such false allegations.³² Drawing on the “war on terror,” accusing targeted scholars of terrorism, and inflecting such attacks with Islamophobia are staples of these campaigns. Character assassination and accusations of criminality are both an old and new tactic. Islamophobia and Israel lobby industry groups have also combined the criminalization of Palestinian advocacy in the U.S. with the criminalization of Palestinian education in Palestine.³³

The assault on Palestinian scholarship, pedagogy, and advocacy is neither new nor exceptional. As I’ve discussed above, they are part and parcel of the general patterns of history and integral to the current campaigns of repression against voices of dissent in the U.S. academy in general. Twentieth

and 21st century history is replete with examples of repression against dissenting voices and the construction of an enemy within.

The McCarthyist campaign against Palestinian scholarship and advocacy is intended to send a chilling message to silence dissenting voices in the academy who research, teach about, and advocate social justice.³⁴ It is not an accident that the leaders and organizations in the Islamophobia/Israel lobby industry are also advocates of right-wing, white supremacist, and intimidation and silencing tactics. For example, David Horowitz, named as a leading Islamophobe and anti-black racist by the Southern Poverty Law Center,³⁵ was simultaneously targeting Palestinian scholarship and advocacy and attacking the Sanctuary movement and promoting Milo Yiannopoulos, an anti-immigrant right-wing agitator. Horowitz partnered with the Canary Mission under the sensational banner, “JewHatred,” plastering university campuses with *wanted-style* posters to incite violence, smear as anti-Semitic the reputation of Palestinian scholars and advocacy, and calling on their universities to fire them.³⁶ Horowitz and Ben Shapiro, a rising star in right-wing circles, co-founded Truth Revolt, which called on SFSU to fire me.³⁷

The white supremacist and anti-Muslim bashing connections in the Islamophobia and Israel lobby industries are further illustrated in the statements by Richard Spencer, who called himself a “white Zionist” during his interview with Israel TV,³⁸ and the websites of Jihad Watch; Atlas Shrugs; and

30 Please see my articles, Rabab Ibrahim Abdulhadi, “The spirit of ‘68 lives on! Palestine advocacy and the indivisibility of justice,” Mondoweiss, July 14, 2017, <http://mondoweiss.net/2017/07/palestine-advocacy-indivisibility/>, and “The spirit of ‘68 lives on: Zionism as racism, and the network of lies,” Mondoweiss, July 21, 2017, <http://mondoweiss.net/2017/07/spirit-zionism-network/>.

31 Daniel Mael, “SFSU Professor Met with Terrorists Tied to American Death on Taxpayers’ Dime,” Truth Revolt, May 27, 2014, <https://www.truthrevolt.org/news/sfsu-professors-met-terrorists-tied-american-deaths-taxpayers-dime>.

32 “Jewish Community Letter in Support of Prof. Rabab Abdulhadi,” International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network, July 1, 2014, <http://www.ijan.org/uncategorized/jewish-community-letter-in-support-of-prof-rabab-abdulhadi/>.

33 Stop the Jew Hatred on Campus, “The Top Ten Schools Supporting Terrorists: Fall 2016 Report,” Horowitz Freedom Center, October 5, 2016, <http://www.stopthejewhatredoncampus.org/news/top-ten-schools-supporting-terrorists-fall-2016-report>; Stop the Jew Hatred on Campus, “Posters Targeting Hamas and BDS Supporters,” Horowitz Freedom Center, October 3, 2016, <http://www.stopthejewhatredoncampus.org/news/images-freedom-center-posters-targeting-hamas-and-bds-supporters-fall-2016>.

34 Rabab Abdulhadi, interviewed by the Editors, “Resisting the New McCarthyism: Rabab Abdulhadi discusses AMCHA’s smear campaign, Palestinian Resistance, and the U.S. Solidarity Movement,” Solidarity, July 21, 2014, <http://www.solidarity-us.org/site/node/4220>.

35 “David Horowitz,” Southern Poverty Law Center, accessed December 1, 2017, <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/david-horowitz>.

36 Ibid. See also, “Pam Geller,” Southern Poverty Law Center, accessed December 1, 2017, <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/pamela-geller>; “Robert Spencer,” Southern Poverty Law Center, accessed December 1, 2017, <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/robert-spencer>.

37 Daniel Mael, “SFSU Professor Met with Terrorists Tied to American Death on Taxpayers’ Dime,” Truth Revolt, May 27, 2014, <https://www.truthrevolt.org/news/sfsu-professors-met-terrorists-tied-american-deaths-taxpayers-dime>.

38 Callum Paton, “Richard Spencer Demands Respect on Israeli TV, Says Jews are ‘Overrepresented’ Newsweek, August 8, 2017, <http://www.newsweek.com/richard-spencer-demands-respect-israeli-tv-says-jews-are-overrepresented-651739>.

Campus Watch/Middle East Forum, to name a few. For example, Jihad Watch regularly features attacks against Palestinian scholars and scholarship on Palestine. The media outlets such as the American Thinker, Algemeiner, Washington Examiner, Tablet, and Frontpage copy and paste the same items, creating widespread and consistent social media noise pollution aimed at character assassination, irrespective of the falsehood and inaccuracy of the allegations.

This industry utilizes racism and fear mongering in McCarthyist-style campaigns against dissenting voices to destroy the careers of scholars, educators, and advocates for justice in/for Palestine.

The use of law as a weapon, weaponizing law, is a tactic that the Islamophobia/Israel lobby industries have increasingly used, from suing of the American Muslims for Palestine to the American Studies Association and U.S. trade unions, such as the United Electrical Workers and UAW, Local 2865. Calling itself the legal arm of the pro-Israel community, The Lawfare Project is suing multiple targets, including several administrators and staff of San Francisco State University and me. Its executive director, Brooke Goldstein, who denies the existence of Islamophobia, declared that “the goal is to make the enemy pay.”³⁹ On Nov. 8, 2017, U.S. District Judge William H. Orrick dismissed the lawsuit and issued his ruling on March 9, 2018. Unsatisfied with the failure of its bogus and frivolous lawsuits, the Lawfare Project, aided by the resources of the Israeli government, major Zionist and Islamophobic donors, and the pro bono resources of a mega law firm with hundreds of

lawyers, Lawfare filed a new lawsuit on March 29, 2018.

At the Intersection of Islamophobia and Israel Lobby: Gender, Sexuality, and Orientalism

In its McCarthyist attacks, the Israel lobby industry employs colonialist, racist, and Islamophobic discourses. The constant reference to “civility” draws on colonial discourses, invoking fear mongering and the “war on terror” that permeates U.S. media and public space and that imagines Muslims and Arabs (including Palestinians) as bombs waiting to go off and constructs a binary of Good Muslims and Bad Muslims.⁴⁰ Echoing Pam Geller’s ads on public transportation vehicles in New York, San Francisco, Washington, and Boston, for example, the attacks invoke Orientalist tropes and colonial discourses of civility to portray Arabs and Muslims as exceptionally homophobic, misogynistic, and bloodthirsty terrorists.⁴¹ Direct or implicit references to homophobia and misogyny underlie and accentuate such discourses.

In 2016, Campus Watch/Middle East Forum employed similar tropes in its campaign seeking to pressure SFSU President Leslie Wong to break the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between SFSU and An-Najah National University in Palestine, the only agreement SFSU has with any Arab or Muslim academic site. The recent Campus Watch/Middle East Forum built on earlier campaigns launched by other groups in the Israel lobby industry to label An-Najah a “terrorist” university. The earlier attack was led by some of the main groups that continue to spearhead those attacks, such as AMCHA Initiative, StandWithUs, the Zionist Organization of America, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, and Scholars for Peace in the Middle East. It sought to criminalize Palestinian scholarship in the U.S. and discredit Palestinian academic institutions in Palestine. Both the 2014

39 Charlotte Silver, “Senate approves bill seen as threat to campus criticism of Israel,” The Electronic Intifada, December 4, 2016, <https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/charlotte-silver/senate-approves-bill-seen-threat-campus-criticism-israel-0>.

40 Mahmood Mamdani, “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism,” *American Anthropologist* 104, no. 3 (2002): 766-775.

41 Hatewatch staff, “Can’t We Talk About This? More anti-Muslim

propaganda from Pamela Geller,” Southern Poverty Law Center, October 2, 2017, <https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/10/02/can%E2%80%99t-we-talk-about-more-anti-muslim-propaganda-pamela-geller>.

42 “AMCHA and Jewish Organizations Write President Wong about Professor Abdulhadi and SFSU Faculty Event Condoning Terrorism,” AMCHA Initiative, Scholars for Peace in the Middle East, Simon Wiesenthal Center Campus Outreach, Zionist Organization of America, March 26, 2014, <http://www.amchainitiative.org/amcha-and-jewish-organizations-write->

and the 2016 smear campaigns quoted the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) smearing of Palestinian universities.⁴²

In its attack, Campus Watch only shows images of all male Hamas fighters and *all male* An-Najah university students. Such imagery seeks to leave the false impression that all Palestinian university students are male. In reality, anyone familiar with Palestinian education data would be aware that Palestinian women make up more than 50 percent of college campuses.⁴³ The intent of Campus Watch is to reinforce the gendered image of Palestinians as terrorist men and Palestinian women as absent from public roles and space.

The American Freedom Defense Initiative (AFDI), created by Pam Geller and Robert Spencer and one of the recipients of the elite Islamophobic and Israel lobby funding the *IJAN Report* refers to, similarly framed its ads in public transportation systems in San Francisco, along with other public transportation systems. Barred from entering the U.K. because of her rabid Islamophobia, Geller has also founded the website Atlas Shrugs, which draws on and celebrates the work of the right-wing theorist Ayn Rand. Geller's ads that equate Israel with civilization and Palestinians with savagery were intended to enlist the U.S. public's image of Arab, Muslim, and Palestinian communities as exceptionally homophobic and misogynist in the service of an Islamophobic and racist Israeli apologist agenda.

This also resonates with U.S. and Israeli developments regarding Arab, Muslim, and Palestinian gender and sexual dynamics. A plethora of examples exist, but a couple would suffice to drive the point home. The first concerns the disappearance and the burning alive of Palestinian teenager

Mohammad Abu Khdeir.⁴⁴ Initial Israeli police reports suggested that Abu Khdeir was killed by his own family. Presenting Abu Khdeir as the victim of a homophobic "honor crime," the Israeli police reports sought to deflect accountability away from

First, treat Islamophobia and anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian discrimination as we treat all forms of racism and racial discrimination — as structural, systemic, and licensed by official and dominant discourses and policies.

the Israeli government and individual Israeli perpetrators — who kidnapped Abu Khdeir in front of his house in Shu'fat, a suburb of Jerusalem, on July 2, 2014, poured kerosene down his throat, and set him on fire to burn alive in a nearby forest.⁴⁵

Likewise, the coverage, including that of the *New York Times*, the main U.S. paper of record, of the execution-style murder of three Arab Muslim youths — Deah Barakat, a Syrian, and two Palestinian women, Yusor Abu Salha and Razan Abu Salha — in Chapel Hill, N.C., in February 2015, presented the killer, Craig Stephen Hicks, as a forward-thinking man who supported abortion rights and as an advocate of gay and women's liberation. The implicit subtext was that of a renaissance man who could not be perceived as a white supremacist killer.⁴⁶ Combined with the news reporting that the killing was a result of a parking dispute, the media message directs readers toward empathy with Hicks and away from seeing him as an Islamophobic killer or from

wong-about-abdulahdi-event-condoning-terrorism/; and "AMCHA and Five Organizations Write President Wong/Board of Trustees about Faculty Event to Promote Antisemitic Boycott of Israel," AMCHA Initiative, Scholars for Peace in the Middle East, Simon Wiesenthal Center, Stand With Us, Zionist Organization of America West, March 5, 2014, <http://www.amchainitiative.org/amcha-and-five-organizations-write-wong-about-faculty-event-to-promote-antisemitic-boycott-of-israel/>.

43 According to Birzeit University's latest statistics, women make up 62.4% of the student body. "Facts and Figures: 2017-2018," Birzeit University, accessed April 10, 2018, <http://www.birzeit.edu/en/about/facts>.

44 Gregg Carlstrom, "Autopsy shows Palestinian teen 'burned alive,'" Al-Jazeera, July 5, 2014, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/autopsy-shows-palestinian-teen-burned-alive-20147512213466184.html>. On July 2, 2014, Palestinian teenager Mohammad Abu Khdeir was kidnapped in the early morning hours as he was going to a nearby mosque to pray. One adult and two minor Israelis

forced him into a car, took him to a nearby forest set up on the destroyed land of the Palestinian village of Dir Yassin, forced him to drink kerosene, and set him on fire.

45 Sigal Samuel, "The Pinkwashing of Mohammed Abu Khdeir," Forward, July 7, 2014, <https://forward.com/opinion/israel/201531/the-pinkwashing-of-mohammed-abu-khdeir/>; Shaked Spier, "After Abu Khdeir murder, an ugly collision of homophobia and racism," 972 Magazine, July 27, 2014, <https://972mag.com/after-abu-khdeir-murder-an-ugly-collision-of-homophobia-and-racism/94465/>.

46 Jonathan Katz and Richard Pérez-Peña, "In Chapel Hill Shooting of 3 Muslims, a Question of Motive," The New York Times, February 11, 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/12/us/muslim-student-shootings-north-carolina.html>; Rana Sweis, "Jordanians See U.S. Reporting Bias in Coverage of Student Killings," The New York Times, February 13, 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/14/world/middleeast/online-commenters-see-reporting-bias-in-killing-of-3-muslims.html>.

understanding Islamophobia as a structural societal context that allows such crimes to occur.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that the Islamophobia industry and the Israel lobby industry correspond to and overlap with each other. I have also demonstrated that the Israel apologist groups constitute a powerful network that is well-funded and politically well-connected. This industry utilizes racism and fear mongering in McCarthyist-style campaigns against dissenting voices to destroy the careers of scholars, educators, and advocates for justice in/for Palestine.

I've argued that the targeting of Palestine is neither exceptional in the history of repression in the U.S., nor is it divorced from the racist and xenophobic rhetoric propagated today by white supremacists, neo-Nazis, and other racist groups that are emboldened and encouraged by the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Finally, I illustrated the Islamophobic, anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian framing that grounds this industry and highlighted the gendered and sexualized Orientalist imagery this industry enlists in its agenda.

Recommendations

As a recurrent target of the Islamophobic Israel lobby industry that seeks to dismantle the academic program I have built, destroy the international collaboration it has with a premier Palestinian university, and erase the legacy of social justice of San Francisco State University, my recommendations to combat structural fear mongering—including Islamophobia, anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian racism, and all forms of racism and racial discrimination—are the following:

- Treat Islamophobia and anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian discrimination as we treat all forms of racism and racial discrimination—as structural, systemic, and licensed by official and dominant discourses and policies
- Reject attempts to construct Islamophobia and anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian racism as either exceptional or special interest issues but confront them with the same seriousness that we confront white supremacy, racism, and anti-Semitism
- Reject the cynical use of anti-Semitism to equate criticism of Israel and advocacy for Palestinian rights as anti-Semitism and disentangle the erroneous equation that assumes that Israel, Jewishness, and Zionism are one and the same
- Reject all old and new McCarthyism that seeks to silence, intimidate, and bully those who speak up for justice in Palestine and anywhere else
- Insist that justice for/in Palestine is part and parcel of the indivisibility of justice
- Demand open and transparent accountability and demystify the opaqueness of the Islamophobia and Israel lobby industries
- Audit the nonprofit status of groups that utilize tax shelters to hide their financing of foundations, religious institutions, and Islamophobic and racist groups
- Support the building of institutions of knowledge production that place justice at the center of their project
- Support scholars under attack and protect universities as sites of learning and critical thinking, challenging the intimidation and dependence on private funding that make institutions of higher education accountable to private corporations instead of public funding
- Encourage, support, and fund academic exchanges between U.S. and international institutions of higher learning, especially in Arab, Muslim, and Palestinian communities

The Making of Contemporary Identity-Based Islamophobia

Saïd Bouamama

IFAR: Intervention, Formation, Action, Recherche

Far from being an irrational fear of Islam and Muslims, Islamophobia is a contemporary form of racism. Racist social relations have gone through historical mutations, allowing them to adapt to changes in contexts and power relations. Racism appeared as an ideological accompaniment to the conquest of the New World, then to slavery and colonization. Racism as a social relationship first took a biologist form before being forced to mutate into a culturalist form, and today into culturalism with a religious tone. After quickly going over the history of racist social relationships, the second part of this essay will discuss the material factors that explain the emergence and development of this new historical form of racism. The third part will be devoted to the consequences of the development of Islamophobia in our world.

Racism is a Historical Reality

One of the most satisfactory definitions of racism is the one offered by Albert Memmi: “Racism is the generalized and final assigning of values to real or imaginary differences, to the accuser’s benefit and at its victim’s expense, in order to justify the former’s own privileges or aggression.”⁴⁷ Starting from this definition, we can highlight the essential traits that allow Islamophobia to be characterized as a new historic form of racism and not simply a fear of Islam.

- Racism is first of all a social relationship, in other words, a relationship between two actors

or groups of actors. Contemporary Islamophobic discourse corresponds to this first characteristic since it works by homogenizing two groups: Muslims and others. The diversity and contradictions within these two groups are masked, as are the similarities between them.

- This social relationship is unequal; in other words, it ranks the two groups, justifying differentiated treatment, i.e., treatment that applies to one but not the other. By looking with suspicion at Muslims, who are seen as homogeneous, contemporary Islamophobic discourse legitimizes exceptional surveillance and monitoring practices for a part of the national community.
- The social function of the social relationship is to justify unequal treatment, namely a distribution of privileges to one and discrimination to the other. One of the effects of contemporary Islamophobic discourse is increasingly unequal access to the market for scarce resources (employment, education, housing, etc.) due to being stigmatized as a “dangerous Muslim.”

If Islamophobia corresponds to Memmi’s definition of racism as a social relationship, it was preceded by other forms as a function of contexts and power relations. Although relations between human groups prior to our contemporary era have included unequal relationships, these relationships did not become systemically widespread until the process of exiting feudalism and the industrialization of old Europe took place. The economist Eric

⁴⁷ Albert Memmi, *Le racisme* [Racism] (Paris: Gallimard, 1982): 158.

Williams has abundantly documented the links between slavery and “amassing the capital that financed the industrial revolution.”⁴⁸ Although elements of racist ideology could be found in the preindustrial era, it was only with industrialization that racism transformed into a system that structured the relations between the different continents and their populations. The first globalization brought with it racism as an ideology that

The first globalization brought with it racism as an ideology that justified the dispossession, violence, and exploitation of slavery and then of colonization.

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The first historical form of racism was biologism, which is the dual assertion of the existence of distinct and classified “human races.” Biological inequality was put forward as a justification for unequal socio-racial relations. Over more than four centuries of slavery and almost one century of colonization, the ideal of the natural superiority of the white man deeply permeated slave-holding and colonial societies. Such a heritage does not disappear on its own even when the conditions that gave rise to it disappear. The imagination and collective unconscious of former slave-holding and colonial societies are still marked by this heritage. As Marx pointed out, “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.”⁴⁹ So long as no real work has been done to deconstruct the legacies of the past, racist social representations inherited from the past remain available and can be revived and updated for contemporary purposes.

Frantz Fanon aptly explains the obsolescence

of biologism and its replacement by a new form of racism: culturalism. According to Fanon, the discredit of biologism after the Nazi episode, then after the discovery of colonial crimes, required racism to change form. As the racist point of view could no longer be supported by the idea of absolute biological difference, it was thereafter based on the assertion of the existence of absolute differences of a cultural nature:

The vulgar, primitive, over-simple racism purported to find in biology, the Scriptures having proved insufficient, the material basis of the doctrine. It would be tedious to recall the efforts then undertaken: the comparative form of the skulls, the quantity and the configuration of the folds of the brain, the characteristics of the cell layers of the cortex, the dimensions of the vertebrae, the microscopic appearance of the epiderm, etc. [...] These old-fashioned positions tend in any case to disappear. This racism that aspires to be rational [...] becomes transformed into cultural racism. “Occidental value” oddly blend with the already famous appeal to the fight of the “cross against the crescent.”⁵⁰

These remarks by Fanon highlight not only the transition from biologism to culturalism but also, ominously, the possibility for this culturalism to be built up from religious institutions. We believe that, in this way, Islamophobia is a variation on cultural racism centered on religious institutions. It is no longer cultures in general that are ranked, but religions. This is the reason why traces of Islamophobia can be found in colonial historical narratives. However, this Islamophobia of the past is interwoven with a broader culturalist discourse. Islamophobia emerges as a system strengthened by previous forms of racism (biologism and culturalism), only in a contemporary way.

Contemporary Islamophobia’s Process of Emerging

Although mentions of the existence of an “Islamophobia” can be found in the texts of

48 Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* [Capitalisme et esclavagisme], (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1968): 6.

49 Karl Marx, *Le 18 brumaire de Louis Napoléon Bonaparte* [The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte], (Paris: Editions sociales, 1968): 15.

50 Frantz Fanon, *Racisme et Culture: Pour la Révolution Africaine* [Racism and Culture: Toward the African Revolution], *Complete Works* (Paris: La Découverte, 2011): 716.

51 On this topic, refer to: Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Muhammad,

some colonial officials since the start of the 20th century, they are rare and sporadic.⁵¹ It was at the end of the 1980s that the process of the emergence and subsequent entrenchment of this new form of racism began. The context of this historical sequence is the end of the international balances resulting from the Second World War due to the disappearance of the Soviet Union. The consequences of this disappearance of the bipolar world can be summarized as follows:

- The start of the process of globalization, i.e., the destruction of customs borders and state protections and regulations;
- The consequence is increased competition between the different major powers for access to strategic raw materials and control of the markets; this competition for oil, gas, and strategic minerals, which up to then had been held back by the existence of a “common enemy,” rapidly spread to the Middle East and Africa;
- The multiple effects of this unregulated competition can be seen on many actors: an unprecedented impoverishment of countries in the South, creating a fertile ground for collective anger and revolt; significant insecurity among workers in the North, creating a fertile ground for the development of racism by seeking a scapegoat;
- Lastly, there is the need to justify new wars for what President Eisenhower once called the “military-industrial complex,” which felt threatened by the disappearance of the historical enemy. In 1961, Eisenhower warned of “the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.”⁵²

This political and economic underpinning is the source of new ideological theories that developed to offer a new historical enemy to justify continued arms spending. This new analytical framework speaks to a part of the white population that is destabilized and isolated, to whom a new enemy is offered that fulfills the function of a scapegoat.

To the best of our knowledge, it was Orientalism scholar Bernard Lewis who provided the first constructed version of the new Islamophobia in his 1990 article “The Roots of Muslim Rage.”⁵³ He also put forward the concept of the “Clash of Civilizations,” which Samuel Huntington would develop.

Huntington, however, generated the main ideological matrix of contemporary Islamophobia, of which the central logic is the production of a new civilizational enemy. His work, published in 1996, rapidly attained the status of a paradigm for the actions and discourse of U.S. administrations. Translated into French in 1997, the analytical framework he offered is rapidly expanding in a growing part of the European political classes. His reasoning is rooted in a few main ideas articulated as a system of causes and effects. Those causes and effects are discussed here to show the reasoning leading to the progressive development of contemporary Islamophobia:

- The definition of civilizations: For Huntington, the concept of civilization is not defined by material factors (technical development, economic organization, type of urbanization, etc.) or political factors (political regime, power structure, dominant political ideology) or ideological factors (value system, worldview, etc.). He contends it is religion that distinguishes different civilizations and religion alone that is decisive in differentiating cultures. Reducing people and societies to religion only leads to making religion the site of all confrontations. According to the author, current and future confrontations cannot be explained by analyzing economic stakes, social situations, and conflicts of social interests. Their sole source appears to be incompatibility between religions that are perceived as ahistorical and homogeneous.
- The abandonment of universality: The culturalist approach centered on religion leads Huntington to virulently criticize “the illusion of universality”: “The time has come for the West to abandon the illusion of universality and to

Islamophobie [Islamophobia]. Comment les élites françaises fabriquent le “problème musulman” [How French elites manufacture the “Muslim problem”], La (Paris: Découverte, 2013).

52 Dwight David Eisenhower, farewell address, January 17, 1961, <https://>

[en.wikisource.org/wiki/Eisenhower%27s_farewell_address_\(audio_transcript\)](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Eisenhower%27s_farewell_address_(audio_transcript)), last accessed on January 27, 2018.

53 Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 1990, 47-60.

promote the strength, coherence, and vitality of its civilization in a world of civilizations.” In order not to be confusing, the author points out that he thinks of Islam as a “civilization” against which it is necessary to defend oneself. It is therefore understandable why this analytical framework immediately resonated in the galaxy of white supremacist organizations on the one hand and among right-wing extremists of industrialized countries on the other. It would seem that we could rejoice at the end of the claim to universality that gave birth to colonialism, but to do so is to forget that it does not lead to the idea of peace among civilizations. The only outcome of abandoning this claim is to present the confrontation between civilizations as inevitable and permanent.

- Binary reduction: Such a concept leads to a negation of the complexity of human societies; in other words, to a series of binary oppositions. According to this analytical framework, societies, social groups, and individuals are either Western or they are not. Thus Western diversity is negated along with the diversity of the rest of the planet. The differences within the “West” are seen as secondary and anecdotal aspects that mask its true Christian identity. Likewise, the differences between so-called “Muslim” states and nations seem to be only an appearance masking their true homogeneity.
- The creation of the internal enemy: The logical consequence of Huntington’s binary homogenizations is the impossibility of being both Muslim and Western. Consequently, Muslims who are real citizens of Western countries tend to be perceived as fifth columnists who need to be monitored and, if necessary, repressed. Within each Western nation, Muslim citizens tend to be under permanent suspicion.

To conclude, it should be emphasized that Huntington’s theorization is not limited only to Muslims, but also constitutes a genuine attempt to bring about the theoretical and ideological realization of white supremacy. In his book *Who are We?*

The Challenges to America’s National Identity,⁵⁴ he presents American identity as being threatened by Latinos. According to him, Latin-American citizens cannot be assimilated into the “core Anglo-Protestant culture.” He also calls for the preservation of a national identity threatened by the culture and demography of this immigration.

The Creators of Islamophobia

The rapid development of contemporary Islamophobia cannot, however, be limited to new culturalist theorizations. We should ask ourselves about the causes that have made these explanations attractive to a significant proportion of the population in industrialized countries. Though not an exhaustive list, the following dimensions should be considered:

- Growing insecurity affecting social categories that had hitherto been more or less protected, leading to the development of destabilized poor whites and members of the lower middle classes who fear being downgraded. Identity-based discourse is aimed at this part of the population by offering a scapegoat.
- A white supremacist movement in the United States and a far-right movement in Europe are seeking to update their political discourse in order to reach wider sections of the population. Distancing themselves from traditional racist discourse (biologist or culturalist) is necessary to broaden their base. Contemporary Islamophobia, by presenting itself as a defense of strong values (democracy, women’s rights, freedom of expression, respect for minorities, etc.) makes it possible to give racism a form of respectability. That is why we suggested that it be called “respectable racism”⁵⁵ during the 2004 French debates on prohibiting the wearing of veils in schools. It was in the name of the “defense of secularism” that girls were excluded from the right to an education.
- Political and media discourse in the United States and Europe aim to justify external wars that take place in countries with almost entirely

54 Samuel Huntington, *Who are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004); French translation: Qui

sommes-nous ? Identité nationale et choc des cultures [National Identity and Culture Clash], (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2004).

Muslim populations. From Afghanistan to Somalia to Iraq, these wars have been accompanied by analyses and positions based on culturalism.

These dimensions and actors, already in action since the end of the 1980s, took on a new scope after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. The war on terrorism has been presented since its inception as a “civilization war” in countries where the clash of civilizations theory and its translations into media and politics have presented Muslims and Islam as a danger for more than a decade.

It would be a mistake to underestimate the extent to which this contemporary Islamophobia has taken root. Three important reasons lead us to postulate that a significant part of the populations of industrialized countries is more or less steeped in contemporary Islamophobia. First, the duration of the ideological offensive, which now spans several decades, must be taken into account. Secondly, as mentioned above, different actors converge (each for its own reasons) on the propagation of Islamophobic theses (white supremacists, media, and a part of the political class, the military-industrial complex, etc.). Finally, part of the population is economically insecure and, for this reason, is becoming more receptive to discourses that offer an explanation in terms of a scapegoat.

Self-fulfilling Prophecies

Islamophobic discourse and practices are not, of course, without effect on Muslim citizens of industrialized countries. The discrimination and/or humiliation suffered ends up arousing in the most fragile people an attraction to what the media now calls “jihadism,” but what we prefer to call an attraction to suicidal nihilism. This minuscule minority in fact reveals the fault lines in our societies, but is in turn put forward as proof of the veracity of Islamophobic theses. Programs to combat “radicalization” that have emerged in most industrialized countries have mostly been built on a similar logic, which has led to a set of confusions:

- A focus solely on the supply side of radicalization and a concealment of demand: We believe the

real question is why there is an attraction to murderous ideologies. If the offer of radicalization is effective, it is because a demand already exists. Dismissing demand, as most deradicalization programs do, makes it impossible to take into account the deep-seated causes: discrimination, humiliation, the effects of Islamophobic discourse, reactions to wars, and so forth.

- A confusion between detection and prevention: Most programs are based on the idea of “detection,” which leads to the search for signs of radicalization: beard, type of clothing, vocabulary, etc. This confusion, which has been highlighted by many authors, risks profiling entire social groups based on external signs. The focus on detection conceals the need to act in terms of prevention, making it possible to take into account the context of “co-radicalization” that characterizes our situation. There is, in fact, an interrelation between “racist radicalization” and what is called “jihadist radicalization.” Only through a preventive approach can these two mutually supporting factors be taken into account.

These errors feed into contemporary Islamophobia even more by providing it with targets that can be identified based on external appearance (clothes, beards, etc.).

Conclusion

Contemporary Islamophobia is a new form of racism following on biologist and culturalist forms. For several decades, Islamophobic theorizations and positions have worked their way through industrialized societies with an effectiveness that is all the stronger because many actors have contributed to spreading it (white supremacists, media and political discourses, military-industrial complex). Its efficacy is further reinforced by the breakdown of new social categories (poor whites and lower middle classes) that give Islamophobia a potential societal base. Only a proactive and aggressive prevention policy focused on all forms of nihilism (including white supremacy) can hope to turn back this new face of racism.

55 On this subject, see my book: Saïd Bouamama, *L'affaire du foulard islamique: La production d'un racisme respectable* [The Islamic Headscarf

Affair: The Creation of Respectable Racism], (Lille: Le Geai Bleu, 2004).

Islamophobia: Toward a Legal Definition and Framework

(Originally published in *Columbia Law Review Online*, November 1, 2016)

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Islamophobia is escalating at a frightening clip in the United States. Scrutiny of this bigotry, presently understood as “fear and suspicion of Muslims,” is rising at an alarming rate. Its rapid rise is reflected in the legal literature, encompassing scholarship analyzing the emerging national security strategies of the state to the civil liberties infractions and threats they pose to Muslim subjects. In short time, Islamophobia has become a subject of considerable scrutiny and interest.

Despite this rising scholarly interest, there is no singular, cogent, or consensus definition of Islamophobia--and more specifically, there is no legal definition that adeptly characterizes the state and private animus directed at Muslim subjects. This piece seeks to fill that void. It is the first to provide a precise definition of Islamophobia to serve and carry forward the proliferating body of legal scholarship addressing the state, private, and converging targeting of Muslim subjects in the United States. It also aims to facilitate advocacy countering Islamophobia. During an impasse when suspicion of Muslim subjects is swelling, fear of homegrown “radicalization” rising, and curtailment of Muslim American civil liberties deepening,

a legal definition and framework for understanding Islamophobia is vital.

Introduction: What does Islamophobia actually mean?⁵⁷

In recent years, Islamophobia has emerged as a term of common popular and political parlance. It saturates media headlines and newsprint,⁵⁸ is pervasive on the pages of scholarship, is frequently uttered from the mouths of politicians and pundits,⁵⁹ and is an emerging focus of legal conferences and symposia.⁶⁰ The mainstreaming of the term “Islamophobia” is a result of the rising fear and suspicion of Muslim Americans—the crux of the term’s common understanding today.

Attempts to coin and define the term “Islamophobia” are largely driven by expediency and the practical and analytical benefits associated with packaging a complex phenomenon into an operable term. Despite critiques of the term from both scholars and advocates,⁶¹ the term “Islamophobia” has proven to be both resonant

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57 Tanya Basu, “What Does ‘Islamophobia’ Actually Mean? A Brief History of a Provocative Word,” *Atlantic*, October 15, 2014, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/10/is-islamophobia-real-maher-harris-aslan/381411/>.

58 For an example of the term appearing in flagship newspapers, see Arun Kundnani, “Opinion, The West’s Islamophobia Is Only Helping the Islamic State,” *Washington Post*, March 23, 2016, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/03/23/the-wests-islamophobia-is-only-helping-](http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/03/23/the-wests-islamophobia-is-only-helping-the-islamic-state/)

the-islamic-state/.

59 Senator Bernie Sanders, in response to Donald Trump’s Islamophobic rhetoric and policy proposals, vowed to “end Islamophobia.” See Press Release, Council of Am. Islamic Relations, “CAIR Welcomes Bernie Sanders’ Pledge to End Islamophobia and Racism,” October 29, 2015, <http://www.cair.com/press-center/press-release/13212-cairwelcomesbernie-sanders-s-pledge-to-end-islamophobia-and-racism.html/>.

60 For example, the University of California, Berkeley’s Center for Race and Gender has held seven global conferences on Islamophobia, with the most recent meeting held in April 2016. See “Media & Events,” Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Ctr. for Race & Gender, <http://crg.berkeley.edu/content/islamophobia/media>, last visited Aug. 9, 2016.

61 Spirited debates between scholars and activists center on the connotation of the term, its efficacy, and whether alternatives such as “anti-Muslim bigotry,” “anti-Muslim racism,” or “Islamophobia” are more precise, practical, and effective tools for characterizing fear, suspicion, and

and resilient.⁶² It is deployed more than any other term to explain the rising animus and bigotry targeting Muslim Americans.⁶³ As of June 2016, Islamophobia was mentioned in 293 law review articles, the vast majority of which were published during or after 2011.⁶⁴

This interest continues today, particularly amid the expansion of anti-terror policing and the enhanced commitment to counter radicalization following terror attacks committed by Muslim subjects in Europe and the United States.⁶⁵ Underscored in the existing scholarship on Islamophobia is the grand question of whether Muslims could be integrated into American society.⁶⁶

As Islamophobia continues to escalate, due to the expansion of government surveillance⁶⁷ and the brazen political rhetoric that mars the 2016 presidential campaign,⁶⁸ it will certainly continue to evolve as a subject of great interest and scrutiny within legal scholarship. With each passing day, the urgency of combating a proliferating and menacing form of bigotry targeting Muslim Americans, and those perceived to be Muslim Americans, grows. This creates a need for both a precise legal definition of Islamophobia and a comprehensive framework that encompasses the fear and suspicion emanating from both public and private spheres. This piece is the first to provide a comprehensive definition and framework of

Islamophobia within the legal literature, filling the void at a point in time in which scholarly interest is rapidly expanding.

Islamophobia therefore has three dimensions: structural policy, private animus, and the dialectical process by which the former legitimizes and mobilizes the latent and patent bigotry of individuals and private actors. The result is far more expansive and complex than mere "fear and dislike" of Islam and Muslims.

This piece defines Islamophobia as the presumption that Islam is inherently violent, alien, and inassimilable. Combined with this is the belief that expressions of Muslim identity are correlative with a propensity for terrorism. It argues that Islamophobia is rooted in understandings of Islam as civilization's antithesis and perpetuated by government structures and private citizens. Finally, this piece asserts that Islamophobia is also a process—namely, the dialectic by which state policies targeting Muslims endorse prevailing stereotypes and, in turn, embolden private animus toward Muslim subjects.

Islamophobia therefore has three dimensions:

violence toward Muslim subjects. See generally Jaideep Singh, "The Death of Islamophobia: The Rise of Islamo-Racism," *Race Files*, Feb. 23, 2016, <http://www.racefiles.com/2016/02/23/the-death-of-islamophobia-the-rise-of-islam-racism/> [hereinafter Singh, *The Death of Islamophobia*] (providing an analysis of why "Islamophobia" is a more effective descriptor of anti-Muslim bias and bigotry than "Islamophobia").

62 "While other terms or phrases have been used to describe this prejudice and discrimination—'anti-Muslim hate' and 'anti-Muslim bias,' among others—'Islamophobia' is the most widely recognized and employed." Bridge Initiative Team, "Islamophobia: The Right Word for a Real Problem," Bridge Initiative, April 26, 2015, <http://bridge.georgetown.edu/islamophobia-the-right-word-for-a-real-problem/> [hereinafter Bridge Initiative, *The Right Word*]. The Bridge Initiative is a research project, housed at Georgetown University, established to monitor, research, and analyze Islamophobia in the United States. See "About," Bridge Initiative, <http://bridge.georgetown.edu/about/>, last visited Sept. 27, 2016.

63 Bridge Initiative, *The Right Word*, supra note 6 ("'Islamophobia' has already gained wide traction in public discourse, and is the most concise and recognizable term currently used to describe prejudice and discrimination.").

64 From 2010 to 2012, the term "Islamophobia" was featured in the title of 225 scholarly articles, with the word appearing 6,240 times anywhere within the articles. This includes scholarly works in all academic disciplines. *Id.*

65 The mass shooting at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Fla., on June 12, 2016, which involved a Muslim American shooter of Afghan descent

(Omar Mateen) who executed 49 people and wounded 53, is considered the "deadliest [terror] attack" since 9/11. See Ana Swanson, "The Orlando Attack Could Transform the Picture of Post-9/11 Terrorism in America," *Washington Post: Wonkblog*, June 12, 2016, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/06/12/the-orlando-attack-could-transform-the-picture-of-post-911-terrorism-in-america/> [http://perma.cc/KY6Q-AGNG].

66 "[T]he vision of Muslims as part of America" is a dominant theme in academic literatures, reflecting the prevailing popular and political discourse around the assimilability of Muslims into the body politic. Edward E. Curtis IV, "The Study of American Muslims: A History," in *The Cambridge Companion to American Islam*, Julianne Hammer & Omid Safi eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013): 15, 26, emphasis omitted.

67 The White House, under President Barack Obama, has led the expansion of policing focused on countering violent extremism ("CVE policing"). See generally "Fact Sheet: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism," White House, Feb. 18, 2015, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism>. Recent terror attacks committed by Muslim culprits, most notably the Orlando attack, which President Obama called "homegrown extremism," will likely expedite that expansion. See Kevin Liptak, "Obama Cites 'Homegrown Extremism,' Escalates Call for Gun Control," *CNN*, June 13, 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/13/politics/obama-orlando-gun-control-homegrownextremism/>.

68 "Islamophobia in the 2016 Elections," Bridge Initiative, Apr. 25, 2015, <http://bridge.georgetown.edu/islamophobia-and-the-2016-elections/#> [hereinafter Bridge Initiative, *Islamophobia in the 2016 Elections*].

structural policy, private animus, and the dialectical process by which the former legitimizes and mobilizes the latent and patent bigotry of individuals and private actors. The result is far more expansive and complex than mere “fear and dislike” of Islam and Muslims.⁶⁹

Part I investigates private Islamophobia, or the fear, suspicion, and violent targeting of Muslims (and perceived Muslims) by individuals and private actors. Part II examines structural Islamophobia and the lesser examined process by which state actors perpetuate fear and suspicion of Muslims through enactment and expansion of formal surveillance, profiling, and immigration policy. Part III reveals the dialectic process by which state policy shapes and endorses popular stereotypes of Islam and Muslim subjects and, during sociopolitical moments such as the protracted “War on Terror,” emboldens private violence toward bona fide and perceived Muslim subjects. Part IV centers on the strategic benefits legal scholars and advocates can attain by deploying this piece’s definition.

Private Islamophobia

Definition

This piece defines private Islamophobia as the fear, suspicion, and violent targeting of Muslims by individuals or private actors. This animus is generally carried forward by nonstate actors’ use of religious or racial slurs, mass protests or rallies, or violence against Muslim subjects.

While informed by government policy and programming, private Islamophobia centers on the anti-Muslim activities and behavior carried out by entities not affiliated with the state.

Analysis

On Nov. 13, 2015, “[t]hree teams of Islamic State attackers acting in unison carried out the terrorist assault in Paris,” killing 129 people and injuring 352 others.⁷⁰ Roughly three weeks later, two (nominally) Muslim culprits shot and killed 14 innocent people at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California, which President Barack Obama declared an act of terrorism.⁷¹ These two attacks exacerbated an already hostile climate toward Muslims in the United States, stoked by hatemongers and fueled by politicians scapegoating Muslims.

A marked rise in religiously and racially motivated hate crimes against Muslims followed these attacks.⁷² “Hate crimes against Muslim Americans and mosques across the United States have tripled in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, Calif., with dozens occurring within just a month.”⁷³ Combined with political rhetoric, representations of Muslims and Islam on mainstream and social media also fuel popular stereotypes of the faith and its followers and, after crisis, embolden the private animus and violence unleashed by private actors. The attack on a gay club in Orlando on June 12, 2016, again sparked fear of escalating hate crimes against Muslim Americans, which in years past has resulted in the killing of perceived Muslims and bona fide Muslims. Recent examples include the shooting of three Muslim American college students in Chapel Hill, N.C., in February 2015;⁷⁴ the arson, vandalism, and destruction of 78 mosques in 2015;⁷⁵ the wave of anti-Muslim protests that swept through the nation;⁷⁶ the rise in private Islamophobic slurs and language made even more

69 Bridge Initiative, *The Right Word*, supra note 6.

70 Adam Nossiter, Aurelien Breeden & Katrin Bennhold, “Three Teams of Coordinated Attackers Carried Out Assault on Paris, Officials Say; Hollande Blames ISIS,” *New York Times*, Nov. 14, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/paristerroristattacks.html> (on file with the Columbia Law Review).

71 Paloma Esquivel, Joseph Tanfani, Louis Sahagun & Sarah Parvini, “Obama: ‘This Was an Act of Terrorism Designed to Kill Innocent People,’” *L.A. Times*, Dec. 6, 2015, <http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-san-bernardino-terror-probe-widens-as-obama-set-to-speak-20151206-story.html>.

72 Muslim identity is commonly viewed in ethno-racial identity terms by private actors, aligning with the narrowing caricaturing of Muslims as immigrant, alien, and Arab. See Khaled A. Beydoun, *Antebellum Islam*, 58 *Howard Law Journal* 141, 163-70 (2014).

73 Eric Lichtblau, “Crimes Against Muslim Americans and Mosques Rise Sharply,” *New York Times*, Dec. 17, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/us/politics/crimes-against-muslim-americans-and-mosques-rise-sharply.html> (on file with the Columbia Law Review).

74 “Three Muslim Students Killed at North Carolina Campus,” *Al-Jazeera*, Feb. 11, 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/students-murdered-university-north-carolinacampus150211093231033.html>, [hereinafter *Three Muslim Students*].

75 “There were 78 instances where mosques were targeted — counting vandalism, arson, and other destruction — in 2015, according to the report compiled by the Council on American-Islamic Relations. Thirty-four of the incidents from 2015 came in November and December. There were 20 total in 2014, the group counted.” Talal Ansari, “There Was a Huge Increase in Attacks on Mosques Last Year,” *Buzzfeed News*, June 20, 2016, <http://www.buzzfeed.com/talalansari/there-was-a-huge-increase-in-attacks-on-mosques-last-year>.

mainstream by the Trump campaign;⁷⁷ and most recently, the targeted killing of a prominent Muslim imam⁷⁸ and his assistant in Queens, N.Y.⁷⁹

While increasingly condemned by mainstream media and repudiated by (some) politicians,⁸⁰ popular bigotry toward Muslims emanates from tropes deeply embedded within state institutions⁸¹ and aligns with contemporary policing and profiling measures such as the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (PATRIOT Act), countering violent extremism (CVE) policing, and proposed state policies such as Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump's "Muslim ban."⁸² However, in line with the examples of private Islamophobia cited above, prevailing definitions of the term "Islamophobia" continue to frame the phenomenon in predominantly private terms.

Perhaps the most widely cited definition of Islamophobia, provided in a prominent study by the Center for American Progress, manifests the overt emphasis on private Islamophobia. The *Fear, Inc.* study defines Islamophobia as, "[e]xaggerated fear, hatred, and hostility toward Islam and Muslims ... perpetuated by negative stereotypes resulting in bias, discrimination, and the marginalization and exclusion of Muslims from America's social, political, and civil life."⁸³

The definition effectively notes the relationship between existing stereotypes and the animus it informs and facilitates. However, its broad articulation does not explicate the role of law, policy, and government actors in enabling "bias, discrimination ... marginalization and exclusion."⁸⁴ Moreover, the description of Islamophobia as "exaggerated fear" illustrates the focus on private Islamophobia, delineating it as deviant or aberrant activity, instead of rational or strategic behavior advancing state interests.⁸⁵

However, private Islamophobia does not exclusively consist of aberrational perspectives or deviant behavior. Islamophobia also encompasses ideas and activity consistent with the anti-Muslim messaging emanating from state policy—and most luridly and loudly today—the state's national security policing arms.

Structural Islamophobia

Definition

This piece defines structural Islamophobia as the fear and suspicion of Muslims on the part of institutions—most notably, government agencies—that is manifested through the enactment and advancement of policies. These policies are built upon the presumption that Muslim identity is associated with a national security threat, and

76 Niraj Warikoo, "Anti-Muslim Rallies Across USA Making Muslims Wary," USA Today, Oct. 10, 2015, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2015/10/09/anti-islamralliesacross-usa-making-muslims-wary/73672674/>.

77 "But Trump has perfected it. For his campaign, Islamophobia is political craft—every sound bite carefully assembled and strategically disseminated—designed to inspire the brazen hate spewed by his supporters, and embolden the racist hate unfolding at his pep rallies." Khaled A. Beydoun, "Donald Trump and Electing Islamophobia," Al-Jazeera, Mar. 13, 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/donald-trump-electingislamophobia160313104258994.html>.

78 "Imam" is an Arabic word for a worship leader at a mosque, who because of that position, often occupies the role of community leader.

79 Imam Maulama Akonjee, 55, and his assistant, Thara Uddin, 64, were shot and killed on Aug. 14, 2016, while walking out of their Ozone Park, Queens, mosque. Pilar Melendez & Ray Sanchez, "New York Imam, His Assistant Killed Near Mosque," CNN, Aug. 14, 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/13/us/new-york-imam-shooting/>. Akonjee led the mosque, located in a burgeoning Bangladeshi enclave of the New York borough. Id.

80 See, e.g., Nihad Awad, "Opinion, Obama Condemned Islamophobia in America. It's Time Republicans Did Too," The Guardian, Dec. 7, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/dec/07/obama-condemned-islamophobia-republicans-should>.

81 For a comprehensive review of the Orientalist and negative stereotypes of Islam and Muslims that drove court decisions, see Marie A. Failing, "Islam in the Mind of American Courts: 1800 to 1960," 32 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 1 (2012). For a historical perspective, see Khaled A. Beydoun, "Between Muslim and White: The Legal Construction of Arab American Identity,"

69 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 29, 37 (2014) [hereinafter Beydoun, Between Muslim and White] (contending that the conflation of Arab and Muslim identity rendered the view that Muslims were inassimilable with American values and prevailing conceptions of citizenship, which from 1790 to 1952, mandated that an immigrant be deemed white by a civil court in order to become naturalized).

82 This author has reflected on Trump's proposal before:

"Donald Trump's calls for a ban on Muslims entering the United States and, more recently, for 'extreme vetting' of anyone seeking to immigrate to the United States have been condemned as breaks from the nation's traditions of religious tolerance and welcoming immigrants. Actually, Trump's proposals reflect a long-standing, if ugly, strain of U.S. immigration policy, one that restricted the entry of Arab and South Asian Muslim immigrants and barred them from becoming citizens until the middle of the 20th century."

Khaled A. Beydoun, "Opinion: America Banned Muslims Long Before Donald Trump," Washington Post, Aug. 18, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-anti-muslim-stanceechoesa-us-law-from-the-1700s/2016/08/18/6da7b486-6585-11e6-8b27-bb8ba39497a2_story.html.

83 An influential study published by the Center for American Progress in 2011 mainstreamed the term in media, scholarly, and political circles. Wajahat Ali et al., "Fear, Inc.: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America" Center for American Progress, Aug. 26, 2011, <http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/08/pdf/islamophobia.pdf>.

84 Id.

85 Id.

while they are usually framed in a facially neutral fashion, such policies disproportionately target Muslim subjects and disparately jeopardize, chill, and curtail their civil liberties.⁸⁶

While framed as a novel form of bigotry, the concept of structural Islamophobia highlights that Islamophobia is a modern extension of “Orientalism,”⁸⁷ a master discourse that positions Islam—a faith, people, and imagined geographic

within popular culture, but more saliently, they are embedded within the institutional memory of government agencies, including the judiciary⁸⁹ and, today, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and anti-terror law enforcement.⁹⁰

Characterizing Islam and Muslim identity as inassimilable, subversive, violent, and harboring an inherent propensity for terrorism,⁹¹ these tropes move state agencies to enact policies—like those developed during the current protracted “War on Terror”—that seek to monitor, prosecute, and deny the entry of Muslim subjects. Such policies assign the presumption of guilt onto Muslims at large and diminish Muslims’ civil liberties.

While a number of modern government policies fit within the structural Islamophobia classification, the PATRIOT Act (and accompanying immigration legislation) and emergent counter-radicalization (or CVE) policing are the two most salient examples. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration established DHS around the principal mission of expanding its anti-terror program, focusing specifically on “Islamic extremism” and culminating in the enactment of the PATRIOT Act two months after the 9/11 attacks.⁹² The PATRIOT Act legally enabled an unprecedented degree of government encroachment “on Americans’ civil rights by ... expanding the electronic surveillance powers of government,”⁹³ which disproportionately targeted Muslim subjects.⁹⁴

9/11 and the Expansion of Structural Islamophobia

State suspicion and systematic surveillance of

The PATRIOT Act legally enabled an unprecedented degree of government encroachment “on Americans’ civil rights by...expanding the electronic surveillance powers of government,” which disproportionately targeted Muslim subjects.

sphere—as the civilizational foil of the West. Connecting Islamophobia to Orientalism, the precedent epistemology from which modern representations and misrepresentations of Muslims derive, is a vital first step to understanding structural Islamophobia. In other words, understanding the foundation and trajectory of (modern) Islamophobia cannot be had without an analysis and understanding of Orientalism.

Analysis

Following the 9/11 terror attacks, professor Leti Volpp observed how terror attacks involving a Muslim culprit spur immediate “redeployment of Orientalist tropes.”⁸⁸ These tropes are embedded

86 For instance, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the PATRIOT Act, which disproportionately targeted Muslim communities, are examples of structural Islamophobia. See *infra* section II.B (analyzing such policies from a structural perspective).

87 See generally Edward Saïd, *Orientalism* (1979) (coining and framing the theory of Orientalism, which positions the West, or “Occident,” as the superior counterpoint and antithesis of the inferior Middle East, or “Orient”).

88 Leti Volpp, “The Citizen and the Terrorist,” 49 *UCLA L. Rev.* 1575, 1586 (2002).

89 See Failinger, *supra* note 25, at 13–28 (analyzing judicial decisions involving Islam or Muslims, which illustrates the pervasiveness of a common set of negative tropes). See generally Beydoun, *Between Muslim and White*, *supra* note 25, at 37 (discussing 10 naturalization cases involving immigrant petitioners from Muslim-majority regions and arguing that Muslim identity—or suspected Muslim identity—conflicted with prevailing constructions of whiteness).

90 While the courts were the primary state enforcement mechanisms of Orientalism (and anti-Muslim animus) during the Naturalization Era (1790–1952), the contemporary moment witnesses the policing apparatuses of

the state, especially DHS, and local law enforcement departments as the primary enforcers.

91 See Khaled A. Beydoun, “Islamophobia Has a Long History in the United States,” *BBC Magazine*, Sept. 29, 2015 [hereinafter Beydoun, *Islamophobia*], <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34385051>.

92 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S.C. (2012)); see also USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006) (codified in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).

93 Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, “Immigration Reform, National Security After September 11, and the Future of North American Integration,” 91 *Minn. L. Rev.* 1369, 1369 (2007).

94 See generally Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, “Race, Civil Rights and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims,” 58 *N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L.* 295, 327–45 (2002) (discussing the impact of the PATRIOT Act on the civil rights of Muslims in America).

Muslim Americans commenced well before 9/11.⁹⁵ However, because the terrorists were Muslims, the state centered its expanded counterterror programming in the direction of Muslim foreign nationals and citizens. With the creation of DHS on Nov. 25, 2002,⁹⁶ electronic surveillance became the strategic cornerstone of the domestic counterterror program following the deadliest terror attack in U.S. history.⁹⁷ The PATRIOT Act enabled close monitoring of noncitizens and citizens suspected of terrorism or of having links to transnational entities classified as terrorist organizations, which severely chilled the religious and political activity of Arab and Muslim Americans; these demographics routinely are linked to national security threats. “Perhaps the most damaging effect the [PATRIOT] Act has on civil liberties, particularly for Arab and Muslim Americans, is the reduction in the standard that law enforcement must meet in order to survey, search, and seize persons and their property.”⁹⁸ After 9/11, the established nexus between Muslim identity and terrorism was tightened, enabling the state to bypass constitutional safeguards when the subject was Muslim. In addition to expanded surveillance capacities, the Bush administration structurally overhauled the state’s immigration and national security functions around the heightened fear of Muslim threat. The newly minted DHS swallowed up previously standalone immigration, customs, and emergency-management functions of the state.⁹⁹

In addition to two wars fought abroad,¹⁰⁰ and broadly expanded domestic surveillance and policing at home, the post-9/11 moment witnessed the enactment of a second policy that bore many parallels to the Muslim ban put in

place during the Naturalization Era. In June 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft instituted the National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS), a sweeping immigration tracking program that almost exclusively targeted Muslim immigrants, nonimmigrants, and permanent residents. The “Special Registration” provision of NSEERS required all male teen and adult nationals

In June 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft instituted the National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS), a sweeping immigration tracking program that almost exclusively targeted Muslim immigrants, nonimmigrants, and permanent residents.

of 25 different countries to allow themselves to be fingerprinted and registered by the federal government or be subject to immediate deportation to their home countries. With the sole exception of North Korea, every single one of the other 25 countries on the Special Registration bulletin was either a Muslim or Arab nation.¹⁰¹

While dissolved in 2011, NSEERS explicitly reintegrated the Orientalist baseline that Muslims were presumptive national security threats. Geographic origins, in addition to race and religion, signaled likelihood of a national security threat. Indeed, the legislation functioned as somewhat of a “Muslim ban” before Trump infamously proposed to prevent all Muslims from entering the United States on December 7, 2015.¹⁰² The “Special Registration” provision of NSEERS, like

95 AEDPA is often credited with beginning this time of heightened surveillance. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) was the beginning of policing of Muslim subjects and communities. One part of this legislation led to the disparate investigation of Muslim American political and social activity, while another led to the deportation of Muslims with links—real or fictitious—to terrorist activity. Beydoun, Islamophobia, *supra* note 35.

96 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 6, 18, 44, and 49 U.S.C.).

97 For a summary of the 9/11 Attacks, see September 11th Fast Facts, CNN (Sept. 7, 2015), <http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/>.

98 Heena Musabji & Christina Abraham, “The Threat to Civil Liberties and Its Effect on Muslims in America,” 1 DePaul J. for Soc. Just. 83, 99 (2007).

99 Khaled A. Beydoun, “Between Indigence, Islamophobia and Erasure: Poor and Muslim in ‘War on Terror’ America,” 104 Calif. L. Rev.

(forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter Beydoun, *Between Indigence*] (manuscript at 23) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“DHS consolidated the state’s immigration and emigration regimes, and functioned as the institutional fulcrum for the sweeping federal and local anti-terror surveillance and policing sanctioned by the USA PATRIOT Act.” (citing USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S.C.)); see also USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S.C.)).

100 Yaser Ali, “Shari’ah and Citizenship--How Islamophobia Is Creating a Second-Class Citizenry in America,” 100 Calif. L. Rev. 1027, 1042-43 (2012) (describing the government’s reliance on “the nation’s fear of another attack toward Muslims—and those who had physical ‘Muslim’ characteristics” to support its case for “two costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq”).

101 Arsalan Ifthikhar, “Arab Americans,” in *Anti-Immigration in the United States: A Historical Encyclopedia*, Kathleen R. Arnold ed., (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Greenwood, 2011): 40, 43.

its more studied and scrutinized piece of post-9/11 legislation, the PATRIOT Act, is a key example of structural Islamophobia.

Structural Islamophobia and Counter-radicalization

Today, rising fear of Muslim “radicalization” drives the current expansion of counter-radicalization, or CVE policing.¹⁰³ CVE policing is “the emergent model of anti-terrorism and national-security policing sweeping through American cities, and most notably, communities with concentrated Muslim American populations.”¹⁰⁴ CVE policing disparately focuses on Muslims, extending the surveillance arm of the state into the communi-

and thus treats Muslim identity as a presumptive national security threat.¹⁰⁶ CVE policing is “cloaked in expertise about the process by which Muslims become terrorists.”¹⁰⁷ Like the PATRIOT Act, and preceding legislation and policy,¹⁰⁸ CVE theory focuses exclusively on Muslim subjects and geographies as presumptive sources of terrorism. Carried forward through collaboration between DHS, local law enforcement departments, and community informants,¹⁰⁹ CVE policing stands as the newest and perhaps most nefarious form of structural Islamophobia—redeploying the embedded tropes that Islam is inherently extreme and those who observe it, and do so conspicuously, are to be closely monitored as presumptive radicals.¹¹⁰ Consequently, CVE policing chills the ability of Muslim Americans to freely exercise their faith and severely diminishes their free exercise of religion, speech, and privacy rights.

Formal CVE policing programs were piloted in Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis in 2014.¹¹¹ However, the New York Police Department began using CVE policing tactics as early as 2002, spying on and seeding informants in Muslim communities, most notably mosques and community centers, in the tri-state area.¹¹² Like AEDPA, the PATRIOT Act, and NSEERS, formalized CVE policing is built upon the very notion that Muslim identity, and the expression of it, is a marker of radicalization or prospective radicalization. The state’s pursuit of radicals and its elusive goal of identifying Muslims at risk of radicalization is expanding,

Islamophobia is also a systemic, fluid, and deeply politicized dialectic between the state and its polity: a dialectic whereby the former shapes, reshapes, and confirms popular views or attitudes about Islam and Muslim subjects inside and outside America’s borders.

ties in which Muslims are concentrated and the spaces where Muslims congregate (most notably, mosques).¹⁰⁵ Again, this government practice is built upon the foundational trope that conflates Muslim identity with the antithesis of civilization

102 Jenna Johnson, ‘Trump Calls for ‘Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering the United States,’ Washington Post, Dec. 7, 2015, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdownofmuslims-entering-the-united-states/>.

103 Radicalization theory “suggests that the path from Muslim to terrorist is a predictable one,” and thus, radicalization can be prevented through monitoring and arrest of a (Muslim) subject believed to be en route toward adopting an extremist ideology. Amna A. Akbar, “Policing ‘Radicalization,’” 3 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 809, 811 (2013).

104 Beydoun, *Between Indigence*, supra note 43 (manuscript at 24-25).

105 Id. (manuscript at 27-30).

106 The New York Police Department (NYPD) views Muslim identity—particularly male, Muslim identity—as a signal of radicalization. According to the NYPD, Muslims who live in Muslim enclaves are in the first of four radicalization stages: That entire class of individuals is already in the funnel and thus a potential “threat.” Cashed out in operational terms, the NYPD’s analysis means that almost the whole young, male Muslim population of urban areas in the United States constitutes a threat because they all are in the “pre-radicalization” stage. Aziz Z. Huq, “Modeling Terrorist Radicalization,” 2 Duke F. & Soc. Change 39, 46 (2010).

107 Akbar, supra note 47, at 817.

108 Such policies include the enforcement of the Naturalization Act of 1790 to circumvent the naturalization of Muslim immigrants. See generally Beydoun, *Between Muslim and White*, supra note 25. Another is the passage of AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)), which was passed five years before the enactment of the PATRIOT Act.

109 Samuel J. Rascoff, “Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter Radicalization,” 64 Stan. L. Rev. 125, 153-55 (2012).

110 “Community policing in counterterrorism as currently envisioned betrays its rhetoric of empowerment and mutual trust, and serves as another weapon in the federal government’s toolkit that perpetuates the ‘Terrorist Other’ stereotype.” Sahar F. Aziz, “Policing Terrorists in the Community,” 5 Harv. Nat’l Security J. 147, 149 (2014).

111 Akbar, supra note 47, at 845-68 (examining the new radicalization policing tactics used by federal and local law enforcement). Counterradicalization parlance and policing are almost exclusively focused on Muslim communities, which sometimes overlap and are frequently conflated with Arab American communities. Id. at 811.

112 “Since at least 2002, ... [it] has engaged in the religious profiling and suspicionless surveillance of Muslims in New York City and beyond.” “Factsheet: The NYPD Muslim Surveillance Program,” American Civil Liberties Union, <http://www.aclu.org/factsheet-nypd-muslim-surveillance-program>, last visited Aug. 9, 2016.

particularly after the recent attacks in Belgium, Paris, and Orlando. Illustrating this phenomenon, the structural presumption that Muslim identity is closely tied to terrorism is also expanding.

Islamophobia as a Dialectic Between State And Society

*Radicalization discourse feeds into pre-existing Islamophobia in the United States, lending legitimacy to anti-Muslim sentiment.*¹¹³

Dialectical Islamophobia

Islamophobia is also a systemic, fluid, and deeply politicized dialectic between the state and its polity: a dialectic whereby the former shapes, reshapes, and confirms popular views or attitudes about Islam and Muslim subjects inside and outside America's borders. Therefore, the third dimension of Islamophobia focuses on "dialectical Islamophobia," which is the process by which state policies legitimize prevailing misconceptions, misrepresentations, and tropes widely held by private citizens.

Again, Islamophobia is the presumption of guilt assigned onto Muslims by state and private actors. But it must also be understood as a process—namely, the process by which state policies such as the PATRIOT Act and CVE policing both endorse ingrained and popular tropes of Muslims as alien, inassimilable, and prone to extremism¹¹⁴ and embolden the private animus and violent targeting of Muslim subjects. This process occurs most intensely during the aftermath of terror attacks, such as the 9/11 terror attacks or the April 2013 "Boston Bombings"¹¹⁵—points in time when structural Islamophobic policies were typically enacted, advanced, or broadened.¹¹⁶

The state's rubber-stamping of widely held

stereotypes of Islam and Muslims in society, through passage of surveillance programming, religious and racial profiling procedures, and tightened immigration policies, is the cornerstone of dialectical Islamophobia. This exchange—by which the broader polity absorbs the presumptive suspicion the state assigns to Muslims by way of (structural Islamophobic) policies such as the PATRIOT Act and CVE policing and subsequently shapes its view of Muslim subjects in line with these poli-

During moments when structural Islamophobia is broadened to address perceived Islamic extremism, such as the threat of the Islamic State (ISIS) and homegrown radicalization, structural Islamophobic policies embolden the private passions of Islamophobes to undertake violence against Muslim subjects, or institutions, in the name of revenge, citizenship, and patriotism.

cies' underlying characterization—is an ongoing dialectic that links state policy to hate and violence unleashed by the polity.

State Endorsement and Emboldening Private Islamophobia

The overwhelming attention on Islamophobia has gravitated toward sensational stories or instances of private Islamophobia. For example, stories about "intensifying calls for the exclusion of Syrian refugees and the isolation of American Muslims,"¹¹⁷ anti-Muslim rallies spearheaded by fringe militants,¹¹⁸ mosque arsons,¹¹⁹ and the January 2015 murders of three Muslim American college

113 Akbar, *supra* note 47, at 876.

114 The law can also serve "at times [as] an expression of popular will," executing the punitive measures an enraged populace calls for during times of crisis. Muneer I. Ahmad, "A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion," 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1259, 1318 (2004).

115 John Eligon & Michael Cooper, "Blasts at Boston Marathon Kill 3, Injure 100," *New York Times*, Apr. 15, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/us/explosions-reported-at-site-of-boston-marathon.html> (on file with the Columbia Law Review).

116 In 2014, hard-line CVE policing programs were piloted in Boston in the wake of the Boston Bombings, as well as in Los Angeles and Minneapolis. See Shelley Murphy, "Boston to Host Anti-Extremist Pilot Program," *Boston Globe*, Sept. 24, 2014, <http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/09/23/boston-site-program-prevent-residents-from-joining-extremistgroups/YpEqq2cYvITZ6u8AFkbarL/story.html>.

117 Shirin Sinnar, "Opinion, Preparing American Muslim Daughters for What Awaits," *Mercury News*, Nov. 25, 2015, http://www.mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_29156471/shirinsinnarpreparing-american-muslim-daughters-what-awaits.

students¹²⁰ dominate newsprint and scholarship. This fixation on sensational stories of private Islamophobia not only glosses over the programmatic fear and suspicion of Muslims administered by government structures but, just as critically, the process by which structural Islamophobia mobilizes private animus.

Prevailing definitions of Islamophobia overlook this interplay between state policy and discursive views of Muslims (and Islam). Like other forms of bigotry, the shape of Islamophobia is contingent upon mass-media representations,¹²¹ political rhetoric and messaging,¹²² and most crucially, government programming and policy. The fluid expansion of structural Islamophobia programming, which is reaching a second apex 15 years after 9/11 with CVE policing, communicates to the broader polity that Islam is to be viewed with suspicion. It marks Muslims and Muslim Americans as, at best, possible threats, and at worst, terrorists in our midst.

In *A Rage Shared by Law*, written in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks, professor Muneer Ahmad observes:

Like the post-September 11 perpetrators, the state claims an intimate relationship with the nation....

Moreover, the state has purported to act in the names of the victims of the terrorist attacks, invoking their memory as justification for a broad range of anti-terrorist policies.... [T]hrough its policies of racial profiling and racially targeted immigration enforcement, the state has... adjudged all "Muslim-looking" people to be terrorists, and carried out acts of retribution against them.¹²³

This very dialectic continues following the Paris, San Bernardino, Belgium,¹²⁴ and Orlando attacks, wherein the nation's intensifying private Islamophobia drives the CVE policing programs expanded by the state. The laws passed after 9/11, followed by the policing and profiling measures that have been carefully protracted through today, speak volumes to the American polity. They redeploy deeply ingrained Orientalist stereotypes that mark Islam as a civilizational antithesis and Muslims as inherently violent and inassimilable.¹²⁵ Instead of challenging these stereotypes, racial and religious surveillance programs affirm and endorse them, communicating to private Islamophobes that their fear, suspicion, and anger are warranted. During moments when structural Islamophobia is broadened to address perceived Islamic extremism, such as the threat of the Islamic State (ISIS) and homegrown radicalization, structural Islamophobic policies embolden the private passions of Islamophobes to undertake violence against Muslim subjects, or institutions, in the name of revenge, citizenship, and patriotism.¹²⁶

Indeed, structural Islamophobic programs and policies could also be viewed as (latent) calls to action, alerting private citizens to be on guard for ripe and unripe Muslim radicals and pushing them to take action. Accordingly, dialectical Islamophobia is a third illustration of how Islamophobia permeates our polity. It shows how state policies interact with private animus—rooted in centuries-old tropes and reified by the "War on Terror"—to foment antipathy toward and violence against Muslims.

118 Justin Wm. Moyer, "Armed Anti-Muslim Protesters Stage 'Strange' Protest Outside Mosque in Clock Kid's Hometown," *Washington Post*, Nov. 23, 2015, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/11/23/armed-anti-muslim-protestersstagestrange-protest-outside-mosque-in-clock-kids-hometown/>.

119 Sarah Parvini, Man Sentenced to 6 Years in Prison for Coachella Valley Mosque Arson, *L.A. Times* (Mar. 1, 2016), <http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-coachellamosquefire-sentencing-20160301-story.html> [<http://perma.cc/9RXX-Q8B7>].

120 Three Muslim Students, *supra* note 18.

121 See generally Jack G. Shaheen, *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People* (Northampton, Mass.: Olive Branch Press, 2001), (providing a comprehensive history of cinematic and television misrepresentations of Arab, Middle East and North African, and Muslim identity); Jack G.

Shaheen, *The TV Arab* (Bowling Green, OH.: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1984), (providing a foundational account of television misrepresentations of Arab and Muslim Americans through the early 1980s).

122 For a comprehensive review and analysis of Islamophobia rhetoric and strategy saturating the 2016 presidential race, see Bridge Initiative, *Islamophobia in the 2016 Elections*, *supra* note 12, at 2.

123 Ahmad, *supra* note 58, at 1319.

124 "Victims of the Brussels Attack," *BBC News*, April 15, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35880119>.

125 See Volpp, *supra* note 32, at 1586 (arguing that these stereotypes define other civilizations as "primitive, barbaric, and despotic").

126 See Ahmad, *supra* note 58, at 1323-24 (arguing that "the exercise of state power" after 9/11 gave legitimacy to individual acts of violence carried out against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians).

Deploying the Definition

The present marks the greatest degree of discord with regard to state and popular understandings of Muslim American identity. Discursively, Islam is overwhelmingly imagined along Orientalist lines and viewed in racial terms as frequently as it is religious terms. However, the state's understanding of Islam (and Muslims) has developed in recent years, partially as a consequence of national security policies aimed at preventing radicalization.¹²⁷ While popular and structural perceptions of Muslims are still founded upon kindred tropes (violent and warmongering,¹²⁸ foreign, unruly, and members of an "enemy race"¹²⁹), this gradually widening disjuncture in perception demands a definition of Islamophobia that enables understanding and, subsequently, vigilance against its multiple forms.

Since private Islamophobes generally imagine Muslims in overly inclusive racial or civilizational terms, strategies to combat this brand of animus should target communities that include not only Muslims but groups commonly mistaken to be Muslims. For instance, Sikh American men are typically perceived to be Muslims by private Islamophobes and, consequently, are among the most vulnerable and targeted victims of private Islamophobia.¹³⁰ Indeed, the Sikh turban itself has become a primary target of Islamophobes, who

have "mistakenly assumed their turbans suggested strong Islamic faith."¹³¹ Turbaned, bearded, and brown-skinned, Sikh men fit the stereotypical caricature of the "Muslim terrorist" more closely than the majority of Muslim men, which has led to profiling, hate crimes, and targeted killings of this group.¹³²

In addition, the phenotypic appearances of non-Muslim South Asian, Latinx, black,¹³³ and biracial men and women are often conflated with Muslim identity. As a result, private Islamophobia threatens non-Muslims in addition to practicing Muslims, mandating a definition and framework that enables protection, advocacy, and coalition building across religious lines.

On the other hand, emergent structural Islamophobic programs are centrally committed to policing Muslims along religious lines. As examined in Part II, CVE policing frames radicalization in largely religious or political terms. Conservative or extremist religious views, attendant critical politics, sectarian affiliation, and conspicuous expression of faith, among other factors,¹³⁴ inform the state's view of who or what constitutes a threat. Because of this focus on religious practices, the pool of potential targets of structural Islamophobia is likely to be far smaller than that of private Islamophobia. Moreover, as the state entrenches and expands its commitment to CVE

127 The development of the state's understanding of Islam, and Muslims, is in large part a consequence of advancing state interests—namely, pushing forward counter-radicalization programming. More specifically, the state's understanding of sectarian division within Islam has evolved, evidenced by its linking "radicalization" to Salafi Islamic traditions and strategic coalition building with Muslims who reject this tradition. Radicalization is understood by state actors as a "Sunni phenomenon." However, this narrow development of Islam has not disrupted the core stereotypes of Islam and Muslims that drive state policy but is again spurred more by state interests. See generally Mitchell D. Silber & Arvin Bhatt, NYPD Intelligence Div., "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat" (2007), <http://eurabia.parlamentnilisty.cz/UserFiles/document/NYPD.pdf>, (setting forth the radicalization theory framework adopted by DHS, which drives the execution of counter-radicalization law enforcement strategy in the United States).

128 Beydoun, *Between Muslim and White*, supra note 25, at 47–48.

129 John Tehranian, *White Washed: America's Invisible Middle Eastern Minority* (New York: New York University Press, 2009): 68–72; see also John Tehranian, "Performing Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation and the Construction of Racial Identity in America," 109 *Yale LJ* 817 (2000). This was the first law review article exclusively focused on the pleas of immigrants from the Arab world and Middle East asserting that they fit within the statutory definition of whiteness, which was a prerequisite for naturalization from 1790 through 1952. These pleas in the naturalization process also highlight the embedded religious and cultural tropes these immigrants faced in civil proceedings.

130 "In particular, Sikh Americans have been the victim of discrimination and hate crimes after being mistaken for Arab or Muslim. This occurs not

only because of their turbans, but also because of their long beards, both of which are Sikh religious symbols." Vinay Harpalani, "DesiCrit: Theorizing the Racial Ambiguity of South Asian Americans," 69 *N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L.* 77, 162 (2015).

131 Amardeep Singh, "The New Wave of Islamophobia: Being Sikh or Muslim in the Age of Donald Trump," *Salon*, January 3, 2016, http://www.salon.com/2016/01/03/the_new_wave_of_islamophobia_being_sikh_or_muslim_in_the_age_of_donald_trump/.

132 The murder of Balbir Singh Sodhi, a gas station owner in Arizona, days after the 9/11 terror attacks illustrates the stereotypical conflation of Sikh men with Muslim terrorists, followed by their victimization after crisis. Tamar Lewin, "Sikh Owner of Gas Station Is Fatally Shot in Rampage," *New York Times*, Sept. 17, 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/17/us/sikh-owner-of-gas-station-is-fatally-shot-in-rampage.html> (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Tiffani B. Figueroa, "All Muslims Are like That: How Islamophobia Is Diminishing Americans' Right to Receive Information," 41 *Hofstra L. Rev.* 467, 483 (2007).

133 "When my sons and I travel abroad, we are often mistaken for Arabs or Muslims." Adrienne Katherine Wing, "Civil Rights in the Post-9/11 World: Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism," 63 *La. L. Rev.* 717, 722 (2003). Professor Adrienne Wing is a black law professor with five black sons. *Id.* at 720.

134 See Akbar, supra note 47, at 833–35 (describing a prominent NYPD report that identifies various factors thought to be associated with radicalization, including "pilgrimage to Mecca," "[g]rowing a beard," and "pa [ying] off the mortgage on [one's] house because Islam forbids paying interest on loans" (alterations in original) (quoting Silber & Bhatt, supra note 71, at 59)).

policing, structural Islamophobia is likely to be further narrowed to specific Muslim American groups and geographies that are perceived to be more associated with radicalization.

Consequently, scholarly and practical interventions concerned with structural Islamophobia should home in on the religious and political contours by which the state perceives Muslim terrorists and radical threats.¹³⁵ Deploying the structural definition of Islamophobia, outlined in Part I, not only distinguishes state from private actors in their perception and policing of Muslim subjects but also enables disciplined and more precise analysis of this type of Islamophobia.

Finally, my definition seeks to collapse an analytical wall between private and structural Islamophobia that perpetuates the latter as a legitimate form of Islamophobia. The popular discourse and political moment have cemented a broad understanding of Islamophobia as exclusively deviant and aberrant private violence. As a result, state policy and policing that target Muslims are viewed as separate and distinct from the hatemongering sweeping through the United States. This limited framing diminishes the efficacy of grass-roots, political, and legal challenges to Islamophobia, which must contemplate the state's manifold roles in advancing Islamophobic policies and emboldening private violence.

A complex and multidimensional form of bigotry requires an equally complex and multidimensional conceptualization, which is what this piece has sought to provide. A definition that encompasses the private infliction of Islamophobia, the state's role, and the fluid dialectic between the two, offers advocates and scholars a framework by which to better understand the various dimensions of Islamophobia and subsequently tailor interventions against it.

Conclusion

This piece seeks to equip legal scholars with a precise and comprehensive definition of Islamophobia to carry forward legal research centering on this rising form of animus. In addition, by highlighting how the three dimensions of Islamophobia function independently and jointly, this piece aspires to facilitate practical interventions against state policies that infringe on the civil liberties of Muslims, as well as hate crimes and private violence inflicted on Muslims and “Muslim-looking” subjects.

While debates questioning the efficacy of Islamophobia and its associated definitions persist, “‘Islamophobia’ has already gained wide traction in public discourse and is the most concise and recognizable term currently used to describe prejudice and discrimination” toward Muslims.¹³⁶ Indeed, increasing use of the term within popular and scholarly spaces illustrates a resonance that supersedes alleged or debated limitations—most prominently the framing of anti-Muslim animus as a “phobia,” which may lead to viewing this animus as irrational and aberrant, instead of structural and strategic.¹³⁷ However, such criticisms are hardly distinct to Islamophobia. They were once attributed to “anti-Semitism,” “homophobia,” and other “widely accepted descriptors” that seek to strategically encapsulate complex, fluid, and multidimensional systems of bigotry.¹³⁸

The search for a perfect term must be replaced by a quest to tailor a more potent tool—specifically, a precise and comprehensive definition of Islamophobia that reveals its structural dimensions, examines how it is carried out by private actors, and analyzes the dynamic interplay between institutions and individuals. The need for this tool is more urgent than ever at a time when Islamophobia and its many menacing tentacles

135 See *id.* at 833-44 (seeking to “engage with the limitations” of the NYPD radicalization report).

136 Bridge Initiative, *The Right Word*, *supra* note 6.

137 Singh, *The Death of Islamophobia*, *supra* note 5.

138 *Id.*; see Bridge Initiative, *The Right Word*, *supra* note 6 (“[W]ords like

‘anti-Semitism,’ ‘racism,’ and ‘homophobia’—all of which have linguistic or conceptual problems—are widely accepted descriptors...prejudice...Both academics and the general public have left behind qualms about these terms’ linguistic shortcomings and use them freely to identify prejudice and discrimination against these groups.”).

dominate our discourse—at a time when presidential candidates peddle Muslim bans and Muslim neighborhood police forces,¹³⁹ hate crimes are on the rise, and counter-radicalization surveillance in Muslim American communities continues to expand. “Islamophobia” may be an imperfect

term, but it continues to show itself as a potent instrument to broaden understanding, advocacy, and intellectual interventions that combat the state and societal animus targeting Muslims and perceived Muslims.

139 Khaled A. Beydoun, “Ted Cruz Has Already Won: His Absurd Plan to Police Muslims Is Already Happening,” *Salon*, Mar. 26, 2016, [http://www.](http://www.salon.com/2016/03/26/ted_cruz_has_already_won_his_absurd_plan_to_police_muslims_is_already_happening/)

[salon.com/2016/03/26/ted_cruz_has_already_won_his_absurd_plan_to_police_muslims_is_already_happening/](http://www.salon.com/2016/03/26/ted_cruz_has_already_won_his_absurd_plan_to_police_muslims_is_already_happening/).

Countering Violent Extremism: Harming Civil Rights and Hurting Communities Based on a False Promise of Success

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Introduction

Countering violent extremism (CVE) programs have existed for several years in the United States and abroad. The U.S.-based version has been largely modeled on the Prevent program in the United Kingdom, multiple iterations of which have been discredited for their ineffectiveness and stigmatization of Muslim communities.¹⁴⁰ The U.S. CVE program has been both problematic and counterproductive, stigmatizing and alienating communities and threatening their civil and human rights.¹⁴¹

In the United States, the government's purported goal seems laudable: to prevent violence by strengthening communities.¹⁴² Unfortunately, the initiatives themselves are based upon discredited and unscientific theories, unjustly target Muslim communities, and infringe upon constitutional rights.

Under the current administration, these concerns have grown. Increased discrimination against Muslims through a range of policies has

emboldened harassment and attacks on Muslim communities, making the targeting of Muslim communities through CVE initiatives an even more dangerous contributor to this environment. The Trump administration has made its distrust and stigmatization of Muslim communities a fundamental tenet of its agenda. Damaging trust with local communities creates an environment in which individuals are less likely to engage with government or report crimes. When people do not report crimes such as harassment, domestic violence, or assault, whole communities are less safe. As a result, the already problematic CVE framework harms community safety and damages attempts to strengthen communities while doing little to prevent violence.

State of Play

In 2011, the White House released its "Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States."¹⁴³ This plan stated that it sought to prevent violent extremists and those supporting

140 See Communities and Local Government Committee, "Preventing Violent Extremism," House of Commons, Sixth Report of Session 2009-2010 (2010), <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmlc/65/65.pdf>.

141 See, e.g., Daniel Hurst, "Refugees May Face Monitoring and Further Restrictions, Leaked Document Suggests," *The Guardian*, Feb. 4, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/feb/05/refugees-may-face-monitoring-further-restrictions-leaked-document>; David Batty, "Prevent Strategy 'Sowing Mistrust and Fear in Muslim Communities,'" *The Guardian*, Feb. 3, 2016 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/feb/03/prevent-strategy-sowing-mistrust-fear-muslim-communities>; Christopher Werth, "British Efforts to Curb Islamic Radicalization Seen as Ineffective," *L.A. Times*, Dec. 4, 2014, <http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-britain-terrorism-bill-20141204-story.html>; Shalailah Medhora, "Turnbull Defends anti-Extremism Programs Despite No Proof They Work," *The Guardian*, Nov. 24, 2015, [https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/nov/24/turnbull-](https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/nov/24/turnbull-defends-anti-extremism-programs-despite-no-proof-they-work)

[defends-anti-extremism-programs-despite-no-proof-they-work](https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/nov/24/turnbull-defends-anti-extremism-programs-despite-no-proof-they-work).

142 See generally Office of the President, "Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States," *The White House* (Dec. 2011), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf>.

143 *Id.*

144 *Id.* at 1-2.

145 Office of the President, "Fact Sheet: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism," *The White House*, Feb. 18, 2015, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism>.

146 "Press Release, Countering Violent Extremism Task Force," *Dept. of Homeland Security*, Jan. 8, 2016, <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/01/08/countering-violent-extremism-task-force>.

them from “inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit acts of violence.”¹⁴⁴ In furtherance of that goal, the government announced its CVE initiative in 2014. The White House CVE Summit sought to advance these efforts in 2015¹⁴⁵ and again in 2016, with the Department of Homeland Security’s creation of a CVE Task Force to coordinate government efforts and partnerships to further these goals.¹⁴⁶ Through the remainder of the Obama administration’s implementation of these alleged CVE initiatives, the concerns of organizations and communities grew regarding the threat to fundamental rights, division of communities and damage to relationships with law enforcement, and casting of suspicion on whole communities without basis.

These initiatives sought to address terrorism or “homegrown terrorism” by developing relationships between community and religious leaders and law enforcement, among others. But focusing on these relationships as the solution to terrorism or extremism created relationships through which Muslim communities were primarily viewed through a law enforcement lens, and it soon became clear that these programs were a gateway for unwarranted law enforcement surveillance. For example, as a part of these efforts, law enforcement agencies required or asked teachers and social and mental health providers to monitor and report on children in their care who might be at risk of becoming “extremists”¹⁴⁷—a vague and overly broad term. According to National Counterterrorism Center guidelines, students would be rated by teachers and social workers on a five-point scale using factors like “perceived sense of being treated unjustly,” “expressions of hopelessness, futility,” and “connection to group identity (race, nationality, religion, ethnicity).”¹⁴⁸ The

FBI released a new website in 2016 geared toward teachers, parents, and teenagers that instructed its users to report people who exhibit “warning signs” that they may commit violence.¹⁴⁹ It provided examples such as taking pictures of buildings or talking about traveling to places that “sound suspicious.”¹⁵⁰ The government implemented local pilot initiatives to achieve these goals in Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis.¹⁵¹ These pilots followed the same practices of monitoring students as purported growing threats based upon these innocuous factors. For example, in Minneapolis,

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school staff were instructed to monitor children in the lunchroom and after school to identify signs of extreme beliefs,¹⁵² and in Boston, law enforcement and mental health and social service agencies were instructed to establish or enhance “formal and informal lines of communication” around such threats.¹⁵³

In the first year of the Trump administration, there have been some changes to the government’s CVE initiatives, though any larger strategy remains to be articulated. Initial reports indicated that the administration may disregard the few CVE initiatives that focused on non-Muslims, and more explicitly focus on targeting and

147 See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Partner Engagement, “Preventing Violent Extremism in Schools,” January 2016, <https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-PreventingExtremismSchools.pdf>.

148 See Murtaza Hussain, Cora Currier, and Jana Winter, “Is Your Child a Terrorist? U.S. Government Questionnaire Rates Families At Risk for Extremism,” *The Intercept*, Feb. 9, 2015, <https://theintercept.com/2015/02/09/government-develops-questionnaire-see-might-become-terrorist/>.

149 See Federal Bureau of Investigation, “When to Report Violent Extremism” <https://cve.fbi.gov/where/?state=report>. Last accessed March 27, 2018.

150 Id.

151 Office of Public Affairs, “Pilot Programs are Key to Our Countering Violent Extremism Efforts,” Dept. of Justice, Feb. 18, 2015, <https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/pilot-programs-are-key-our-countering-violent-extremism-efforts>.

152 See, e.g., C-Span, “Minneapolis Public Schools CVE Program,” March 9, 2015, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4530677/minneapolis-public-school-cve-program>.

153 United States Attorney’s Office, “A Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies: Incorporating Violent Extremism into Violence Prevention Efforts,” Dept. of Homeland Security, Feb. 2015, p. 8, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Boston%20Framework_1.pdf.

surveillance of Muslim communities—potentially rebranding programs as “Countering Violent Islamic Extremism” or “Countering Radical Islamic Extremism.”¹⁵⁴ While reports of rebranding these programs to explicitly target Muslims have subsided, the government continues to connect extremism almost exclusively to Muslims and Islam, thereby making their intent clear.

Additionally, the Trump administration has escalated its counterterrorism and law enforcement-based approach to Muslim communities, using CVE as one of its tools. Specifically, already-designated CVE grants were reallocated to focus

to continue the work after the grant cycle ended.¹⁵⁸ Notably, the new June 2017 grantees were largely law enforcement-based agencies.

Baseless and Unfounded: CVE as a Practice

The premise of CVE initiatives is that adopting or expressing extreme or radical ideas puts individuals on a path toward violence, and that there are observable “indicators” to identify people who might engage in terrorism or other violence.¹⁵⁹ This premise is false, debunking the whole notion of these initiatives.

According to researchers, there are no identified reliable criteria that can predict who will commit a terrorist act.¹⁶⁰ Numerous empirical studies have concluded that a person’s decision to engage in political violence is a complex one, involving myriad environmental and individual factors, none of which is necessary or sufficient in every case, and none of which falls into a linear path or process resulting in violence.¹⁶¹ There are no known predictors of violence, including religiosity,¹⁶² which means that focusing on Muslims in response to extremism is not only discriminatory, it is also ineffective.

As there are no known patterns or predictors of “extremist” violence, law enforcement agencies should focus on violent behavior and criminal conduct rather than targeting individuals based upon their beliefs. Thus, law enforcement can conduct an investigation when there is reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime has been or is being committed. Focusing on baseless programs like CVE expends law enforcement resources on profiling wholesale communities, rather than on

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more on law enforcement. When Donald Trump came into power, the previous administration had already announced grants to 31 organizations to administer part of a \$10 million appropriation by Congress in 2016.¹⁵⁵ A few months later, the Trump administration froze these grants and proposed budget cuts that would bring the budget for these initiatives down to zero by fiscal year 2018.¹⁵⁶ On June 23, 2017, DHS announced revised grant awardees.¹⁵⁷ According to DHS officials, the change in grantees was based upon the criteria of partnership with law enforcement, prior experience in CVE and related efforts, and ability

154 Julia Edwards Ainsley, Dustin Volz, & Kristina Cooke, “Exclusive: Trump to Focus Counter-Extremism Program Solely on Islam-Sources” Reuters, Feb. 1, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-extremists-program-exclusiv/exclusive-trump-to-focus-counter-extremism-program-solely-on-islam-sources-idUSKBN15G5VO>.

155 Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by Secretary Johnson Announcing First Round of DHS’s Countering Violent Extremism Grants,” Dept. of Homeland Security, Jan. 13, 2017, <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/13/statement-secretary-jeh-johnson-announcing-first-round-dhss-countering-violent>.

156 Julia Edwards Ainsley, “White House Budget Slashes ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ Grants,” Reuters, May 23, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-budget-extremism/white-house-budget-slashes-countering-violent-extremism-grants-idUSKBN18J2HJ>.

157 “DHS Countering Violent Extremism Grants,” Dept. of Homeland Security, June 13, 2017, <https://www.dhs.gov/cvegrants>.

158 Jennifer Hansler, “DHS Shifts Focus of Funding to Counter Violent Extremism,” CNN, July 4, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/01/politics/cve-funding-changes/index.html>.

159 See, e.g. Strategic Implementation Plan, supra note 3 at 13.

160 See, e.g., Decl. of Marc Sageman, Latif V. Holder, No. 3:10-cv-00750, 2015 WL 1883890 (D. Or. Aug. 7, 2015), <https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/latif-et-al-v-holder-et-al-declaration-marc-sageman>; See Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell, and Michael King, “The Edge of Violence: A Radical Approach to Extremism,” DEMOS (2010) https://www.demos.co.uk/files/Edge_of_Violence_-_web.pdf.

161 National Defense Research Institute, “Social Science for Counterterrorism,” RAND (2009), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG849.pdf.

162 Faiza Patel, “ReThinking Radicalization,” The Brennan Center for Justice (2011), <http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/RethinkingRadicalization.pdf>.

actual threats, thereby making all communities less safe. It is imperative that law enforcement focus on evidence-based investigations in order to keep communities safe.

Constitutional Violations and Civil Rights Harms

In addition to the fact that studies indicate that the CVE initiatives are baseless, they are also substantially damaging to Muslim communities and the rights and protections of everyone living in the United States. These programs infringe upon constitutional rights such as free speech and religious liberty, and they violate the civil rights of individuals through bias-based profiling and by conducting surveillance of whole communities.

The First Amendment protects freedom of belief, religion, speech, and association. Our nation's founders recognized the importance of these rights, which is why they hold a special place in our history and in the Constitution. All viewpoints, no matter how extreme, are protected by the First Amendment, and radical ideals are just that: ideas.

Thus, CVE initiatives raise significant constitutional concerns because they target people based upon their ideas or beliefs, not any wrongful conduct. These initiatives unfairly and unjustifiably target entire Muslim communities, impacting their rights to free speech, association, and religious liberty. Monitoring these communities chills free speech and association because individuals are more likely to refrain from sharing their views if they know that the government is watching. Simultaneously, by targeting those who appear to be or who identify as Muslim, these programs also infringe on constitutional guarantees of religious equality as they appear to disfavor one set of religious beliefs.

Sadly, this type of monitoring or surveillance is not new to American history; many shameful moments in history include the surveillance

of communities whose beliefs the government disfavored or found offensive.¹⁶³ One prominent example was the surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and other civil rights leaders and activists whom the government labeled as radicals and

When government targets people based upon their beliefs or ideas, it is not preventing violence; it is simply wasting resources on an unfounded strategy while damaging the free speech and expression of the American people.

national security threats.¹⁶⁴ Looking back, it is clear that the civil rights movement depended on powerful leaders who exercised their constitutional rights to dissent and advocate, and that the FBI should not have been spying on them. In fact, the Senate's Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities found in its final report that these FBI surveillance activities violated laws and infringed upon the constitutional rights of free speech and association.¹⁶⁵ As with many current policies that target Muslim communities, the FBI claimed to be "protecting national security" and "preventing violence" during the civil rights movement.¹⁶⁶ Despite the abuse of authority and the impact on constitutional rights, the government continues to target communities for surveillance under the same false premises.

When government targets people based upon their beliefs or ideas, it is not preventing violence; it is simply wasting resources on an unfounded strategy while damaging the free speech and expression of the American people. When communities know that the government is monitoring their statements or actions, an environment of

¹⁶³ See, e.g. Michael German, "Radically Wrong: A Counterproductive Approach to Counterterrorism," American Civil Liberties Union, Feb. 14, 2013 <https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/radically-wrong-counterproductive-approach-counterterrorism>.

¹⁶⁴ See, e.g. David J. Garrow, "The FBI and Martin Luther King," The Atlantic (July/Aug. 2001) <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/07/the-fbi-and-martin-luther-king/302537/>.

¹⁶⁵ Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 2d Session, Report No. 94-755 (1976) available at <https://archive.org/details/finalreportofsel03unit>.

¹⁶⁶ Id. at 5-6.

fear and self-censorship is born that results in a silencing of free speech and a restriction of association. Similarly, targeting Muslims sends the message that practicing Islam will lead to surveillance by the government, thereby chilling the ability of Muslims to practice their faith.

Perpetuation of Stigma and Impact on the Ground

Until recently, CVE efforts by the federal government claimed to focus on all types of extremism, regardless of faith. However, even prior to the Trump administration's numerous anti-Muslim

mind—one way or another, these community members were the problem.

As seen in the implementation of these initiatives, these efforts place the onus on people who do not have expertise in “violent extremism” to identify and report threats based upon innocuous examples, making schools and mental health and social service agencies spaces of mistrust and fear. Schools should be environments in which curiosity and expression thrive. Mental health services should be safe spaces to share intimate struggles and fears, protected by confidentiality. Social services should be accessible for those who need assistance based upon the existing qualifications. These environments should be protected spaces for those in need or exploring their identities. Placing employees and professionals in these spaces in partnership with law enforcement agencies with the goal of spying on and reporting individuals corrupts these relationships and erodes trust. Targeting individuals without any reliable, factual basis damages free speech and expression and confidential relationships with mental health providers. Indeed, the result is to push Muslim communities into the corners of society, limiting their access to the learning and resources that others receive, while silencing their engagement within their own communities.

The impact of the stigma and perpetuation of the image of Muslims as suspicious cannot be overstated. Muslim leaders and community members in Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis have described how undue government scrutiny of local CVE pilot projects set them apart from their neighbors and painted them as suspect based simply on their faith, race, and ethnicity.¹⁶⁸ Focusing on Muslim communities sends the false message to local communities and the mainstream public that Muslims are inherently suspicious and

Focusing on Muslim communities sends the false message to local communities and the mainstream public that Muslims are inherently suspicious and prone to violence.

policies, the focus of CVE programs has been overwhelmingly on Muslim communities. For example, the pilot programs in Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis focused on Muslim populations. In fact, in monitoring these communities, some in law enforcement determined that even those who do not participate are suspicious, labeling them as “radicalized.”¹⁶⁷ In the eyes of law enforcement, members of these communities were suspect regardless of what they did—if they participated, they were monitored and expected to ascertain which youth were at risk; if they did not participate, they were labeled as radicalized. Local, state, and federal law enforcement descended into their communities having already made up their

167 See, e.g., Cora Currier, “Spies Among Us: How Community Outreach Programs to Muslims Blur Lines between Outreach and Intelligence,” *The Intercept*, January 21, 2015, <https://theintercept.com/2015/01/21/spies-among-us-community-outreach-programs-muslims-blur-lines-outreach-intelligence/>.

168 See, e.g., Statement of Muslim Organizations, Council on American-Islamic Relations-Minnesota et al., “Minnesota Muslims Concerned About New ‘Stigmatizing, Divisive and Ineffective’ CVE Pilot Program,” May 1, 2015, <http://files.ctctcdn.com/bd15115b001/d068ad69-9ad8-46a0-bdcd-b9d57454ed20.pdf>; Tamara Audi, “U.S. Muslim Community Divided Over White House Outreach Plan,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 20, 2015, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-muslim-community-divided-over-white-house-outreach-plan-1429555173>; Statement of Muslim Student Associations,

Muslim Students Association West, “Muslim Students Associations Across CA against Federal Government’s Countering Violent Extremism Programs,” (Feb. 21, 2015), <https://us4.campaign-archive.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e=%5BUNIQID%5D%5C%20Letter%20from%20Muslim%20Justice%20League%20et%20al.%20to%20Lisa%20O.%20Monaco%20Assistant%20to%20the%20President%20for%20Homeland%20Security%20and%20Counterterrorism%20-%20Feb%2013%202015%20available%20at%20http%3A%2F%2Fwww.brennancenter.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fanalysis%2FBoston%20Organizational%20Letter%20re%20CVE%20Concerns.pdf>; Press Release, Asian Americans Advancing Justice-Los Angeles et al., “Los Angeles Based Groups Serving American Muslim Communities Question Federal Government’s ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ Programs As Ill-Conceived, Ineffective, and Stigmatizing,” (Nov. 13, 2014) available at <https://www.advancingjustice-la.org/sites/default/files/20141113%20-%20MR%20-%20CVE%20Statement.pdf>.

prone to violence. Evidence has shown that this is untrue.¹⁶⁹ So not only is government selling a false narrative, it is also contributing to an environment in which Muslims are increasingly discriminated against and attacked for their faith, both as individuals and through their faith-based institutions.

Conclusion

For several years, the U.S. government has invested in these unfounded CVE initiatives. Impacted communities' requests for more information regarding these programs have often been met with silence. Constitutional concerns, civil rights implications, and the negative impact on Muslim communities go unaddressed. Yet, the infiltration and targeting of Muslim communities

continue—only now, under a government that explicitly names them as the problem. Law enforcement agencies have the duty of investigation, the goal of preventing violence, and the obligation of upholding the law. Unfortunately, CVE initiatives fail at all three. Rather than conducting evidence-based investigations, law enforcement is conducting bias-based profiling and surveillance of whole communities without basis. Claiming violence prevention, they are using baseless, ineffective theories as the foundation for their strategy. And, instead of upholding the law, they are violating the Constitution and the civil rights of the American people and contributing to an environment in which attacks against Muslims flourish.

¹⁶⁹ See *The Edge of Violence: A Radical Approach to Extremism*, supra note 20 (explaining that religious beliefs and practices are not good

predictors of violence).

Reducing a Threat to a Nuisance: A Holistic Strategy to Counter Islamophobia

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*In the name of God, Most Compassionate, Most Merciful
All praise and thanks belong to God, the Lord of the Worlds
May peace and prayers be upon Prophet Muhammad*

In many ways, Islamophobia is nothing new. Over the course of American history, almost every religious minority has experienced a systematic campaign of bigotry and discrimination before becoming fully enfranchised members of American society. Catholics went through it. Quakers went through it. So did the Jewish community.

Those religious minorities suffered everything from quiet suspicion to legalized discrimination to violent hostility. Different century, different community, same bigotry. People died. Houses of worship burned down. Courts upheld discriminatory laws.

Yet every one of those religious communities ultimately overcame such opposition. Catholics are now fully accepted and fully participating members of American society. The same is true for Quakers, Mormons, and Jews. Indeed, those and other historically disenfranchised religious communities have reached the highest levels of political, economic, and social power in the United States.

For a long time, that positive outcome seemed improbable, if not impossible. Quakers experienced discrimination as far back as the Revolutionary War because of their pacifistic religious beliefs.

“During the war, Quakers were disenfranchised, and Americans rounded up wealthy Quakers thought to be dangerous and transported them to safe areas away from the fighting and their homes. Only slowly after the war were Quaker voting rights restored.”¹⁷⁰

Jewish Americans were also maligned and marginalized going back to the founding. “After the Revolution, even the most tolerant states continued to deny citizenship and voting rights to Jews, although they were allowed to practice their religion, but usually not publicly. Not until the 19th century did states extend full citizenship to Jews.”¹⁷¹ Later, the U.S. infamously turned away Jewish refugees fleeing the Holocaust.¹⁷²

Perhaps the best example of how the American hazing process unfolds can be seen in the history of Catholic Americans. During Colonial times, Catholics were—to put it mildly—unwelcome, for British immigrants to North America brought a virulent hostility to Catholicism along with them.

Anti-Catholic bigotry persisted after the founding of the United States, seeping from public discourse into public policy. Even future Supreme Court Chief Justice John Jay argued that New

170 John Kaminski, “Religion and the Founding Fathers,” The Newsletter of the National Historical Publications and Records Commission, Vol. 30.1 (March 2002), <https://www.archives.gov/files/nhprc/annotation/2002/2002-mar.pdf>

171 Ibid.

172 Daniel Gross, “The United States Turned Away Thousands of Jewish Refugees Fearing They Were Nazi Spies,” Smithsonian Magazine, November 18, 2015, <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/us-government-turned-away-thousands-jewish-refugees-fearing-they-were-nazi-spies-180957324/>

173 Sewell Chan, “Is Anti-Catholicism Dead?,” The New York Times, July 23,

York's state constitution should require citizens to renounce any allegiance to foreign authorities in "ecclesiastical" matters, i.e., loyalty to the pope.¹⁷³

Anti-Catholic sentiment increased dramatically when waves of Irish immigrants came to America's shores during the 19th century. Conspiracy theories, pogroms, and economic marginalization haunted those immigrants. "Fears of Catholic conspiracies to take over the government endured from the 1820s to 1840s, prompting deadly riots in cities like Boston and Philadelphia."¹⁷⁴

The Know Nothing Party briefly transformed anti-Catholic bigotry into a somewhat successful political movement using language that should sound familiar to any modern student of Islamophobia. The party's 1856 platform called for "more stringent & effective Emigration Laws," "Eternal enmity to all those who attempt to carry out the principles of a foreign Church or State," "Our Country, our whole Country, and nothing but our Country," and "American Laws, and American legislation; and death to all foreign influences, whether in high places or low!"¹⁷⁵

The Know Nothing Party eventually withered and died, but its anti-Catholic sentiments lasted for decades. Several states passed laws requiring children to attend public schools so as to prevent them from attending private Catholic schools. Catholic politicians faced open hostility.¹⁷⁶ The KKK "thrived in many urban areas as an agent of resistance to rising Catholic political influence."¹⁷⁷

Yet Catholics eventually won their struggle. They built houses of worship across the country, as well as private schools. This ensured safe spaces to educate, organize, and advance their communities. They established organizations dedicated to defending their rights in the court of law and their reputation in the court of public opinion. They engaged in the very political process that once shunned them, becoming a critical voting bloc before winning elections in their own right, culminating with President Kennedy's victory in 1960.

Change did not happen overnight, but anti-Catholic laws were eventually repealed or struck down. Anti-Catholic organizations lost financial and political power, devolving into irrelevance. Catholics and Protestants healed their divisions when they found themselves on the same side of political debates about abortion and other issues important to social conservatives.

As of 2017, 67 percent of Americans "feel warmly" toward Catholics.¹⁷⁸ Although some Americans may still hold anti-Catholic sentiment, such people no longer pose a serious or constant threat to the legal rights or physical safety of the Catholic community.

Today, there can be no doubt that American Muslims claim a large corner of the market once occupied by Catholics and other suspect religious minorities. In fact, history has repeated itself with remarkable consistency.

Today's anti-Muslim activists, organizations, and politicians rant about the supposed dangers of Islam with the same level of hysteria that yesterday's Know-Nothings used to rant against Catholicism. Both Muslims and Catholics were accused of being dangerous immigrants, culturally irredeemable, and loyal to foreign powers.

For Catholics, the supposed foreign puppet master was the church. In the case of American Muslims, it could be the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Al-Qaida or ISIS, depending on the particular conspiracy theory.

Because of the similarities between anti-Catholic and anti-Muslim bigotry, it is comforting and perhaps even reasonable to assume that American Muslims will eventually and inevitably experience the same positive outcome as Catholics.

Demographic realities give American Muslims some reason to be optimistic. As of 2017, 58 percent of Americans between the ages of 18 and 29 reportedly held "warm feelings" toward Muslims, while only 44 percent of Americans aged 65 and older express similar feelings.¹⁷⁹ If

2008, <https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/23/is-anti-catholicism-dead/>

174 Ibid.

175 "Guide to the Know-Nothing Platform, 1856." Collection Guides, Duke University, <https://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/scriptorium/americanvotes/know-nothing.html>

176 Josh Zeitz, "When America Hated Catholics," *POLITICO Magazine*, September 23, 2015, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/09/>

when-america-hated-catholics-213177

177 Ibid.

178 "How Americans Feel About Different Religious Groups," Pew Research Center, February 15, 2017, <http://www.pewforum.org/2017/02/15/americans-express-increasingly-warm-feelings-toward-religious-groups/>

179 Ibid.

180 James Hutson, "The Founding Fathers and Islam," *Information*

those trends hold, American Muslims may, sooner or later, overcome the challenge that Catholics survived before us.

Many of the African slaves brought to North America were Muslim, Muslims fought in every major American conflict since the Revolutionary War, the Founding Fathers specifically envisioned religious freedom for "Mahometans," and Muslim-majority Morocco was the first nation to officially recognize the United States.

However, success is not guaranteed, for the struggle American Muslims face is unique in several critical ways.

First, Islam is not particularly new to America. Muslims were here before America was America. Many of the African slaves brought to North America were Muslim, Muslims fought in every major American conflict since the Revolutionary War, the Founding Fathers specifically envisioned religious freedom for "Mahometans," and Muslim-majority Morocco was the first nation to officially recognize the United States.¹⁸⁰

American Muslims like Muhammad Ali and Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, both proudly and publicly Muslim, achieved mainstream popularity decades ago. Even Malcolm X, perhaps one of the most controversial men of his time, went on to become widely respected, recognized to this day in both film¹⁸¹ and literature.¹⁸²

Yet none of this positive history has inspired

enough good will to shield American Muslims from the taint of conspiracy theories or the threat of discrimination.

The other unique aspect of Islamophobia is its racist aspect.¹⁸³ The vast majority of American Muslims are people of color. In fact, American Muslims represent the most racially diverse religious group in the United States.¹⁸⁴ Perhaps this is why the epithets hurled at Muslims, spray-painted on the walls of mosques, and used against non-Muslims who fit the stereotype of a Muslim (particularly Sikhs) often include a racial component.

Although ethnic hatred played a similar role in hostility toward Irish Catholics, the fact that Irish immigrants were white Europeans undoubtedly made it easier for the community to be accepted. The same is true for Quakers, Mormons, and Jews.

On the other hand, racial minorities—including indigenous peoples and African-Americans—have been struggling against systematic injustice for hundreds of years, with no clear end in sight. Because American Muslims are also largely people of color who face hostility because of both their religion and their ethnicity, Islamophobia may last considerably longer than, for example, anti-Catholic sentiment did.

Another unique aspect of Islamophobia is the overlapping and interacting role that terrorist attacks, political campaigns, lopsided media coverage, and government policies play in artificially fomenting it.

Although manifestations of Islamophobia existed as far back as the 1980s—just identify the villain in some of Hollywood's most popular action movies—Islamophobia did not pose a common and constant physical threat to American Muslims until Al-Qaeda perpetrated 9/11.¹⁸⁵

Bulletin, Library of Congress, Vol. 61, No. 5 (May 2002), <https://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/0205/tolerance.html>; Kerry Dolan, "Why Morocco Matters to the U.S.," *Forbes*, November 21, 2013, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kerryadolan/2013/11/21/why-morocco-matters-to-the-u-s/#5aa1fd124f75>

181 Roger Ebert, "Reviews: Malcolm X," *RogerEbert.com*, November 18, 1992, <https://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/malcolm-x-1992>

182 Madison Gary, "All Time 100 Non-Fiction Books: The Autobiography of Malcolm X," *Time Magazine*, August 17, 2011, <http://entertainment.time.com/2011/08/30/all-time-100-best-nonfiction-books/slide-the-autobiography-of-malcolm-x-as-told-to-alex-haley/>

183 Amy McCaig, "Islamophobia Represents a Form of Racism Mixed with

Cultural Intolerance," *Rice University News*, September 14, 2017, <http://news.rice.edu/2017/09/14/islamophobia-represents-a-form-of-racism-mixed-with-cultural-intolerance/>

184 "Muslim Americans Exemplify Diversity, Potential," *Gallup*, March 2, 2009, <http://news.gallup.com/poll/116260/muslim-americans-exemplify-diversity-potential.aspx>

185 "Data: Hate Crimes Spiked Against Muslims After 9/11," *Public Radio International*, September 12, 2016, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-09-12/data-hate-crimes-against-muslims-increased-after-911>

In the immediate aftermath of the attack, hate crimes against Muslims, and those perceived to be Muslim, multiplied overnight. Numerous mosques were vandalized. Commentators took to the airwaves, making jihad a household word.

Despite the fact that right-wing extremists have committed the majority of domestic terrorist attacks since 9/11, media outlets give the opposite impression by amplifying violent attacks committed by Muslims.¹⁸⁶ According to a Rice University study, violent attacks “by Muslim perpetrators received, on average, 449 percent more coverage than crimes carried out by non-Muslims.”¹⁸⁷

Reporters also rush to place such attacks in the context of religion, throwing around the terms “Islamic fundamentalism,” “radical Islam,” and “jihadist” with abandon.

Few other groups suffer such treatment. Although the Oklahoma City bomber was a U.S. military veteran who considered himself a patriot opposed to the excesses of the federal government, no media outlet describes Timothy McVeigh or other right-wing extremists as “radical patriots,” much less “patriotists.”

Between 24-hour news channels, online news coverage, newspapers, magazines, and Hollywood movies, Muslims face an Islamophobic media atmosphere far more pervasive than what Catholics and other targeted religious minorities had to face in the past.

Politics also obviously plays an outsized role. Public manifestations of anti-Muslim bigotry leveled off in the years after 9/11, but spiked again in 2010¹⁸⁸ for a variety of reasons:

- The departure of President George W. Bush, who kept a lid on Islamophobia within the Republican Party by speaking of Islam and Muslims in friendly ways even as he pursued

policies considered harmful to Muslims.¹⁸⁹

- Backlash against President Obama, who was accused of being everything from overly friendly to Muslims to a Muslim himself.¹⁹⁰
- Controversy over the so-called Ground Zero Mosque, a political hot potato that served as a rallying cry and coming-out party for anti-Muslim hate groups.
- Tea Party victories in that year’s midterm congressional elections, which gave anti-Muslim activists political power.

Although manifestations of Islamophobia existed as far back as the 1980s—just identify the villain in some of Hollywood’s most popular action movies—Islamophobia did not pose a common and constant physical threat to American Muslims until Al-Qaida perpetrated 9/11.

For obvious reasons, Islamophobia went on to reach a fever pitch during the bloody rise of ISIS and the openly anti-Muslim presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump.

Finally, it is also worth noting the unique role that government agencies sometimes play in spreading anti-Muslim animus.

During the waning years of the George W. Bush administration, the Justice Department publicly, dubiously, and improperly labeled over 300 American Muslim organizations “unindicted co-conspirators” in the prosecution of the Holy Land Foundation.¹⁹¹ Although a federal court later ruled that the government violated the Fifth Amendment rights of those groups by doing so, anti-Muslim bigots still cite the incident to malign American Muslims.¹⁹²

186 Miriam Valverde, “A Look at the Data on Domestic Terrorism and Who’s Behind It,” PolitiFact, August 16, 2017, <http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2017/aug/16/look-data-domestic-terrorism-and-whos-behind-it/>

187 Craig Considine, “The Racialization of Islam in the United States: Islamophobia, Hate Crimes and ‘Flying While Brown,’” Religions, 8, no. 165 (2017), <http://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/8/9/165>

188 “Hate Crime Statistics 2010,” U.S. Department of Justice, accessed April 6, 2018, <https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses>

189 “Islam is Peace,” White House Historic Archives, September 17, 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/>

[releases/2001/09/20010917-11.html](https://www.fbi.gov/pressroom/2001/09/20010917-11.html)

190 Kathleen Parker, “If Obama is a Muslim, is Trump a Russian Spy?” The Washington Post, January 6, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/if-obama-is-a-muslim-is-trump-a-russian-spy/2017/01/06/26fe7128-d45c-11e6-a783-cd3fa950f2fd_story.html?utm_term=.e9f14aa360ac

191 U.S. v. North American Islamic Trust, U.S. Court of Appeals, No. 09-10875 (Fifth Circuit, October 20, 2010).

192 “About Frank Gaffney, Jr.,” Southern Poverty Law Center, accessed April 6, 2018, <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/frank-gaffney-jr>

During the Obama administration, the federal government formally established the Countering Violent Extremism program. Despite its generic name, the program placed particular focus on the threat of Muslim extremist groups,¹⁹³ as opposed to the more common threat of white supremacist and right-wing groups.

As for the Trump administration, it has openly transformed anti-Muslim bigotry into government policy, appointing known anti-Muslim extremists to government positions, instituting the Muslim Ban, and frequently reminding the American people to fear “Radical Islamic Terrorism.”¹⁹⁴

There are other national and local incidents of government agencies casting a spotlight of suspicion on Muslims, from the New York Police Department’s spying program,¹⁹⁵ all the way back to the FBI’s efforts to monitor and infiltrate African-American Muslims during the civil rights movement.¹⁹⁶

In light of these and other unique factors, American Muslims cannot rest comfortably in the hope that they will inevitably experience the same positive outcome as Catholics. Nor can American Muslims wait for elderly bigots to die off, or for young pluralists to grow old.

Point being: The American Muslim community has been held hostage to recurring domestic and international events. Muslims are always just one terrorist attack, campaign season, or government policy away from an artificial surge in anti-Muslim bigotry.

In light of these and other unique factors, American Muslims cannot rest comfortably in the hope that they will inevitably experience the same positive outcome as Catholics. Nor can American Muslims wait for elderly bigots to die off, or for young pluralists to grow old.

Because Islamophobia results from a complex set of interacting factors—some domestic, some international—the only sure way to defeat Islamophobia in the long term is to proactively address the underlying factors that inspire it. American Muslims must do what Catholic Americans did, and even more, to defeat it.

To that end, Muslim American organizations—including my own, the Council on American-Islamic Relations—have pursued a multipronged strategy to counter Islamophobia.

Founded in 1994, CAIR’s official mission is to enhance understanding of Islam, protect civil rights, promote justice, and empower American Muslims. With over 30 chapters across the nation, CAIR now bills itself as the largest Muslim civil rights and advocacy organization in the United States.

CAIR’s earliest prominent projects involved criticizing the Islamophobia of the action film “True Lies”¹⁹⁷ and persuading Nike to recall an athletic shoe featuring the name of God written in Arabic.¹⁹⁸ But terrorist attacks like the Oklahoma City bombing, which was initially and incorrectly linked to the Middle East¹⁹⁹, and 9/11 thrust CAIR into the national spotlight as it worked to counter Islamophobia in both the court of law and the court of public opinion.

Here in Atlanta, the Georgia chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations does the same on a smaller scale. As a rural and politically conservative Southern state, Georgia might seem

193 Eric Rosand, “Fixing CVE in the United States requires more than just a name change,” Brookings Institution, Feb. 16, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/02/16/fixing-cve-in-the-united-states-requires-more-than-just-a-name-change/>

194 Maha Hilal, “Trump’s Year in Islamophobia,” Institute for Policy Studies, December 21, 2017, <http://www.ips-dc.org/trumps-year-islamophobia/>

195 Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, “After Spying on Muslims, NYPD Agrees to Greater Oversight,” The New York Times, March 6, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/nyregion/nypd-spying-muslims-surveillance-lawsuit.html>

196 Zaheer Ali, “What Happened To Malcolm X?” CNN, February 17, 2015, <https://www.cnn.com/2015/02/17/opinion/ali-malcolm-x-assassination-anniversary/index.html>

197 “Arab-Americans Protest ‘True Lies,’” The New York Times, July 16, 1994, <https://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/16/movies/arab-americans-protest-true-lies.html>

198 Carlyle Murphy, “Nike Pulls Shoes That Irked Muslims,” The Washington Post, June 25, 1997, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1997/06/25/nike-pulls-shoes-that-irked-muslims/b02211fb-c120-4780-9ce4-4c01225c8e92/?utm_term=.fd36867156e5

199 Carla Hall, & Larry Stammer, “Terror in Oklahoma City: American Muslims Feel Sting of Accusations in Bombing’s Wake,” The Los Angeles Times, April 22, 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-04-22/news/mn-57460_1_oklahoma-city-bombing

like fertile ground for anti-Muslim sentiment.

However, the beating heart of the state, Atlanta, is a diverse city with historical ties to the civil rights movement, as well as a large, and largely accepted, African-American Muslim population. Georgia Muslims of various other backgrounds live in and around Atlanta. The city of Clarkston, just east of Atlanta, also has a significant population of Muslim refugees, mostly from Somalia.

Georgia is also home to major corporations, media outlets, sports teams, a presidential library, and the world's busiest airport. All of this has created a diverse environment in which Georgia Muslims experience the best and worst of life as American Muslims.

This also makes Georgia a unique testing ground for what does and does not work in the struggle against Islamophobia.

For example, Georgia state legislators have repeatedly tried to pass a law banning courts from considering "foreign law," the latest iteration of what critics call anti-Shari'a hysteria.²⁰⁰

The Georgia bill has failed because of opposition from Jewish groups, as well as the business community, both of which expressed concern about the symbolic and practical dangers of such legislation.

School bullying is obviously a problem for every community, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Georgia is no exception.

Violent hate crimes against Georgia Muslims are rare. In the 10 years since an arsonist burned a mosque to the ground in Savannah, no Georgia mosque has been similarly damaged.²⁰¹

Hate speech is more common. Numerous mosques received threats in the wake of Donald Trump's election victory, and one mosque received almost 30 minutes of voicemail messages left by a man who threatened to shoot, bomb, decapitate,

and otherwise attack its members.²⁰² The FBI arrested him in late 2017.²⁰³

Multiple Georgia counties have attempted to slow or block the construction of mosques, including Newton County in 2016. The county reversed course and allowed the mosque to proceed after a combination of community pressure, private negotiations, and public outrage.²⁰⁴

Those problems are not unique to Georgia, which is a microcosm of the nation at large. The four strategies we have employed to address these issues locally can be applied nationally, and perhaps even internationally.

I. Educating the Muslim Community

People who are not familiar with their rights cannot easily defend their rights. CAIR Georgia and other civil rights organizations have therefore delivered dozens of Know Your Rights seminars at mosques in recent years so that the community has the knowledge and confidence to protect itself. The seminars give particular focus to traffic stops, courtroom visits, FBI interviews, and airport travel, as well as a person's rights as an employee in the workplace.

In providing this educational service, we work to ensure that the community is aware of both its legal rights and responsibilities, thus reducing the risk that Georgia Muslims who experience discrimination will fail to remedy it.

II. Engaging With People of Different Faiths and Backgrounds

Education is without doubt the best vaccine against discrimination. For that reason, "enhancing understanding of Islam" has been part of CAIR's mission since its founding.

Polling data confirms the obvious: Americans who know Muslims are more likely to hold a

200 Zaid Jilani, "At Least 13 States Have Introduced Bills Guarding Against Non-Existent Threat of Shari'a Law," ThinkProgress, February 8, 2011, <https://thinkprogress.org/report-at-least-13-states-have-introduced-bills-guarding-against-non-existent-threat-of-sharia-law-49c0ab42be1f/>

201 Ariel Hart, "Georgia: Arson Ruling in Mosque Fire," The New York Times, August 26, 2003, <https://mobile.nytimes.com/2003/08/26/us/national-briefing-south-georgia-arson-ruling-in-mosque-fire.html>

202 "CAIR Georgia Welcomes Arrest of White Supremacist Who Allegedly Phoned Threats to Georgia Mosque," CAIR Georgia, December 14, 2017, <http://cairgeorgia.com/press-releases/488-cair-georgia-welcomes-arrest-of-white-supremacist-who-allegedly-phoned-threats-to-georgia-mosque.html>

203 Ellen Eldridge, "Missouri Man Indicted Over Threats to Georgia Mosque," The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, December 14, 2017, <https://www.ajc.com/news/local/missouri-man-indicted-over-threats-georgia-mosque/YoIGclnZqPiXc0mb06fu8K/>

204 Meris Lutz, "Ban Affecting Newton County Mosque Expires," The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, September 20, 2016, <https://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt-politics/ban-affecting-newton-county-mosque-expires/z0HhbEq16CnS9ToD806u5H/>

favorable view of Muslims, while those who don't know any Muslims are more likely to hold a negative view of the community.²⁰⁵

As such, CAIR Georgia spends considerable time and energy explaining Islam to people of other faiths, answering tough questions about the Muslim community, and finding opportunities to collaborate on an interfaith basis. Interfaith

American Muslim organizations must not hesitate to dialogue with conservative religious and political groups, including – and especially – those predisposed to hold suspicious views toward Muslims.

dialogue is increasingly common, but it too often happens among progressive religious communities that are already inclined to get along with people of different faiths.

American Muslim organizations must not hesitate to dialogue with conservative religious and political groups, including—and especially—those predisposed to hold suspicious views toward Muslims.

That's why CAIR Georgia launched an outreach program aimed at political conservatives a few years ago.²⁰⁶ That's why over 20 Georgia mosques unite every year to host a statewide Visit a Mosque Day, encouraging and welcoming thousands of Georgians to visit their local mosques.²⁰⁷ All comers are welcome, as are all questions.

Dialoguing in this frank but friendly way is a necessary, but not sufficient, part of changing hearts and minds in the long term.

III. Building Coalitions With Other Communities

For over 20 years, CAIR's mission statement has called for the organization to "build coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding." The importance of this clause has become even more evident in recent years.

CAIR National and many of its chapters have redoubled their efforts to support other maligned and marginalized groups, including African-Americans impacted by police brutality, Latinos targeted by unjust immigration policies, and other religious groups targeted by hate crimes, including Jewish and Sikh Americans.

Forming such "intersectional" alliances is also happening at the national level, perhaps best exemplified by the work of activist Linda Sarsour.²⁰⁸ By uniting different communities to face a common threat, targeted groups hope to better protect themselves and each other.

IV. Countering Anti-Muslim Hate Groups

Even as American Muslims dialogue with our neighbors and collaborate with other civil rights groups, we must also confront anti-Muslim extremists who seek to spread the disease of bigotry. CAIR's national office long ago established a Department to Monitor & Combat Islamophobia, which tracks the complex web of Islamophobic groups operating across the United States, including Brigitte Gabriel's ACT for America, Pamela Geller's Stop the Islamization of America, and Ryan Mauro's Clarion Project.²⁰⁹

Like the Know-Nothings of the past, these groups feast off ignorance and traffic in bigotry, all for the sake of maligning and marginalizing American Muslims. With a collective budget of hundreds of millions of dollars, and plenty of free

205 Shibley Telhami, "What Americans Really Think About Muslims and Islam," Brookings Institution, December 9, 2015, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/12/09/what-americans-really-think-about-muslims-and-islam/>

206 Johnny Kauffman, "Ga. Muslim Group To Expand, Focus on Talks with Republicans," WABE, August 19, 2016, <https://www.wabe.org/ga-muslim-group-expand-focus-talks-republicans/>

207 Steve King, "Dozens Learn About Islam At Local Mosque," WJCL 22, March 11, 2017, [http://www.wjcl.com/article/dozens-learn-about-islam-at-](http://www.wjcl.com/article/dozens-learn-about-islam-at-local-mosque/9122297)

[local-mosque/9122297](http://www.wjcl.com/article/dozens-learn-about-islam-at-local-mosque/9122297)

208 Ali Gharib, "Muslim, American, and Intersectional: The Activism of Linda Sarsour," American Civil Liberties Union, August 22, 2016, <https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/muslim-american-intersectional-activism-linda-sarsour>

209 "U.S. Islamophobia Network," The Council on American-Islamic Relations, accessed April 6, 2018, <http://www.islamophobia.org/islamophobia-network/organizations.html>

airtime on Fox News, such organizations wield considerable influence over a certain segment of the American population.

Although sound strategy sometimes demands that Muslims ignore these groups altogether, lest they benefit from a public spat with Muslim activists, the 2016 election confirms how dangerous such groups can be when they are able to quietly build, and ultimately attain, power.

The Muslim Ban, and other ongoing attempts to limit legal immigration from Muslim countries, represents the manifestation of an Islamophobic wish list years in the making. The anti-Muslim hate groups behind these policies must be debated, ostracized, and condemned with the same level of force used to speak out against anti-Semitic and racist organizations.

V. Politically Empower American Muslims

If we had to identify the symbolic moment that officially and finally marked the end of anti-Catholic bigotry as a serious force, it would be the election of President Kennedy. Although it seems impossible to imagine an American Muslim winning the presidency anytime in the foreseeable future, Muslims can, should, and must continue to make political headway.

Long before Kennedy took the oath of office, Catholic Americans formed an identifiable and critical voting bloc, wielding influence over their elected officials. That meant running for office, registering voters, lobbying elected officials, endorsing candidates for office, and otherwise becoming actively involved in politics.

Prominent Muslim candidates for office in Arizona, Michigan, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and other states are doing just that in 2018, campaigning for everything from governor to Congress to U.S. Senate. In doing so, candidates hope to walk through the doors previously opened by Rep. Keith Ellison, Rep. Andre Carson, and state Rep. Ilhan Omar.

Whether these latest Muslim candidates win or lose in 2018, their participation in the electoral process is critical to advancing and empowering American Muslims in the political arena.

VI. Countering Extremism Effectively

Let us first note that American Muslims have no obligation to speak out against what we had nothing to do with in the first place, nor do American Muslims have some unique ability to single-handedly put an end to violent attacks by extremist groups.

Nevertheless, Muslim leaders and organizations speak out against unjust violence associated with our faith because speaking out is the right thing to do. Speaking out also serves to disprove the claim that American Muslims never speak out, a view held by many Americans who may genuinely not realize that the horrific violence they see amplified in the media does not reflect the views of Muslims or the teachings of Islam.

Two months *before* the Orlando shooting massacre, CAIR Georgia hosted its first annual “Muslims Rebutting Extremism” seminar.²¹⁰ The event brought CAIR Georgia together with a Muslim expert in extremist groups from The Carter Center and a Georgia imam who once survived a terrorist attack.

Together, the three speakers directly addressed and rebutted the similar arguments that both anti-Muslim bigots and Muslim extremists use to justify their views. In doing so, the speakers sought to give imams and other local leaders tools they can use to both rebut Islamophobia and to rebut extremist views in the exceedingly rare event they encounter such views within the Muslim community.

When ISIS first emerged, CAIR National and other Muslim organizations also joined forces to release a detailed letter rebutting the extremist group’s arguments point by point. This was just one example of Muslims, here and abroad, standing up against extremism privately and internally.²¹¹

These efforts stand in stark contrast to

210 “Muslims Rebutting Extremism,” CAIR Georgia, August 29, 2017, <http://www.cairgeorgia.com/press-releases/469-muslims-rebutting-extremism-cair-georgia-hosts-2nd-annual-seminar-on-islamophobes-terrorists.html>

211 “Global Condemnations of ISIS/ISIL,” Islamic Networks Group, accessed April 6, 2018, <https://ing.org/global-condemnations-of-isis-isil/>

government-funded, government-run CVE programs, which arguably do more harm than good by casting suspicion on American Muslims without doing much to counter the actual threat of extremism. Such programs also lack the credibility to achieve support within the American Muslim community, much less an individual teetering on the brink of extremist ideas.²¹²

Even an effective CVE program—if such a thing exists—is only a defensive measure designed to treat symptoms, not cure the disease, which brings us to the next point.

VII. Seek a Just American Foreign Policy

If terrorism is a major contributing factor to Islamophobia, then ending Islamophobia requires us to solve the problems that lead to terrorism. Until we do, American Muslims will remain just one breaking news headline away from a surge in Islamophobia.

Although terrorist groups like ISIS and Boko Haram describe themselves as ideological creatures committed to killing or subjugating anyone who does not agree with their worldview, other terrorist actors tend to explain their horrific violence by citing political grievances with American foreign policy.

Indeed, some of the most infamous terrorists, including Osama Bin Laden²¹³, the surviving Boston Marathon bomber²¹⁴, the would-be Times Square bomber²¹⁵, and even the Orlando Pulse nightclub mass murderer,²¹⁶ complained about various aspects of U.S. foreign policy—American troops in the Middle East, drone strikes in Pakistan, U.S. support for Israel's treatment of Palestinians, etc.

To be clear, no country should ever change its foreign policy to mollify extremist groups, nor could the United States expect the threat of violence to suddenly and completely vanish if we

did so. But pursuing a just peace for Palestinians, ending support for corrupt dictatorships in the Arab world, closing Guantanamo Bay, and ceasing unjust military actions in the Middle East are simply sound moral policy.

As an added benefit of addressing those issues, our nation can reasonably expect that the recruiting base for extremist groups would considerably shrink. Fewer recruits mean fewer attacks, which means, ultimately and hopefully, the additional benefit of a downward trend in Islamophobic sentiments.

Conclusion

In many ways, Islamophobia is nothing new. American Muslims are simply the latest religious minority to face a systematic campaign of bigotry and discrimination. This hazing process has happened to other communities before us, and it may happen to other communities after us.

If the history fully repeats itself, American Muslims will eventually emerge from this period of difficulty stronger than they were before it started. However, people of good faith, of all faiths, cannot wait, or hope, for that outcome.

Because Islamophobia results from a complex set of interacting factors—some domestic, some international—the only sure way to defeat Islamophobia in the long term is to address the underlying factors that inspire it.

To that end, American Muslims must continue to defend their own civil rights, engage with their neighbors of other faiths, counter anti-Muslim hate groups, seek political empowerment at the ballot box, and push our government toward a more just and moral foreign policy.

In doing so, American Muslims can hope to eventually reduce Islamophobia from a threat to a nuisance.

212 Eric Rosand, "Fixing CVE in the United States requires more than just a name change," Brookings Institution, February 16, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/02/16/fixing-cve-in-the-united-states-requires-more-than-just-a-name-change/>

213 "Bin Laden Claims Responsibility for 9/11," Fox News, October 30, 2004, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/2004/10/30/bin-laden-claims-responsibility-for-11.html>

214 "Prosecutors: Boston Bombing Suspect Scrawled Motive of Attack Inside Boat," The Guardian, March 2, 2015, [https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/02/boston-bombing-pretrial-hearing-suspect-boat-](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/02/boston-bombing-pretrial-hearing-suspect-boat-evidence)

[evidence](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/02/boston-bombing-pretrial-hearing-suspect-boat-evidence)

215 "Times Square Bomber Faizal Shahzad Pleads Guilty '100 Times'" The Telegraph, June 22, 2010, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7845570/Times-Square-car-bomber-Faisal-Shahzad-pleads-guilty-100-times.html>

216 Glenn Greenwald and Murtaza Hussain, "As the Trial of Omar Mateen's Wife Begins, New Evidence Undermines Beliefs About the Pulse Massacre, Including Motive," The Intercept, March 5, 2018, <https://theintercept.com/2018/03/05/as-the-trial-of-omar-mateens-wife-begins-new-evidence-undermines-beliefs-about-the-pulse-massacre-including-motive/>

Four Things to Learn From France When Combating Islamophobia at a Policy Level

Marwan Muhammad

Collective Against Islamophobia in France

The last 15 years have provided us with enough experience (sometimes at our own expense) to discover what works and what doesn't when trying to address Islamophobia in France.

Historically, France perceives itself as the country of human rights, the place where fundamental freedoms meet rationality and free thinkers find safe haven, enlightened by a long-standing tradition of passionate and yet very civilized public debate. This belief is so deeply embedded in our perception of ourselves as a people that it doesn't allow for a critical examination of what has happened in France over the last generations, as far as races (as a social and political construct) and religions are concerned.

Any criticism from within France is treated as an attack on the republican model, an attempt to be divisive and fuel "communautarisme" (the supreme insult wielded at black, Arab, Muslim, Roma, or Asian individuals who dare speak of their own agency).

Any criticism from outside France is discarded as a cultural misunderstanding, with the stable idea that an international audience cannot grasp the concept of "laïcité" and the emancipating virtues of French universalism, which only seems to apply when defined by a mainly white, male, powerful crowd.

And when Muslim women are asked to remove their clothes by the police on the (not so

glamorous anymore) beaches of the Riviera, with the full support of (then) Prime Minister Manuel Valls,²¹⁷ or when the minister of women's rights, Laurence Rossignol, claims that Muslim women wearing headscarves are "political militants" comparable to "Niggers supporting slavery,"²¹⁸ it's difficult to think of any context or justification that would minimize the extent and the violence of such destructive and prejudicial statements, at the highest governmental level, against both black and Muslim communities.

The Collective Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF) was created in 2003 to provide victims of discrimination and hate crimes with the legal and psychological support they need. At a time when the headscarf ban in public schools (later euphemized as the "law on conspicuous signs in public schools") was debated, the organization formed around the idea that something was inherently wrong with banning (young) Muslim women from education and telling them it's for their own good.

Since then, there has been an ongoing attempt to generalize and extend this exclusion to other fields (universities, workplaces, and even homes of child caretakers), all in the name of "laïcité." With the help of communities and other NGOs, we were able to stop most of these attacks on fundamental freedoms, but 15 years after CCIF's work began, it's very difficult to draw a positive picture of the situation in France when assessing the status of Muslims.

217 "« Burkini » : Manuel Valls désavoue Najat Vallaud-Belkacem En savoir plus sur," *Le Monde*, August 25, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/religions/article/2016/08/25/burkini-manuel-valls-desavoue-najat-vallaud-belkacem_4987686_1653130.html

218 Frantz Durupt, "Laurence Rossignol et les «nègres qui étaient pour l'esclavage»," *Libération*, March 30, 2016. http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/03/30/laurence-rossignol-et-les-negres-qui-etaient-pour-l-esclavage_1442820

We have dealt with hate crimes, desecration of cemeteries, arsons, and degradations on mosques, making progress as we gained experience in our litigation and media strategies, as well as in our organizing.

If we define Islamophobia as the construction of the Muslim problem, we can say that after being constructed as a cultural, religious, and identity problem, Muslims were now also looked at as a security problem.

Just when we thought most of the work was done, as we were capitalizing on painstakingly acquired inclusive case law and shifting our projects from reaction to prevention, the terrorist attacks of the last three years brought an unprecedented wave of repression on Muslims in France.

The attacks on Charlie Hebdo; on the kosher supermarket; on the Bataclan concert; in Saint Denis, Saint Etienne du Rouvray, and Nice; with their hundreds of civilian casualties, have brought terrorist violence back into France. Retrospectively, as an unavoidable and yet destructive consequence, these attacks have provided the justification for a wide-scale neoconservative shift in policy on the grounds of security; the state of emergency has been the operational framework to implement this policy shift.

If we define Islamophobia as the *construction of the Muslim problem*, we can say that after being constructed as a cultural, religious, and identity problem, Muslims were now also looked at as a security problem. This latter security part of the spectrum, which covers most of Islamophobia in the United States since 9/11 and in the United Kingdom since 7/7, is relatively new in France. From this holistic experience and looking at similarities and differences with other North American, European, African, and Central Asian countries, we offer recommendations that can apply to many contexts and which, if implemented with a rational and yet humanistic approach,

can help us make progress and demonstrate that security and human rights concerns are not irreconcilable, but rather feed into and reinforce one another.

Address the full spectrum of intolerance, from hate speech to hate crime.

When looking at contemporary forms of intolerance and racism (against Asian, Jewish, Muslim, black, Roma, ... minorities), a recurring feature is the nonrandom nature of these phenomena. They are fueled by two types of processes: Systemic racism and interpersonal racism.

Systemic racism, present in structures and sometimes initiated (and/or supported) by the state, is enduring, stable, and inherently linked to structures of power. This part of racism is closest to being utilitarian. It also serves a political and sociological purpose. Politically, it serves electoral interests, if a leader or a party identifies a political premium associated with the demonization and othering of a minority. When a candidate thinks he can win political points by depicting Muslims as a threat to our identity and our security, reality and academic knowledge are often of no help, as political speeches do not appeal to rationality but rather to emotions. Politicians are creatures of rationality and electoral empiricism. Sociologically, it stabilizes elites through discrimination. The denial of access to the media, to academia or, for that matter, to any position of power or influence is a constant feature of racism. It follows naturally that Islamophobia was mainly focused, for the last 15 years in France, on the constant refusal to see Muslims (and especially women) in any position of visibility or responsibility, where they would challenge the status quo. The recent dismissal of Rokhaya Diallo (journalist and anti-racist activist) from an advisory body on web technologies is just one of the latest examples of how biases against Muslims, blacks, and women intersect.²¹⁹ It took a few racist tweets and a letter from an alt-right MP to lobby the government and instantly have the talented journalist removed.

219 "France Fails to Face Up to Racism," Editorial, The New York Times, December 28, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/opinion/france->

[racism-rokhaya-diallo.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/opinion/france-racism-rokhaya-diallo.html)

Interpersonal racism, mostly expressed via hate speech on social networks and hate crime, is the most visible manifestation of the problem. This racism wounds and kills, and it supports the notion that elites are not so much responsible for racism, described as a form of ignorant rant, sometimes escalating to physical violence. Racism is then easily conceived of as a poor man's disease, resulting from a lack of knowledge and exposure to diversity.

Unsurprisingly, interpersonal racism has been the main (if not the only) focus of state-sponsored initiatives to combat racism in France. And when a teachers union dares to organize a workshop on how best to address structural racism within institutions, the acting minister of education, Jean-Michel Blanquer, sues them for libel, after they've used the expression "state racism" in one of their publications. So much for freedom of expression, as #JeSuisCharlie would say.

Recommendations

- Understand that Islamophobia, like any other form of contemporary racism, is not a collection of random events but a phenomenon with structural and contextual factors that all need to be addressed.
- Implement not only awareness programs on diversity, but also deep analysis and audits of policies and their impact on minorities, to address structural racism.
- Work with social networks to identify and de-prioritize hate speech in their ranking and suggestions algorithms, and work with authorities and civil society when qualified threats and incitements to violence are made.
- Develop a holistic approach that takes into account both the manifestations of Islamophobia (hate speech, hate crime, discrimination) and their ideological and political roots, in order to affect the situation positively and call for responsibility to be taken at a political level.

Do not Islamize problems. Rationalize them.

For the last 15 years, it has been widely accepted, without a serious assessment of such an assumption, that "Islam" is a loose concept used to explain almost everything. Any problem emerging in our society that could even remotely be attached to anything resembling a Muslim, an Arab, a black, or any individual living in the deprived suburbs of France ends up being Islamized.

Security is a *Muslim problem*, made more pressing than ever with the recent terrorist attacks perpetrated by groups who identify with Islam. Sexism is a *Muslim problem*, as many selective feminists of the last hour would contend that the headscarf is an unequivocal symbol of how "submissive" Muslim women are. Proselytism at school is a *Muslim problem*, as Muslim children are placed under close watch to ensure they are not radicalized (i.e., using religious idioms when eating or when thanking God). Animal welfare is a *Muslim problem*, since every Eid is the occasion for Islamophobic groups to ask for a ban on ritual slaughter, displaying for the occasion a sudden (and equally superficial) interest in how animals are treated in the food industry. And the list goes on, as Islamophobes always look at new ways of Islamizing the very real problems our societies face.

But, by placing the causality on religion, we avoid any rational analysis of how these issues actually emerge and waste any realistic chance of addressing them effectively. Islamizing the problems has been a way to problematize Islam, which further fuels structural and political expressions of Islamophobia (see above). It has also been one of the greatest mass diversions of recent political history: Why explain the government's repeated failures in security and the ongoing inequalities between men and women, when we can coin a Muslim-related hashtag and tweetstorm a way out of a critical assessment of public policies?

Terrorism, sexism, diversity at school, and an ethical approach to food production are real contemporary challenges that call for all our

attention. These are not “Islamic” issues, but rather, global issues that are not restricted to any ethno-cultural or religious groups.

Recommendations

- De-Islamize issues of concern and use an evidence-based approach to build a diagnosis on any topic.
- When explaining problematic and criminal behavior, focus on what people do, rather than who they are. Crime and/or marginal attitudes have more to do with choices than with identity.
- Respect international agreements (OSCE, U.N., etc.), explicitly stating that policies, when related to criminality, can never be associated with an ethno-cultural or religious minority.

Work with communities, not on them.

An ongoing (and widely accepted) feature of the relationship between Muslim communities and the state is the fact that government thinks it must exert control over Muslims. Control means two things:

Surveillance: Most governments have special task forces watching Muslim NGOs, leaders, intellectuals, imams, and significant public figures. Several of these programs have involved infiltration techniques, threats, or bribes. As an example, in 2014, the CCIF had to assist a Palestinian refugee who was threatened by the authorities to have his residency permit removed if he didn’t agree to infiltrate the local mosque and provide privileged information.

Injunctions: Authorities, through a special office within the Ministry of Interior, provide instructions on how Muslims should organize. These “suggestions” are a condition for a continued engagement with the government. In 2016, the government even went a step further: Tired of engaging with Islamic federations, the then minister of interior, Bernard Cazeneuve, created the Foundation for Islam in France and appointed as its president ... a former minister of interior,

Jean-Pierre Chevènement, who made himself famous by calling youths in the suburbs “savages”²²⁰ in 1999 and asking for Muslims to be “more discreet”²²¹ as soon as he was nominated. Indeed, Muslims were quite discreet over his appointment to represent them, as they simply weren’t even consulted.

These two components of control have been at play since colonial times. What is new is the way in which control techniques and incentives evolve in often nonsensical ways. For instance, one might think it could be useful to work with communities to assess how they want to organize and choose how they want to be represented. Well, not with Muslims in France. And when they do organize and use their own sense of agency to build initiatives and projects, they are simply blacklisted.

As we’ve seen above, the current issues we face are affecting all of us, so how could a government address these issues without the involvement and engagement of 10 percent of its citizens?

If some of these issues are sensitive and require trust, how could any organization or community engage with a government that deals with them as a threat or second-class citizen who cannot speak and decide for themselves?

Recommendations

- If the principle of “laïcité” is the clear separation between the state and the churches (i.e., the religious groups), then it flows from this concept that the government should not get involved in the way religious communities organize, or confiscate their voice when they speak without permission or express criticism.
- When designing work plans on Islamophobia, work with communities to define and describe the most common manifestations of the problem and take into account their concerns.
- Include also thematic experts from the groups that are affected by each form of racism.
- Encourage debate and grass-roots initiatives, as inclusively as possible, with a deliberate

220 “«Sauvageon», le mot qui fâche,” *Libération*, January 12, 1999. http://www.liberation.fr/france/1999/01/12/sauvageon-le-mot-qui-fache_263424

221 Geoffroy Clavel, “Jean-Pierre Chevènement enchaîne les bourdes sur

l’islam: un républicain ancienne école en terrain miné,” *Huffington Post France*, August 29, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2016/08/29/islam-discret-monde-musulman-chevenement-bourdes_n_11758094.html

focus on women and youth, to allow for self-determination and independent representation of communities.

Use data to *quantify* prejudice, not *enhance* it.

Data is dangerous and potent. At a time when numerical limitations are removed by the progress of information technology, the use we make of data is a question of choice, not capacity. Minorities are particularly exposed to this ambivalence of data.

When used and regulated with the intent of promoting equal access to all opportunities, data is a formidable tool to identify areas where discrimination mostly happens and measure the efficiency of public policies when trying to address it. On the other hand, when used under the radar by governmental agencies or without regulation, data provides intrusive information on families and individuals, which can expose them to great harm.

In France, ethnic and religious data is mostly banned from the field of advocacy. Statisticians and demographers have to go to great methodological lengths to identify and use proxies in order to measure and assess discrimination and inclusion patterns. Still, studies constantly confirm a discrimination pattern against minorities²²² and an inefficient set of public policies to turn this situation around.²²³

At the same time, the government has implemented a series of anti-terrorism policies that have provided intelligence agencies with unprecedented access to personal data and surveillance techniques. The state, through its most essential and social features (health care, education, administration) is evolving into a gigantic data-generating machine, with a set of markers deliberately identifying Muslims within a “de-radicalization” framework.

These markers are so loose that any religious involvement can cause an individual to be listed,

without a transparent mechanism to assess the validity of the claim. Even though a report by the Senate has exposed the flaws and failures of the “de-radicalization” framework,²²⁴ the data remains and continues to be compiled, without control or regulation by an independent commission.

During the first year of the state of emergency, based on this data, more than 4,400 homes have been raided, leading to only six investigations on cases related to potential terrorist activities (still pending). Out of these, the CCIF had to

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intervene on 431 cases (raids and house arrests). All cases that went to court showed that the families were suspected and later raided with no basis. As a result, the raid orders and house arrests were deemed invalid. But even then, the harm was done, as many of these individuals had already lost their jobs and were perceived as suspects in their social context, all as a result of a poorly targeted surveillance program that traded methodological and ethical consistency for the appearance of political voluntarism and statistical objectivism.

Recommendations

- Implement wide-scale quantitative studies on discrimination, including Islamophobia, under the surveillance and control of equality bodies

222 “Le Défenseur des Droits Présente son Rapport D’activité,” Défenseur des Droits, last modified February 28, 2017, <https://www.defenseurdesdroits.fr/fr/actus/actualites/le-defenseur-des-droits-presente-son-rapport-d%27activite>

223 “Rapport 2016 sur la lutte contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la xénophobie,” Commission Nationale Consultative Des Droits De L’Homme,

accessed February 21, 2018. <http://www.cncdh.fr/fr/publications/rapport-2016-sur-la-lutte-contre-le-racisme-lantisemitisme-et-la-xenophobie>

224 Matthieu Suc, “Un rapport du Sénat enterre le concept de déradicalisation,” Mediapart, July 13, 2017. <https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/130717/un-rapport-du-senat-enterre-le-concept-de-deradicalisation>

and data protection agencies, in order to guarantee the quality and ethical consistency of the results.

- Ask for an independent assessment of all data mining programs used for anti-terrorism, in cooperation with data protection agencies and a human rights advisory board.
- Provide state data on the number of cases of raids and house arrests, as well as individuals suspected of radicalization, to measure the efficiency of the targeting process and focus security resources where they are actually needed by focusing on criminal risk factors, rather than religious markers.

Expanding the Definition of Islamophobia: Ideology, Empire, and the War on Terror

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Over the last few years, the number of hate crimes against Muslims has spiked.²²⁵ What explains the rise of anti-Muslim racism fully a decade and a half after the events of 9/11? Why has Islamophobia become more virulent even though there has been no 9/11-type attack since then? The number of Americans killed by jihadists in this country since 9/11 is less than 100. This figure pales in comparison to the over 400,000 killed by gun violence during the same period.²²⁶

The answer to these questions lies in how we understand Islamophobia: what it is, where it comes from, and whose interests it serves.

CNN uses the attacks on mosques as a measure of Islamophobia. While a useful empirical measure of anti-Muslim sentiment, it is also quite limited. One might expand it to talk about hate crimes that include not just the desecration of mosques and Muslim community spaces, but also physical attacks on Muslim and Muslim-looking men and women. Groups like CAIR and SPLC count hate crimes in these ways. Sikh men who wear turbans have come under attack because it is assumed that they are Muslim.²²⁷ Muslim women who wear a hijab or a veil tend to be attacked more than their male counterparts. The outward symbols of Islam—mosques, veils, and turbans—have been attacked, and the people in them have been

dehumanized, becoming mere vessels of an “evil ideology.”

The FBI defines a hate crime as “a traditional offense like murder, arson, or vandalism with an added element of bias.” For the purposes of collecting statistics, Congress has defined a hate crime as a “criminal offense against a person or property motivated in whole or in part by an offender’s bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity.”²²⁸

It is important to record such information and to hold the perpetrators of hate crimes accountable, to the extent that this is possible in the current legal system. But Islamophobia is about more than hate crimes committed by individuals who hold a “bias.” Such a definition fails to explain why individuals hold these views. Why have incidents of hate crimes spiked in the U.S. after 9/11? To what do we owe this rise in bias? To answer these questions, we need to look beyond the individual and at the structures of U.S. society.

In the scholarly community, manifestations of anti-Muslim racism have been viewed through the lens of daily acts of hostility, i.e., the daily verbal attacks, insults, and dismissals experienced by people of color. Coined by Harvard professor Chester Pierce to discuss the experience of African

225 Katayoun Kishi, “Assaults against Muslims in the U.S. surpass 2001 level,” Pew Research Center, November 15, 2017. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/15/assaults-against-muslims-in-u-s-surpass-2001-level/>

226 Peter Bergen, Albert Ford, Alyssa Sims, and David Sterman, “Terrorism in America After 9/11,” New America.org. <https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/what-threat-united-states-today/>

227 Charles Lam, “Sikh Man Stabbed to Death in Robbery of Central California Convenience Store,” NBCnews.com, Jan. 5, 2016. Available at <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/sikh-man-stabbed-death-robbery-central-california-convenience-store-n490786>

228 “What We Investigate—Civil Rights,” FBI, accessed February 20, 2018. <https://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/717/05/>

Americans, the term “microaggressions” has since been expanded along the way to include other people of color, as well as women, LGBTQ people, the disabled, and others.

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No doubt, Muslims and those who look Muslim endure constant microaggressions, which collectively cause psychological trauma and have impacts on their health and overall well-being.²²⁹ It is draining to be at the receiving end of such treatment, as I am constantly reminded by friends on Facebook. However, Islamophobia is about more than microaggressions.

While racism is carried out and experienced at the individual level, to limit our understanding of Islamophobia to hate crimes and microaggressions is to miss the institutional structures that shape racism and discrimination.

Daily acts of hostility, hate crimes, and even job discrimination are the outward manifestations of a system that is steeped in racism. It is this system we must name, understand, and organize against if we are to put an end to anti-Muslim racism.

Islamophobia and Empire

In my book, “Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire,” I set out to explore how the image of the Muslim enemy is tied to a set of practices that sustain and reproduce empire. I draw on the work of the pre-eminent scholar of anti-Muslim racism and empire, Edward Said. Said argued that anti-Muslim racism, or Orientalism, was tied to European colonialism. Indeed, all projects of political domination are sustained by ideologies that mark the colonized as “inferior” and in need of either civilizing or discipline.

Building on this work, I argue that Islamophobia

is an ideology that has come to be accepted as normal, as “common sense,” in the War on Terror era. In this sense, it is not just an individual bias but a systematic body of ideas which make certain constructions of Muslims—that they are prone to violence, that they are misogynistic, that they are driven by rage and lack rationality—appear natural.

But ideas don’t exist in a vacuum. They are part of a larger structure, in this case empire. The current shape and structure of U.S. imperialism, while it has long roots, draw most immediately from the reconfiguration of American society after World War II. The U.S. was one of two hegemons on the global stage, and policymakers, particularly Cold War liberals, would shape and realize a national security state. In 1947, the National Security Act was passed, which entrenched “security” as a key element of the postwar order. It created the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The top-secret National Security Council Paper NSC-68 laid out a vision for U.S. postwar grand strategy. Written in 1950 and declassified in 1975, NSC-68 was one of the most influential foreign policy documents of the Cold War. It called for massive increases in military spending, a civil defense program to ensure loyalty among the citizenry, a media propaganda campaign to build and sustain public support, and psychological warfare and propaganda programs abroad. Every aspect of life—social, political, intellectual, and economic—was conceived as playing a role in national defense, and a massive security establishment was constructed, paid for by significant tax increases and cuts in social welfare programs and services not related to the military. U.S. objectives, moreover, could only be met by abandoning any effort to “distinguish between national and global security.” Confronted by the collapse of the European and Japanese empires and the rise of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Revolution, it fell to the U.S. to take on the mantle of world hegemon and to beat back the threat to “civilization.”

229 Derald Wing Sue, ed. *Microaggressions and Marginality: Manifestation,*

Dynamics, and Impact (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2010).

However, the growth of the military-industrial complex, against which President Eisenhower warned us on Jan. 17, 1961, did not recede with the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Instead, it gained a new lease on life with the War on Terror, as the threat to “Western civilization” once posed by communism was replaced by Islamic fundamentalists; the “clash of civilizations” framework developed by political scientist Samuel Huntington would inform the language by which Muslim enemies would replace the Cold War enemy. Moreover, as was true more than a half century ago, the emergence of this new supposed threat has served as justification for new wars abroad, particularly in the Middle East. It is thus not possible to understand the rise of Islamophobia without placing it in this longer historical context of militarism and U.S. intervention.

It is this imperial system, born in the post-WWII period and strengthened in the War on Terror, that is the crucible of Islamophobia. Drawing on the work of scholars and activists who have examined various aspects of this system, I offer a matrix of Islamophobia in my book. This matrix includes numerous institutions such as federal, state, and local governments, the legal system, the electoral arena, the academy, think tanks, the corporate media, and the national security apparatus (from the FBI to local police departments).

Matrix of Islamophobia

In each of these spheres, Islamophobia informs or is generated by a set of practices and serves certain goals, all of which are tied, directly and indirectly, to the war on terror and empire. As I have argued in “Constructing the Terrorist Threat: Islamophobia, the Media, and the War on Terror,”²³⁰ the terrorist threat has been systematically constructed to meet various goals and aims. It fits within a longer tradition where African Americans, Chinese Americans, and Latina/o Americans have been turned into racialized threats

in order to justify the status quo and advance the interests of elites.

Here I will discuss three spheres that form the matrix of Islamophobia—the electoral arena, the corporate media, and the security apparatus.

In the political sphere, particularly during an election year, Islamophobia serves to garner political support for candidates, which they hope to translate into votes. While Donald Trump is the most egregious and visible voice of anti-Muslim racism in this group, the phenomenon is far bigger than Trump. As I have argued elsewhere,²³¹ this is a bipartisan project. The endless war on terror that has consumed trillions of dollars could not be sustained without the fear of a Muslim terrorist enemy.

While racism is carried out and experienced at the individual level, to limit our understanding of Islamophobia to hate crimes and microgressions is to miss the institutional structures that shape racism and discrimination.

Indeed, ISIS is the perfect enemy, as its attacks on Western targets promote fear and provide a rationale for continued U.S. intervention in the Middle East and for a bloated national security state. The mainstream media are central to the process of keeping the fear of terrorism alive. It is important to note here that ISIS attacks take place with far greater frequency in the Middle East and the primary victims of their attacks are Muslims. This, however, is not newsworthy. As many scholars have observed, it is only when the West is targeted that there is heightened media attention.

In general, when a Muslim is involved in an attack, regardless of whether they have any connection to ISIS or other violent groups, the corporate media cover it with relish on a 24/7 loop because terrorism coverage is good for ratings and good for business, just as wars pad the bottom

230 “Constructing the Terrorist Threat: Islamophobia, The Media & The War on Terror,” written by Deepa Kumar, directed by Sut Jhally (2017; San Francisco, CA: Media Education Foundation, 2017), DVD.

231 Deepa Kumar, “Islamophobia: A Bipartisan Project,” Politics, The Nation, July 2, 2012, <https://www.thenation.com/article/islamophobia-bipartisan-project/>

line. Various terrorism “experts” from numerous think tanks offer the talking points that are then reinforced by politicians, as well as former and current generals and CIA heads and other officials, in order to keep the fear of terrorism alive in the public imagination.

Various agencies of the national security state have targeted Muslims by sending informants into mosques and community centers, and not only for purposes of surveillance.²³² In numerous cases,

If the goal is to keep Americans safe, this money is better spent on creating a free health care system and good jobs.

such as the “Newburg Four,” agents provocateurs have instigated terror plots in an effort to entrap people. Investigative journalist Trevor Aaronson, who studied 500 terrorism prosecutions since 9/11, showed that over half of these involved agents provocateurs. Aaronson concludes that the FBI, through the use of its 15,000 informants (many of them criminals), creates terrorists out of individuals who otherwise would not have turned to political violence.²³³ Retired counterterrorism specialist Marc Sageman reaches similar conclusions in his book “Misunderstanding Terrorism.”

The FBI benefits from the process of entrapping innocent people. In fact, every two months or so the FBI announces another high-profile arrest of a Muslim terrorism suspect, keeping the U.S. on its War on Terror footing and sustaining the multibillion-dollar homeland security industry.

It is important here to note, however, that the majority of people who are part of the national security state are not self-conscious ideologues, as Arun Kundnani shows in his book “The Muslims Are Coming.” They likely do not have a sense

that they play a part in reproducing empire; rather, they see themselves as involved in keeping the American public safe. What is significant is that they operate in a climate in which the “Islamic threat” is taken for granted, naturalized, and seen as common sense.

This is how ideology operates; while there are ideologues that produce and disseminate ideas, most bureaucrats, media producers, and other agents of the imperial state are largely oblivious to these narratives. They nonetheless naturalize it through their activities.

What this analysis shows is that anti-Muslim racism is structural; it is rooted in the various imperial institutions that further the U.S.’s interests both abroad and at home. Here it is important to note that these interests are those of the elite, the 1 percent as they are called, not the vast majority of Americans.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention lists the leading causes of death among Americans as cancer, respiratory disease, Alzheimer’s disease, and suicides, among others.²³⁴ Terrorism doesn’t make the list. Yet, trillions of dollars are spent on the War on Terror. If the goal is to keep Americans safe, this money is better spent on creating a free health care system and good jobs. Researchers who have studied the spike in suicides in the U.S. since 1999 call these “deaths of despair,” the product of the loss of jobs and meaningful family relationships.²³⁵

Further, the resources directed at the War on Terror have made the world no safer. It is time to redirect these resources in ways that improve the quality of life both for those who live in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia who have been on the receiving end of U.S. wars and drone strikes as well as people right here in the United States. This means nothing short of dismantling empire and reorganizing our societies in ways that benefit the 99 percent.

232 Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United States (New York: NYU School of Law, 2011). <http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/targetedandentrapped.pdf>

233 Trevor Aaronson, “Inside the Terror Factory,” Mother Jones, January 11, 2013. <https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/01/terror-factory-fbi-trevor-aaronson-book/>

234 CDC, “Leading Causes of Death,” online at <https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/leading-causes-of-death.htm>

235 Jessica Boody, “The Forces Driving Middle-Aged White People’s ‘Deaths of Despair,’” NPR, online at <https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/03/23/521083335/the-forces-driving-middle-aged-white-peoples-deaths-of-despair>

Countering Islamophobia Is a Civil Society Responsibility

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"I think Islam hates us," replied then-presidential candidate Donald Trump to a question by Anderson Cooper about whether "Islam is at war with the West." Candidate Trump added, "But there is a tremendous hatred. And we have to be very vigilant. We have to be very careful, and we cannot allow people coming into this country who have this hatred of the United States and of people that are not Muslim." Trump doubled down on his comments during the Republican debate hosted by CNN on March 9, 2016, when the debate moderator, Jake Tapper, asked Trump if he meant "all 1.6 billion Muslims." Trump emphatically responded, "I mean a lot of them." Since his election, President Trump has issued executive orders banning the entry of citizens from six Muslim-majority countries while continuing to express Islamophobic sentiments.

Trump is not alone in expressing these anti-Muslim sentiments, but his statements represent their normalization all the way to the highest office in the land. Indeed, Trump's primary sources of information are television news and talk shows,²³⁶ which only illustrates the growing saturation of Islamophobia in the airwaves and public atmosphere. Trump simply parrots the dominant narrative, but more crudely than the polite or

covert expressions of racism that mark significant parts of our discourse.²³⁷

Islamophobia has infected contemporary civil society, and key public figures now find electoral success in fanning the flames of fear, prejudice, xenophobia, sexism, and racism. Islamophobia is part of a broader strategy deployed by long-discredited, right-wing political elites in the desire to claim a defense of civil society from the threat of the feared and demonized Muslim other.²³⁸ Right-wing forces at work today represent the continuity of "white backlash" that the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. spoke about in the 1960s and that has been at work since the passage of the Civil Rights Act. The examination of Islamophobia should be undertaken with a clear historical lens that links the gains of the civil rights movement in the 1960s and the three evils of society that MLK spoke about in 1967—militarism, materialism, and racism—that continue to undermine civil society.²³⁹ Islamophobia is the new signpost for an old and entrenched racism that seeks to reclaim a lost and unjust past.

Defining the problem

We should make a fundamental shift in how

236 Maggie Haberman, Glenn Thrush and Peter Baker, "Inside Trump's Hour-by-Hour battle for Self-Preservation," *New York Times*, December 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/09/us/politics/donald-trump-president.html?_r=0; Philip Bump, "Here are all the times we're pretty sure that Trump was watching Fox News as president," *The Washington Post*, November 29, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/11/29/here-are-all-the-times-were-pretty-sure-that-trump-was-watching-fox-news-as-president/?utm_term=.279380d8918b

237 Uzma Jamil, "Reading Power: Muslims in the War on Terror Discourse."

Islamophobia Studies Journal vol. 2, no. 2, 2014, pp. 29–42. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/islastudj.2.2.0029

238 "Anti-Muslim Activities in the United States: Violence, Threats, and Discrimination at the Local Level," *New America*, 2018, <https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/anti-muslim-activity/>

239 Hatem Bazian, "Islamophobia and 'The Three Evils of Society,'" *Islamophobia Studies Journal*, vol. 3, no. 1, 2015, pp. 158–166. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/islastudj.3.1.0158

we define Islamophobia and identify the areas of emphasis for research and work to counter the pernicious phenomenon. Correctly defined, Islamophobia is a structural organizing principle that is employed to rationalize and extend the dominant global power alignment, while attempting to silence the collective global other. Yes, the basic term, “Islamophobia,” can be defined as “fear,” “anxiety,” or “phobia” of Muslims, but at the same time it is a far more encompassing process impacting law, economy, and society. At one level, its civil society ideologues attempt to classify who belongs to the “civilized world,” the criteria for membership, and who is the demonized and ostracized global other. At a deeper level,

Reducing the rights and citizenship of Muslims to a debate about the nature of Islam allows the right wing and Islamophobes to externalize and demonize Muslims, especially by magnifying cultural differences, a strategy which then gets packaged into campaigns to save Western society from a possible takeover.

Islamophobia is a renewed drive to rationalize existing domestic and global racial stratification, economic power hierarchies, and open-ended militarism. Islamophobia reintroduces and reaffirms racial structures that are used to regulate resource distribution domestically and globally.

At the core, demonization of the Muslim subject has less to do with the subject him/herself and more to do with the cunning forces that view the targeting of Muslims and Islam as the best strategy to rehabilitate their discredited agenda and image in society. Peddling and stoking fear are utilized as a substitute for offering sound economic and social policies and engaging in legitimate debates on how best to address the multitude of

challenges facing society in general.

The strategy has been tried and tested many times in the past with devastating consequences. Claiming to defend and protect society from a “strange,” “foreign,” or “different” ethnic, religious, and racial grouping is not new and always ends in absolute disaster. A brief examination of America’s history gives us many examples of such a strategy: targeting Native Americans; oppressing African Americans during slavery, Jim Crow, and to the present; the Chinese Exclusionary Act; demonizing Catholics; anti-Semitism and targeting Eastern Jewish immigrants in the early period of the 20th century; Japanese internment; and the never-ending anti-Mexican discourse. When we examine each one of these episodes in America’s history, we can identify the political forces that used fear, bigotry, and demonization to gain power for themselves while claiming a defense of the country from enemies, which in each case led to undermining the constitutional, ethical, and moral foundation of society itself.

Critically, targeting Muslims serves as a convenient foil for right-wing political forces desiring to roll back civil rights legislation, voter and immigration rights, environmental protection, and equitable economic policies.²⁴⁰ Islamophobia makes it possible to reduce and narrow the scope of the debates and frame national issues under the rubric of national security and through a manipulative appeal to patriotism. Here, the terms of debate are set by right-wing forces but also draw in the center, left, and segments of the progressives who respond to criticisms of religion and Islam, such as impassioned arguments to save Muslim women from Muslim men in faraway lands.²⁴¹ We must be reminded that the debates are not about the nature of Islam as a religion, but rather about the rights of Muslims as citizens and equals in American and Western society. Reducing the rights and citizenship of Muslims to a debate about the nature of Islam allows the right wing and Islamophobes

240 Elsadig Elsheikh, Basima Sisemore, and Natalia Ramirez Lee, “Legalizing Othering The United States of Islamophobia,” Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society, UC Berkeley, 2017.

241 Lila Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others,” *American Anthropologist*, 104, no. 3 (September 2002): 783–790; Fadwa El Guindi, *Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance* (Oxford: Oxford Press, 2003); Saba

Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011); Sana Tayyeh, “From Orientalist Sexual Object to Burkini Terrorist Threat: Muslim Women through Evolving Lens,” *Islamophobia Studies Journal* vol. 4, no. 1 (2017): 101–114. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/islastudj.4.1.0101; Telhami Shibley, “What Americans Really Think about Muslims and Islam,” *The Brookings Institution*, December 9, 2015.

to externalize and demonize Muslims, especially by magnifying cultural differences, a strategy which then gets packaged into campaigns to save Western society from a possible takeover.

What is deployed first by the right wing eventually infuses all civil society, and the scope of the national debate begins to reflect bigotry at every turn. Let's be clear that the reactionary forces that opposed the passage of the Civil Rights, Voting Rights, and Immigration and Nationality Acts have set their sights on reversing the much-needed progress in the country and are utilizing Islamophobia as the Trojan horse to achieve this intent. "Take our country back" is shorthand for opposing equality, fairness, and dignity for all Americans, and Islamophobia is used to obfuscate the real targets.

Let us dispense with the notion that the problem of Islamophobia is driven by the media and the constant negative representation of Islam and Muslims. While I concur that media coverage intensifies the problem, the role of the press, as Noam Chomsky aptly argued, is to manufacture consent of the governed.

Right-wing economic and political forces identify society's supposed enemies, and the media then are off to the races with the needed distorted coverage. The corporate media is an economic enterprise owned by elites in the Global North, and the scope of coverage is shaped by those who own and operate media organizations. The media pursue the agenda that reflects the elite's priorities, and journalists are under tight rein on who, what, and when is to be covered, with the final content subject to editorial control.²⁴²

At one time or another, right-wing political and economic forces have identified African Americans, Native Americans, Jews, Chinese, Latinos, Japanese, Irish, Italians, Mormons, Catholics, and Vietnamese as their opponents, and media coverage reflected the set priorities in each era. African Americans are constantly framed negatively in the media, and the cause is white

supremacy or the newer version, the alt-right.

Targeting Muslims makes them an instrument to shape and reshape power disparities at a time when right-wing political and economic ideas in the West have failed. Right-wing sets of ideas, including deregulation, privatization of education, reducing taxes while expanding military expenditures, shrinking government, and trickle-down economics, have run into dead-end failures. Islamophobia, then, emerges from right-wing elites in Western society who are fighting ideological battles among themselves, and Muslims are constructed as the enemy, making it possible for a proxy cultural, ideological, economic, and religious war to take shape. Fear of Muslims is used as a diversion from the real causes behind social and economic difficulties arising from massive global shifts and, indeed, failed right-wing policies.

In the imagination of civil society, Islam and Muslims are judged and approached as pre-constructed and never allowed to enter the discourse independently. Islam and Muslims become what is imagined and consumed in the confines of a closed-circuit internal reproduction system that always points back to the imagined.

Just as the "Star Wars" movies have created a rich discourse and tapestry about an imagined and unreal space, Islamophobic imagination has had success in creating a similarly unreal picture of Islam and Muslims. What people see and experience daily about the faith is akin to a well-arranged studio set with characters and props to fit into the Islamophobic narrative. Facts, data, and real narratives are irrelevant in the Islamophobic imagination because the constructed frame filters everything and reduces it to stereotypes revolving around violence and terror. Unfortunately, many news organizations and political leaders end up reproducing an imaginary reality that links Islam to violent extremism. Furthermore, when for a moment or in complete error the narrative departs from the imagined violent norm, it is corrected by pointing out that these represent mere exceptions.

242 Noam Chomsky, *Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda* 2nd Ed. (Seven Stories Press, 2002); Edward Herrmann and Robert W. McChesney, *Global Media: The New Missionaries of Global Capitalism* (A&C Black, 2001); Ashley Lutz, "These 6 Corporations Control

90% of The Media In America," *Business Insider*, June 14, 2002, <http://www.businessinsider.com/these-6-corporations-control-90-of-the-media-in-america-2012-6>

Islamophobia and America's Future

To understand Islamophobia, it's essential to understand how generating anti-Muslim sentiment relates to debates on immigration, citizenship, and the meaning of being American (or, in another context, European). Fear of Islam makes it possible to argue for the equivalence of white Christian identity to American identity, which demonstrates that behind efforts to other Islam and Muslims lies a deeper resistance to racial, ethnic, and religious diversity.²⁴³

Islamophobia is less about Islam or Muslims and more about the uncertainty of society as a whole.

Islamophobia collapses all Muslim immigrants into one threatening group, nullifying racial, ethnic, and cultural differences. It is increasingly constructed around security²⁴⁴ and a clash-of-civilizations lens that promotes bigotry and animosity toward Muslims to obscure policy debates, such as immigration into the United States from Mexico and Latin America. Islamophobia easily diverts attention from these debates because its discourse takes center stage in daily life and manifests in political circles as well as in media production, popular films, TV programming, and a limitless line of books, novels, comics, and computer games.²⁴⁵

In this context, Islamophobia is less about Islam or Muslims and more about the uncertainty of society as a whole. The ongoing otherization project defines politics, culture, economy, religion, and identity by magnifying the differences between America and Islam, and then transforming them into an existential threat in the minds of

Americans, which in turn promotes a false sense of patriotic unity during a time when rapid and global political, economic, and social changes generate national uncertainty. The internal otherization of Islam and Muslims functions as a diversion that populists rely on as they seek seats of power through promises of restoration and greatness.

The slogan "Make America great again" is precisely this, a call for a restoration to an idealized and glorified past when the political, social, and religious order served a singular identity to the exclusion of others. According to right-wing populists, wrongheaded multiculturalism, political correctness, identity politics, refugees, illegal immigration, and burdensome regulations all weaken America, as do bad trade practices by and trade deals with Mexico, China, Japan, and Europe. Noticeably, all these grievances point away from the country's elite, which has plundered the United States, ravaged the earth of its resources, conducted endless interventionist wars, and squandered the money of hardworking people across this great land.

It is in this political context that we saw right-wing domestic attacks on President Obama as a closet Muslim and a demand to reframe the war on terrorism as a war on radical Islam, or even a war on Islam itself. Soon, the "Islam is peace" days of President George W. Bush were all but forgotten and replaced by a clamor to otherize Islam and Muslims that overshadowed policies attempting to dismantle all of President Obama's agenda. The increasing visibility of Islam and Muslims in America's landscape provided further opportunity to draw the distinction between the ideal past and the problem of the diverse present represented by the Obama administration.

In the current administration, Muslim

243 Christopher Nelson, "The Domestic Is Political, and the Political Is Gendered: An Analysis of Veiled Subjects, Gendered Epistemologies, and Muslim Bodies," *Islamophobia Studies Journal*, vol. 3, no. 1, (2015): 106–114, JSTOR. www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/islaj.3.1.0106.

244 Hatem Bazian, "National Entry-Exit Registration System: Arabs, Muslims, and Southeast Asians and Post-9/11 'Security Measures,'" *Islamophobia Studies Journal*, vol. 2, no. 1 (2014): 82–98. JSTOR. www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/islaj.2.1.0082.

245 S. Sayyid, "A Measure of Islamophobia," *Islamophobia Studies Journal*, vol. 2, no. 1 (2014): 10–25. JSTOR. www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/islaj.2.1.0010; Evelyn Alsultany, *The Arabs and Muslims in the Media: Race and Representation after 9/11* (New York, NY: New York University

Press, 2012); Gargi S. Bhattacharyya, *Dangerous Brown Men: Exploiting Sex, Violence and Feminism in the "War on Terror"* (London: Zed Books, 2012); Sabri Ciftci, "Islamophobia and Threat Perceptions: Explaining Anti Muslim Sentiment in the West," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 23, no. 3 (2012): 293–309; Brigitte Levens Nacos and Oscar Torres Reyna, *Fueling Our Fears: Stereotyping, Media Coverage, and Public Opinion of Muslim Americans* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); John Sides and Kimberly Gross, "Stereotypes of Muslims and Support for the War on Terror," *The Journal of Politics* 75, no. 3 (2013): pp.583–98; Joseph Suad and Benjamin D'Harlingue, "The Wall Street Journal's Muslims: Representing Islam in American Print News Media," *Islamophobia Studies Journal* vol. 1, no. 1 (2012): 132–164. JSTOR. www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/islaj.1.1.0132.

Americans are under siege, and the officials in the White House and the executive branch give us good reason to be doubly concerned for the future. Trump's administration approaches Muslims and Islam through a clash-of-civilizations lens that views immigrants and refugees as an Islamic demographic invasion of the West. Policies such as the executive order that instituted the second travel ban may be challenged by the courts, but the institutionalization of othering Islam and Muslims continues unabated in the Trump administration. Even without the ban, the Customs and Border Protection agency has become ideologically driven, showing a greater focus on Muslims at all ports of entry. The stories of "random secondary screenings," questions regarding one's religious background, and demands to access electronic devices of Muslim American travelers are on the rise.²⁴⁶ Among a certain sector of the right wing, an openly hostile and violent attitude has become prevalent since President Trump's victory and is often directed at Muslim Americans, who have found themselves at the forefront of the negative campaign season.

Meanwhile, across some red states and counties, mosque construction projects face renewed resistance in the form of flimsy clauses used to deny building or expansion permits. The case of Al Salam Foundation's attempt to build a new mosque in Indianapolis is a case in point on the challenges of securing building permits in the current period.²⁴⁷ Some of these cases will end up in court, but Muslim Americans can't count on the Department of Justice to aid them on the grounds

of religious freedom, considering the background of the current administration. Immediately after the 2016 presidential elections, the Southern Poverty Law Center documented some 867 hate crimes cases across the country, with a large number directed at Muslim Americans, Sikhs, and Latino immigrants.²⁴⁸ Also, due to their visible clothing and the hijab, Muslim American women were disproportionately targeted in hate crimes

In the current administration, Muslim Americans are under siege, and the officials in the White House and the executive branch give us good reason to be doubly concerned for the future.

following the election. Even more alarming is that the Muslim American community witnessed attacks on 85 mosques and Islamic centers, including several burned to the ground, in the first six months of 2017.²⁴⁹ In all of these recorded incidents, President Trump, the former White House spokesman Sean Spicer, and other top administration figures have not uttered a single word in defense of Muslim Americans. Adding to this assault on Muslim Americans is the drive to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization in order to use that status to target American Muslim organizations by claiming they associate with the Muslim Brotherhood and/or provide the group material support.²⁵⁰

246 Alex Kane, "Even Muslim-American Citizens Have Been Caught in the Net of Trump's Travel Ban," *The Nation* March 23, 2017, <https://www.thenation.com/article/even-muslim-american-citizens-have-been-caught-in-the-net-of-trumps-travel-ban/>; Andy Greenberg, "A Guide to Getting Past Customs with Your Digital Privacy Intact," *WIRED*, February 12, 2017, <https://www.wired.com/2017/02/guide-getting-past-customs-digital-privacy-intact/>; Faiza Patel and Rachel Levinson-Waldman, "The Islamophobic Administration," *Brennan Center for Justice*, April 9, 2017, <https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/islamophobic-administration>

247 Rebecca Guterman, "This Virginia County Denied a Necessary Permit to Build a Mosque, and It Doesn't Pass the Smell Test," *ACLU's Program on Freedom of Religion and Belief*, February 14, 2017, <https://www.aclu.org/blog/religious-liberty/free-exercise-religion/virginia-county-denied-necessary-permit-build-mosque>; Emma Kate Fittes, "Muslim leaders get pushback on plans to build mosque in residential neighborhood," *The Indianapolis Star*, January 15, 2018, <https://www.desertsun.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/01/15/carmel-indiana-mosque-plans/1033737001/>; The Islamophobic Center for Security Policy led by Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. put out a whole guide on contesting the building of mosques through the permitting process. See Karen Lugo, "Mosques in America: A Guide to Accountable Permit Hearings and Continuing Citizen Oversight," *Center for*

Security Policy, 2016, https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Mosque_in_America.pdf

248 Southern Poverty Law Center, *Intelligence Report: The Year in Hate and Extremism*, February 15, 2017, <https://www.splcenter.org/news/2017/02/15/hate-groups-increase-second-consecutive-year-trump-electrifies-radical-right>; South Asian Americans Leading Together Report, *Communities on Fire: Confronting Hate Violence and Xenophobic Political Rhetoric*, 2018, <http://saalt.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Communities-on-Fire.pdf>

249 Christopher Ingraham, "American mosques – and American Muslims – are being targeted for hate like never before," *The Washington Post*, August 8, 2017, <https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/nation-world/article/American-mosques-and-American-Muslims-are-11742354.php>; also, see 2015 figures in Daniel Burke, "Threats, harassment, vandalism at mosques reach record high," *CNN*, December 11, 2015, <https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/10/living/mosques-attack-study-2015/index.html>

250 Arjun Singh Sethi, "Calling the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group would hurt all American Muslims," *The Washington Post*, February 8, 2017, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/02/08/calling-the-muslim-brotherhood-a-terrorist-group-would-hurt-all-american-muslims/>

The goal of the Islamophobia industry²⁵¹ is to weaken the Muslim American organizational infrastructure and its leadership. Furthermore, despite the inclusion and accommodation made for Israel, the conspiratorial worldview driving alt-right Islamophobia is deeply anti-Semitic and hostile to Jews at its core.²⁵² The question for American Jews is whether the support and defense of Israel is the only measuring stick for this administration, or whether a deeper critique would emerge in the days and months to come, as well as a real alliance with Muslims against the rising tide of fascism in the country.

Lastly, on a more positive note, the political, social, cultural, and religious tide in parts of the country has swung toward Muslim Americans in decisive and irreversible ways. Major segments of civil society across the country have coalesced around the otherized Muslim American community and have begun taking visible and measurable steps toward defiant acts of solidarity. One can't overestimate the reverberations of all these civil society efforts that began during the 2016 campaign and, in my estimation, will reach a peak in the 2018 midterm election. The otherization of Muslims and Islam by Trump and his administration has awakened a sleeping civil society giant, a human decency guided by universal ethical and moral imperatives that can produce a counter-narrative. It is this part of the society that will have the last word on the difference between facts and bigotry.

Civil Society's Responses to Islamophobia

How can we best counter this anti-Muslim strategy and provide an exit from this path that can surely lead to disaster, if it has not already done so with the current atmosphere in the country? What are

the steps needed to take back civil society and usher in a more inclusive, just, and fair America?

First, defeating Islamophobia is a collective civil society responsibility.

Islamophobia is a civil society problem and not only a Muslim issue. This means everyone has a role to play in countering and pushing against the rising tide of Islamophobia. Attacks on Muslims and immigrants are carried out in the name of defending society from a contrived threat while the real targets are the majority in the society that is being stoked toward hatred and bigotry. Once we accept that the majority is the real target, then the responsibility to counter Islamophobia and bigotry falls on everyone who desires a fair, just, and inclusive society rooted in the defense of constitutional rights and promotion of racial, religious, and cultural diversity.

Second, we must expose and marginalize Islamophobic voices.

The current political elites on the local, state, and national level must speak forcefully and continuously against Islamophobia and be proactive in exploring opportunities to expose the voices of bigotry and fear. Many in the Islamophobia industry who act as spokespersons, serve on organizational boards, and are active in various civil society arenas feel at ease because their bigotry meets no resistance. Anyone who engages or supports any aspect of the Islamophobia industry must be exposed and marginalized in civil society.

Third, society and the law must embrace Muslims as equals.

Since the right wing and the Islamophobia industry attempt to isolate and marginalize Muslims, immigrants, and racial minorities, the response from the responsible and visionary political leadership

muslims/?utm_term=.fb1f673cace8; Abigail Hauslohner, "How an obscure U.S. policy effort could hurt American Muslims," *The Washington Post*, January 11, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/how-an-obscure-policy-effort-could-hurt-american-muslims/2017/01/11/8ce93184-d76e-11e6-b8b2-cb5164beba6b_story.html?utm_term=.046d88f70a2a; Joby Warrick and Abigail Hauslohner, "Trump's security picks deepen Muslim worries about an anti-Islamic White House," *The Washington Post*, November 18, 2016, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trumps-security-picks-deepen-muslim-worries-about-an-anti-islamic-white-house/2016/11/18/d7796cc6-add6-11e6-8b45-](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trumps-security-picks-deepen-muslim-worries-about-an-anti-islamic-white-house/2016/11/18/d7796cc6-add6-11e6-8b45-f8e493f06fcd_story.html?utm_term=.faec2f8b937a)

[f8e493f06fcd_story.html?utm_term=.faec2f8b937a](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trumps-security-picks-deepen-muslim-worries-about-an-anti-islamic-white-house/2016/11/18/d7796cc6-add6-11e6-8b45-f8e493f06fcd_story.html?utm_term=.faec2f8b937a)

See the Islamophobic outfit, The Clarion Project, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Plan For America – Court Document," https://clarionproject.org/muslim_brotherhood_explanatory_memorandum/

251 Corey Saylor, "The U.S. Islamophobia Network: Its Funding and Impact," *Islamophobia Studies Journal*, vol. 2, no. 1 (2014): 99–118. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/islastudj.2.1.0099

252 Steven Fink, "Fear Under Construction: Islamophobia Within American Christian Zionism," *Islamophobia Studies Journal*, vol. 2, no. 1 (2014): 26–43. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/islastudj.2.1.0026

should be the opposite. Defending and embracing the Muslim subject does not mean avoiding criticism of Muslims or Islam, but recognizing that the political debate about Muslims has nothing to do with the religion, theology, or history of 1.6 billion people. The political leadership must embrace Muslims as equals and partners in developing the agenda for the betterment of the society and go beyond engaging Muslims through a narrow securitization lens.

Fourth, know that Muslim women are primary targets.

The role of Muslim women is a central mobilizing and rationalizing tool for the structural process of othering Islam and Muslims. While violence and structural discrimination against women is a global reality, we must recognize the mobilization of a constructed Orientalist paradigm in service of Islamophobic discourses directed at maintaining global male power hierarchies and marginalizing Muslim women and men alike. At a time when violence, sexism, and discrimination against women are receiving much-needed and overdue attention, the experiences of Muslim women are often left out. Muslim women are undertaking and leading the resistance against the Islamophobia industry and must be supported in this endeavor and not doubly marginalized by civil society.

Fifth, build a new civil and human rights coalition.

All groups and individuals that are serious in wanting to reclaim civil society from the fear-mongers must work hard to develop a broad-based civil and human rights coalition to carry the political agenda forward. This coalition is only possible if all the impacted communities and their allies come together. No single group can bring about this change, and Muslims alone can't defeat Islamophobia, counter the anti-immigrant venom, and stop anti-black racism in today's America, but a collective and broad-based coalition can and will make a difference.

Sixth, ignore and report Islamophobes online and amplify credible voices.

The internet and social media are the primary

fields where the crudest forms of Islamophobia get deployed before making their way to the mainstream outlets. While the Islamophobia industry is made of some 101 groups and organizations that employ a relatively small number of people, their footprint and reach far exceed their numbers due to their mastery of social media and the internet. Responding to online Islamophobic posts is a poor strategy that only amplifies Islamophobic messages to a new audience. Countering Islamophobia on the internet requires withholding direct response

Islamophobia is a civil society problem and not only a Muslim issue. This means everyone has a role to play in countering and pushing against the rising tide of Islamophobia.

to negative messaging, documenting and reporting these occurrences to social media companies, and amplifying credible voices from civil society while providing sound research.

Seventh, develop a civil society rapid response team.

The Islamophobia industry is well-funded and has a national and international infrastructure that works to magnify and intensify the negative Islamophobic campaigns with support from key media outlets. Responding individually or organizationally is a futile endeavor for anyone or any group since the opposition operates in a well-coordinated and highly integrated campaign. The national civil rights and human rights coalition needs to develop a "rapid response team" that includes key participants from all groups with a focus on development of immediate countermeasures to undo the effects of Islamophobic campaigns or minimize their impact on the mainstream.

Eighth, incubate funds and endowments to counter Islamophobia.

At a time when the right wing and the Islamophobia industry have access to millions

if not billions of dollars to push bigotry and fear in civil society, the response calls for mustering resources and deploying them effectively. Civil society leaders and organizations should work to incubate resources or develop endowments that can fund projects and community-based initiatives working to counter the rising tide of Islamophobia, fear, and bigotry. Certainly, the right wing and the Islamophobia industry seem to have access to significant resources, which we might not be able to match, but effectively deployed resources can go a long way in defeating the forces of bigotry, racism, and darkness.

Ninth, de-link defeating Islamophobia and countering violent extremism.

The Islamophobia industry has constantly made the link between demonization of Muslims and acts of terrorism. The link has been so ingrained in the mind of so many in civil society that the discussion about Islamophobia is often coupled

with countering violent extremism initiatives. The net effect of this link makes ending or countering Islamophobia contingent on defeating or countering violent extremism, which is a faulty association.

Tenth, share and highlight sound research.

Academic and community-based projects have been in the forefront in documenting, researching, and sharing evidence on the impact of Islamophobia, but with limited national exposure and recognition. Countering Islamophobia calls for highlighting the work of the unsung and underfunded heroes who work tirelessly while constantly under attack from the Islamophobia industry. Synthesizing the work by sharing website links and research coming out of these institutions will go a long way in impacting civil society and reshaping the American Muslim experience with Islamophobia and how best to systematically address it.

Reflections on Countering Islamophobia Online

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Islamophobia: A Brief Introduction

The idea of fearing a certain group of people because of their culture, belief, or because they are different is not new. It has been around for centuries. This process of ethnic, racial, or religious profiling has been commonly referred to as “stereotyping.” The Sept. 11 attack in New York marked a seismic geopolitical shift in the portrayal of Muslims across the media. It changed people’s perceptions of Islam and made them anxious and fearful of an entire group of people. The attacks made people wonder if all Muslims were extremists, and if they were, when would they attack again? Given that thousands of people died that day, they were right to fear terrorists, who belong to extremist groups like Al-Qaida. However, society went too far in its fear of Muslims and ended up creating overgeneralized stereotypes that are still widely spread today, even though extremist terrorist groups represent only a very small fringe of the 1.6 billion Muslims who live in countries extending from Indonesia and Afghanistan to Algeria and Morocco.

Definitions of Islamophobia

Islamophobia, like any other fear or aversion, is characterized by a somewhat exaggerated sense of dislike and hostility toward Muslims. The negative side effects of Islamophobia on victims can also extend to those who appear Muslim.

This may include non-Muslim individuals from predominantly Muslim countries, like Pakistan, for example. This reminds us of the Sikh man who was attacked after 9/11 because his attacker thought he looked like Osama bin Laden. The book “The Politics of Islamophobia” defines it as “an increasingly visible ‘backlash’ against Muslims across Europe and the United States.”²⁵³ The term “backlash” in this case encompasses all negative messages received by Muslims. While this definition is broad, it serves its purpose of identifying specific acts as Islamophobic. Under this definition, acts perpetrated against individuals need not cause bodily harm alone. Islamophobic actions could include the controversial cartoons by Danish artists who in 2006 drew “humorous” cartoons of Prophet Muhammad to mock Islam,²⁵⁴ an act that was frowned upon by many Muslims, who saw it as an unacceptable insult and even as blasphemy.

The book “Islamophobia: Making Muslims the Enemy” states that “Islamophobia reflects the largely unexamined and deeply ingrained anxiety many Americans experience when considering Islam and Muslim cultures.”²⁵⁵ While this definition is not as broad as Tyrer’s, it does limit its application to the United States and its citizens. This approach allows Gottschalk and Greenberg to classify Islamophobia in one population group and to see how long-simmering resentments remain and lead to action.

A study published on the Gallup website

253 David Tyrer, *The Politics of Islamophobia: Race, Power and Fantasy* (London: Pluto Press, 2003), 3.

254 Martin Asser, “What the Muhammad cartoons portray,” BBC News,

January 2, 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4693292.stm

255 Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg, *Islamophobia: Making Muslims the Enemy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008).

under the title “Islamophobia: Understanding Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the West,” on the other hand, gives a detailed explanation of Islamophobia, including how and why it affects Muslims. It defines Islamophobia as “an exaggerated fear, hatred, and hostility toward Islam and Muslims that is perpetuated by negative stereotypes resulting in bias, discrimination, and the marginalization and exclusion of Muslims from social, political, and civic life.”²⁵⁶

This is especially true since terrorist attacks are covered extensively by national news media, which may give the false impression that they happen all the time. However, terrorism is a rare phenomenon, with a few instigators.

Islamophobia is not confined to the United States. Here is an example of Islamophobia from Norway. On July 22, 2011, a Norwegian extremist set off a fertilizer bomb inside the capital and then proceeded to shoot teenagers attending a youth camp.²⁵⁷ Anders Behring Breivik carried out these attacks because he believed that social democrats were turning his country over to Muslim control.²⁵⁸ This is a prime example of Islamophobia, because Breivik not only feared Muslims, but also feared their potential control. In the end, his fear was great enough to urge him to become the terrorist himself. Initial media reports assumed that radical Muslims were behind the attacks. In this case, Gallup polls would best define these reports as Islamophobic, because the Norwegians’ bias against Islam and Muslims did not allow them to see another attacker or aggressor until much later.

According to a 2016 Council on American-Islamic Relations report titled “Confronting Fear: Islamophobia and its Impact in the United States,” the Center for Race and Gender defines Islamophobia as a social construct that “reintroduces and reaffirms a global racial structure through which resource distribution disparities are maintained and extended.”²⁵⁹ This definition accounts for Islamophobia all over the world, because it is not present in just one society but,

rather, across Europe and America. It can also apply to Anders Breivik, because his fear was that Norway was polluting itself with immigrants and that there was not enough space in Norway for the traditional Lutheran faith and Islam to coexist side by side.

A Runnymede Trust Report centered on Islamophobia defined it as an “unfounded hostility toward Muslims, and, therefore, fear or dislike of all or most Muslims.”²⁶⁰ As we examine anti-Muslim research, there is a paradigm that emerges. The definition of Islamophobia is characterized by some level of aversion, fear, or hatred toward Muslims in general because of the extreme acts of a few radicalized individuals in society. It stems from a lack of understanding of the Muslim faith and stereotypes that are broadly and indiscriminately imposed on an entire population.

The Three Waves of Islamophobia in the United States

Three waves of Islamophobia have prevailed in the United States, each at a different point in time and as a result of a unique set of circumstances. The first wave of Islamophobia emerged after the 1979-1981 Iran hostage crisis. The second wave of Islamophobia emerged after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, and the third wave of Islamophobia emerged after the recent attacks in Paris, San Bernardino, California, and Orlando, Florida. The third wave of Islamophobia could be said to be the most aggressive and most detrimental wave, due to its far-reaching destructive effects and negative ramifications, mainly as a result of the wide publicity, via both mainstream media and social media. Many media outlets spread negative images, distorted stereotypes, and hate speech against Muslims, linking them to acts of violence, extremism, and terrorism. The wide outreach of these media venues and their immediate, instant transmission magnified their impact on many audiences. This, in turn, resulted in an escalation

256 “Islamophobia: Understanding Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the West,” Gallup, accessed February 21, 2018. <http://news.gallup.com/poll/157082/islamophobia-understanding-anti-muslim-sentiment-west.aspx>

257 Sindre Bangstad, *Anders Breivik and the Rise of Islamophobia* (London: Zed Books, 2014). x.

258 Ibid.

259 “Confronting Fear: Islamophobia and its Impact in the United States,” Council on American-Islamic Relations, 2016. <http://www.islamophobia.org/images/ConfrontingFear/Final-Report.pdf>

260 Gordon Conway, “Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All; Report by the Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia.” (London: London Runnymede Trust, 1997).

of acts of violence and hatred against Muslims, especially in the United States, including attacks on mosques, Islamic centers, and women wearing the hijab (Muslim headscarf). There is no question that the rhetoric that dominated the speeches of some of the candidates in the latest presidential election in the United States also played an extremely important role in contributing to the rise of anti-Muslim sentiments and boosting the spread of Islamophobia on a large and unprecedented scale.

Countering Islamophobia: Strategies and Techniques

Islamophobia, a new word for an old fear, is a branch of racism, including anti-Semitism, which is so deeply ingrained in society that it can be present in any type of communication exchange.²⁶¹ Globally, many Muslims report that they do not feel respected by those in the West. According to the previously mentioned Gallup report, 52 percent of Americans and 48 percent of Canadians say the West does not respect Muslim societies, and smaller percentages of Italian, French, German, and British respondents seem to agree.

There is no law that can be passed to limit the disrespect Muslims face, but fostering better understanding and re-evaluating bias can lead to gradual, positive change. Societies should ideally reach a more nuanced and deep understanding about Muslim populations and learn not to generalize and force their assumptions on people they do not know.

At the same time, Muslims also have a responsibility and an important role that they should seriously undertake and effectively play. "When coming to people who are believers of other faiths, instead of shouting the differences, Muslims are to raise the agreements, similarities, and commonalities conducive to a climate of peaceful coexistence."²⁶² This quote clarifies what Muslims ought to be doing, in terms of not confronting intolerance with anger. It is more important to be

proactive, rather than reactive. Spreading awareness and correct knowledge, rather than being on the defensive, will help to further engage non-Muslims and lead them away from Islamophobic tendencies. Ignoring the problem will not make it go away. In order to be active citizens, Muslims must try to actively change media perceptions through positive messages. In doing so, they should try to reach out to mainstream media, and they should certainly make use of new media platforms, such as online forums. This is especially important in the current era of digital communication, where most people get their news and engage in all forms of communication online.

Islamophobia on the Internet

The internet, with all of its unfiltered content, can sometimes harm Muslims and negatively affect their image and reputation. Twitter campaigns, such as #banislam, for example, try to shed light on Islamic extremism. In a new digital world, where information exchange occurs instantly and simultaneously, it is impossible to stop or censor these types of campaigns entirely. However, Muslim users came up with #MuslimRage to counter the anti-Muslim campaign.²⁶³ This hashtag highlighted the bias and hate Muslims receive on an everyday basis, in a humorous, witty, and satirical way. Here, it is worth mentioning that Muslims who took part in this campaign did not respond with hate or anger. In fact, it could be said that they were wise not to, because if they did, this would have further promoted the angry and aggressive Muslim stereotype, which would have been harmful and counterproductive.

The Internet: A Double-Edged Sword in Dealing With Islamophobia

In light of the above discussion, it could be said that the internet is a double-edged sword when dealing with the complex notion of Islamophobia. On one hand, the internet, with its many

261 Hillel Schenker and Abu Zayyad Ziad, *Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006).

262 Seyyed-Abdulhamid Mirhosseini and Hossein Rouzbeh, eds., *Instances of Islamophobia: Demonizing the Muslim "Other"* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2015), 1.

263 Katie McFadden, "#MuslimRage Hashtag Takes Over Twitter: Hilarious Response Tweets to 'Muslim Rage' Newsweek Cover," *Travelers Today*, September 18, 2012. <http://www.travelerstoday.com/articles/3076/20120918/muslimrage-hashtag-takes-over-twitter-hilarious-response-to-muslim-rage-newsweek-cover-twitter-social-media-muslim-islam-twitter-satire-funny-comedy.htm>

applications; instant, wide outreach; and multiple uses, could be considered one of the main factors behind the spread of Islamophobia, not just in the United States, but also internationally. On the other hand, it could be said that the internet also offers unique opportunities to counter Islamophobia and to provide some of the fastest, most effective, and most powerful tools to fight it, through mediated online campaigns.

Some of these campaigns have already been launched by Muslims online, as will be discussed below, but there is certainly a need for more efforts in this respect on a regular, continuous basis.

The internet also offers unique opportunities to counter Islamophobia and to provide some of the fastest, most effective, and most powerful tools to fight it, through mediated online campaigns.

Examples of Successful Online Campaigns Countering Islamophobia

One good and effective example of countering Islamophobia was after Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump insinuated that Ghazala Khan's religion was what might have stopped her from speaking at the Democratic National Convention. Khan stood up for herself and spoke out. Other Muslim women started using #CanYouHearUsNow to show just how often they use their voices and how powerful, strong, vocal, and outspoken they are, in addition to exhibiting clear examples of their success and achievements in various fields. In other words, they effectively, and powerfully, countered the distorted stereotype of the silenced Muslim woman by making sure that their "voices" were heard, loud and clear, through this mediated online campaign.

Another positive and successful example of countering Islamophobia was when Trump answered a question by a Muslim woman during the second presidential debate about the potential danger of Islamophobia by giving an Islamophobic

reply, which suggested that Muslims should always "report" anything they see that may seem remotely suspicious. This triggered a social media campaign by many Muslims, #MuslimsReportStuff, that was witty, sarcastic, and painfully funny. It included messages such as "My mom cooks the same soup every day, I will report her to the authorities," or "My brother refuses to tidy up his room, so I am reporting him to the FBI." Here, it could be said that the strategic use of humor served the purpose and helped to create a strong and powerful impact. This is another excellent example illustrating the power of social media and citizen journalism when properly used and effectively deployed.

In both the above examples, it could be said that the effective strategies and tactics needed to counter Islamophobia include combining technological savvy with wit, humor, intelligence, and swift reply, in addition to using the right message through the right medium to reach the right audience at the right time.

Other examples of positive and effective efforts to counter Islamophobia include the following:

- The Unity Productions Foundation (UPF) video "American Muslims: Facts vs. Fiction," which is available on YouTube, attempts to correct some of the commonly held stereotypes and misconceptions about American Muslims, such as perceiving them as new immigrants to the U.S., or associating them collectively with extremism, fundamentalism, and terrorism.
- The "Pro Islam Billboard Campaign" attempts to spread the correct awareness about Islam and Muslims, using billboard messages such as: "Jesus: A Prophet of Islam," "Looking for the Answers in Life? Discover Muhammad," and "#Who Is Muhammad? Got Questions, Get Answers: WhyIslam.Org."
- The #MuslimsAreSpeakingOut series of videos tries to provide a platform for different groups of Muslims, whether they are religious scholars, preachers, intellectuals, professionals, journalists, or laypeople, to provide their views on the rise of extremism and to speak out against violence and terrorism, clearly denouncing all forms of violence and extremism, and dissociating Islam from them.

- The #Islamophobin Pill campaign launched by CAIR was a very hilarious, sarcastic, witty, and tactful campaign, suggesting that those who exhibit signs of Islamophobia, or excessive, irrational fear of Muslims, should start seeking healing by taking the fictitious Islamophobin pill three times a day until their Islamophobic symptoms start to fade away.

Recommendations on the Right Approaches to Countering Islamophobia

- Being “proactive” rather than “reactive.” (Being the fire preventer is always better than being the firefighter.) In other words, Muslims should make a sincere effort to spread the correct information about their faith to others, i.e., to non-Muslims, at all times, not just as a reaction to Islamophobic acts or campaigns, or being on the defensive after an act of terror is committed by someone having a Muslim name.
- Being outspoken and frank about the problem of extremism and condemning terrorism, openly and loudly, without being excessively apologetic to the extent of being ashamed of one’s identity and religious affiliation and/or becoming less willing to declare it publicly.
- Avoiding violence, aggression, and offensive language and actions in reaction to Islamophobic acts or messages. This is especially important since such aggressive acts can only add to the problem of associating Muslims with terrorism and extremism, and, therefore, can prove to be truly harmful, damaging, and counterproductive. Also, it is not possible to defend the Muslim faith by defying its principles, or to defend the Prophet of Islam by betraying his values and going against his peaceful example and ideal morality.
- Encouraging more young Muslims to study and practice journalism and all arts of communication, so there can be a better, more nuanced and realistic representation of Muslims in all media venues.

Effective strategies and tactics needed to counter Islamophobia include combining technological savvy with wit, humor, intelligence, and swift reply, in addition to using the right message through the right medium to reach the right audience at the right time.

- Integrating and including Muslims in all forms of community activities in their respective neighborhoods and communities, and exhibiting their concern about issues related to education, schooling, the environment, transportation, etc., in addition to issues of social justice, equity, and inclusion. This will help to solidify and highlight their role as active citizens who are visibly engaged and effectively integrated in their respective societies.
- Finally, encouraging more Muslims to run for office at the local and national levels, which would be an excellent way to safeguard the interests of the Muslim community and to counter anti-Muslim policies and legislation that could be harmful to their interests, both at the present and in the future, in addition to countering anti-Muslim sentiments and actions.

Islamophobia and Right-Wing Movements in the United States: From Theories to Action

Chip Berlet

Journalist and human rights activist

Outlandish slurs and ludicrous conspiracy theories about Islam and Muslims are running rampant in the United States, with terrible consequences in terms of bigotry and violence. These fraudulent claims resonate in huge right-wing echo chambers filled with Islamophobic scare stories that are mobilizing people into action against a threat

fundamental freedoms, including the principle of equality for all people of all ages and from all walks of life, and to this end, recognizes that broad-based and sustained economic growth in the context of sustainable development is necessary to sustain social development and social justice.²⁶⁵

Today the idea of human rights is getting battered from the seats of power in our nation's capital. We watch as attacks on Muslims, Jews, people of color, immigrants, and those in the LGBTQ communities create horrific headlines on a daily basis.

perceived to be real. Sociological theory tells us that situations defined as real are real in their consequences.²⁶⁴

I write as a person active in the global human rights movement framed in the "Platform for Action" issued at the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, China, in September 1995.

The Platform for Action requires immediate and concerted action by all to create a peaceful, just and humane world based on human rights and

Attorney Ann Fagan Ginger, founder of the Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute, began promoting the idea of a human rights framework in the United States in the 1960s. Black feminist organizer Loretta Ross returned from the 1995 Beijing conference on women fired up and re-centered her work as part of a struggle for basic human rights for all. Sometimes it takes decades for ideas to gain traction. And sometimes the struggle for human rights is pushed backward. Today the idea of human rights is getting battered from the seats of power in our nation's capital. We watch as attacks on Muslims, Jews, people of color, immigrants, and those in the LGBTQ communities create horrific headlines on a daily basis.

Yet there is resistance. I have many allies in the struggle for human rights. Penny Rosenwasser works with children from the Middle East, building bridges across religious, ethnic, and racial boundaries.²⁶⁶ Ruby Sales is a legendary civil rights activist who recovered from the trauma of seeing her friend and ally Jonathan Daniels shot dead in

264 William Isaac Thomas and Dorothy Swaine Thomas, *The Child in America: Behavior Problems and Programs* (New York, N.Y.: A.A. Knopf, 1928), 572.

265 The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, "Action

for Equality, Development and Peace: Platform for Action," UN.org, September 2015, para. 4, last accessed March 23, 2018, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/plat1.htm#statement>.

266 Penny Rosenwasser. See <http://pennyrosenwasser.com/about/>.

1965 by a shotgun blast meant for her.²⁶⁷ Since then Sales has devoted her life to healing the wounds of racial, gender, and religious bigotry.²⁶⁸ Professor Mohammad Jafar Mahallati has proposed an international day of friendship among the peoples of the world.²⁶⁹ Friendship is based on mutual respect rather than “tolerance,” a word which implies some fault that must be overlooked out of courtesy.

All four of us (and many more allies) see ourselves as part of a global human rights movement, in which we work as people of faith, following the path of the children of Abraham, and in accordance with the United Nations’ Mandates on Human Rights.²⁷⁰ Interviewed in the spring of 2017, Ruby Sales continued holding our nation accountable for living up to its promises. “When people say that racism is not an American value, referring to Donald Trump and his racism, I’m able to go back in time and show them that not only is it part of the American value system, but it is also part of our history.”²⁷¹ Sales reminds us that Martin Luther King Jr. gave us hope when he said, “No lie can last forever,” and “The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.”

Categorizing the Antagonists

Why is it necessary to explore the categories in detail? Especially in the United States with our First Amendment protection on free speech, it is important to note that in terms of the law it is a big step from advocacy to intimidation, assault, and violence. These acts are not protected by our Constitution. Primarily, it is the aggressive/genocidal sector noted below that should be the concern of law enforcement agencies. Many right-wing populist movements in the U.S. spread Islamophobia as part of a larger portfolio of white ethno-nationalism, yet this alone does not justify constant aggressive and intrusive law enforcement monitoring.

Islamophobia is also centered in mainstream narratives and ideologies that frame all Muslims as an undifferentiated subversive threat to our nation. This challenges all of us as participants in a multi-dimensional society to be critical of Islamophobia in political movements and social movements that exist within the worldview of political party leaders and followers.

If you are struggling to push back Islamophobia in the United States, it is useful to know whom to push. See accompanying chart for examples.

Islamophobia in the United States Is Not Monolithic

“Mainstream” Political Movements

Large-scale social movements

Some organized Christian right groups

Cultural white nationalist movements

Significant portion of the Republican voters in 2016

Some militant and aggressive Israeli nationalist movements

Outlier Political Movements

Right-wing populist movements

Cultural and social

Christian nationalist movements

White nationalist movements

Separatist and exclusionary

Christian supremacist movements

White supremacist movements

Aggressive and genocidal

White supremacist neofascist movements

White supremacist neo-Nazi movements

267 Mary Frances Schjonberg, “Remembering Jonathan Daniels 50 years after his martyrdom,” Episcopal News Service, August 13, 2015, <http://episcopaldigitalnetwork.com/ens/2015/08/13/remembering-jonathan-daniels-50-years-after-his-martyrdom/>.

268 Ruby Sales, “Where Does It Hurt?” Interview with Krista Tippett, On Being program, August 17, 2017, Online transcript: <https://onbeing.org/programs/ruby-sales-where-does-it-hurt-aug2017/>.

269 Mohammad Jafar Mahallati. See <https://www.oberlin.edu/mohammad->

[jafar-mahallati](https://www.oberlin.edu/mohammad-jafar-mahallati).

270 United Nations Mandates on Human Rights. Online at <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/Mandate.aspx>.

271 Liz Mineo, “For Ruby Sales, long road to hope,” The Harvard Gazette, April 7, 2017, <https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2017/04/civil-rights-legend-ruby-sales-sees-reason-for-hope-ahead-of-harvard-divinity-school-talk/>.

Terminology

Populism

According to scholar Cas Mudde: “Populism is an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups: “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite,” and argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people. Mudde notes that populist politicians almost always combine populism “with other ideologies, such as nativism on the right and socialism on the left.”²⁷²

Right-wing populism

The goals of right-wing populist movements are not only defensive or reactive. Matthew N. Lyons and I argue their growth is often fueled by fears of liberal social and economic policies and left-wing social movements. We also identified Andrew Jackson as “the first U.S. president elected with

Avoid the vague blanket terms “hate groups,” “hate crimes,” and “hate speech.” Instead use word pairs that link the prejudice to the problematic acts.

the use of populist rhetoric” and claimed the first U.S. populist movement we would unequivocally describe as right wing was the Reconstruction-era Ku Klux Klan....”

Fascism, Neofascism, and Neo-Nazism

Roger Griffin argues that fascism “is a revolutionary form of nationalism” seeking to forge “the ‘people’ into a dynamic national community” using populist rhetoric and a “purifying, cathartic national rebirth” to make the nation great again.²⁷³

Robert Paxton says fascism is “marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or victimhood” that generates

movements calling for “unity, energy, and purity.” This involves a “mass-based party of committed nationalist militants,” according to Paxton. These militants build an “uneasy but effective collaboration with traditional elites.” This right-wing populist movement then drifts toward fascism. Paxton warns this can lead to abandoning “democratic liberties” and the use of “redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints.” The outcome can lead to aggressive nationalist campaigns of “internal cleansing and external expansion.”²⁷⁴

Some Recommendations for Public Policies

Randy Borum warns that in “discourse about countering terrorism, the term ‘radicalization’ is widely used, but remains poorly defined. To focus narrowly on ideological radicalization risks implying that radical beliefs are a proxy—or at least a necessary precursor—for terrorism, though we know this not to be true.”²⁷⁵ Be aware that the term “violent radicalization” can tread on First Amendment guarantees. The phrase “bigoted violence” better highlights the actual problem.

- Avoid the vague blanket terms “hate groups,” “hate crimes,” and “hate speech.” Instead use word pairs that link the prejudice to the problematic acts. This creates a teaching moment.

Islamophobic bias	Misogynist attacks	Anti-Mexican
Anti-Semitic	Anti-black	discrimination
language	violence	Sexist language
Homophobic	Anti-immigrant	Racist jokes
stereotypes	xenophobia	

When we use the word “hate” we teach 80 percent of white Americans that they have no complicity in systems of oppression and political repression. The remaining 20 percent already know that’s not true.

- Be willing to criticize the mass media and their advertisers when they profit from the use of

272 Cas Mudde, “The Problem with Populism,” *The Guardian*, February 17, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/17/problem-populism-syria-podemos-dark-side-europe>.

273 Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), xi.

274 Robert O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (New York: Knopf, 1994), 218.

275 Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” *Journal of Strategic Security*, Volume 4, Issue 4 (2011): 7–36.

demeaning or provocative language that feeds prejudice and bigotry—and frequently encourages violence.

- Expand funding for training law enforcement officers and security agents in the realities of upholding the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights in a multicultural society.
- Consider dropping the term “tolerance” and replacing it with the word “respect.” Should people “tolerate” their husbands, wives, partners, friends? Or should they respect them? The global human rights movement is built upon a foundation of mutual respect among all peoples.

Concluding Observations

Bigoted right-wing groups do not cause prejudice in the United States, they exploit it. What we clearly see as objectionable bigotry surfacing in the rhetoric of right-wing populist movements is actually the magnified form of oppressions that swim silently in the familiar yet obscured eddies of “mainstream” society. Islamophobia, racism, anti-immigrant xenophobia, anti-Semitism, sexism, and homophobia are major forms of supremacy that create oppression and defend and expand inequitable power and privilege; but there are others based on class, age, ability, language, ethnicity, immigrant status, size, religion, and more. These oppressions exist independently in the mainstream culture, alongside right-wing movements in U.S. society.²⁷⁶

None of this sociological or philosophical framework is new. I learned it in the 1960s while attending Boy Scout camps and ecumenical religious youth retreats, first as a participant and then as a discussion leader.

In her book “Eichmann in Jerusalem,” philosopher Hannah Arendt concluded there is

but one universal mandate: that when we witness oppression we must oppose it.²⁷⁷ Claiming to be patriots defending the nation against subver-

History will record whether or not our struggle for justice and global human rights succeeded. But history will judge us as to whether we stood up and spoke out now against Islamophobia and other forms of systemic oppression.

sion and betrayal, we witness people maligning, brutalizing, and murdering Muslims. Social science research has established that demonizing rhetoric targeting scapegoats can prompt violence, including murders.²⁷⁸

Fascist and neo-Nazi movements are active in the United States today. My wife, Karen Moyer, and I know something about resisting these forces. From 1977 to 1988 we lived in the Marquette Park neighborhood on the Southwest Side of Chicago, where uniformed neo-Nazis inflamed white racial prejudice. That’s the same neighborhood that blocked a march for open housing led by Martin Luther King Jr.²⁷⁹ We worked in a multiracial coalition, the Southwest Community Congress, and challenged racial violence against black people that included beatings and firebombing of homes. We built coalitions across traditional boundaries, mobilized resistance to the white supremacists, and challenged entrenched white nationalism. After 10 years our neighborhood was a safe place for ALL residents. Resistance is not futile. A few months before our conference at The Carter Center, a statue of King was unveiled on the grounds of the Georgia Capitol.²⁸⁰

276 Chip Berlet, “Mapping the Political Right: Gender and Race Oppression in Right-Wing Movements,” in Abby Ferber, ed., *Home-Grown Hate: Gender and Organized Racism* (New York: Routledge, 2004): 18–45. Online at <https://www.academia.edu/34734671/>.

277 Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Viking Press, 1963). An excellent discussion of Arendt’s thesis is by Judith Butler, “Hannah Arendt’s challenge to Adolf Eichmann,” *The Guardian*, August 29, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/aug/29/hannah-arendt-adolf-eichmann-banality-of-evil>.

278 Chip Berlet, “Heroes Know Which Villains to Kill: How Coded Rhetoric

Incites Scripted Violence” in Matthew Feldman and Paul Jackson (eds.), *Doublespeak: Rhetoric of the Far-Right Since 1945* (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2014). Online at https://www.academia.edu/26640115/Heroes_Know_Which_Villains_to_Kill_How_Coded_Rhetoric_Incites_Scripted_Violence.

279 Frank James, “Martin Luther King Jr. in Chicago,” *Chicago Tribune*, last accessed March 23, 2018, <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/chi-chicagodays-martinlutherking-story-story.html>.

280 Myrdd Wells, “Georgia Capitol’s Martin Luther King Jr. statue unveiled on 54th anniversary of ‘I Have a Dream,’” *Atlanta Magazine*, August 28, 2017, <http://www.atlantamagazine.com/news-culture-articles/georgia-capitol-s-martin-luther-king-jr-statue-unveiled-54th-anniversary-dream/>.

I believe in a God that demands justice from the People of the Book—those of us who are Jews, Christians, and Muslims. We are the children of Abraham/Avram/Ibrahim/Ebrahim who are admonished by our prophet Isaiah:

Woe to those who make unjust laws, to those who issue oppressive decrees to deprive the poor of their rights and withhold justice from the oppressed of my people.... To whom will you run for help? Where will you leave your riches?²⁸¹

History will record whether or not our struggle for justice and global human rights succeeded. But

history will judge us as to whether we stood up and spoke out now against Islamophobia and other forms of systemic oppression.

The Tools of Fear

The Tools of Fear is an online chart that helps explain the techniques used by demagogues to mobilize resentment and create systems of oppression that can result in violence against scapegoated groups in a society. It can be found at: <https://www.tools-of-fear.net/>.

281 Isaiah 10: 1-4. New International Version (NIV). Nashville, TN: Harper

Collins Christian Publishing.

Multilayered Approach on Islamophobia: A Contribution Toward Developing a Sustainable and Strategic Response

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The Current Situation of Islamophobia

Since 9/11, Islamophobia has been growing strongly in the West and has continued to take root through intensive campaigns and public discourses disseminating fear of Islam, and through a significant number of incidents targeting Muslims, mosques, Islamic centers, Islamic attire, and Islam's sacred symbols. Reports and evidence reveal that negative sentiment toward Islam and Muslims keeps expanding in the minds of mainstream Westerners through mistrust toward Islam and its adherents. There are clear indicators showing that more and more Westerners are in doubt that Islam is a religion of peace; they feel suspicious over religious activities conducted in mosques and Islamic centers, while associating Islam with the ongoing phenomena of extremism and terrorism.

Particularly during the last few years, Islamophobia has reached an intractable point as it continues to grow without any sign of possible decline. This is reflected in the wide scale of negative narratives against Islam, as well as through incidents targeting mosques, Islamic centers, Muslim individuals and communities, and women wearing the veil, or hijab. Mosques and Islamic centers are the most common target as a significant number of incidents of vandalism and arson involving mosques and prayer facilities are occurring in the U.S., Canada, Germany, Sweden, the U.K., and the Netherlands.

The current main hot spots of Islamophobia remain the U.S. and Europe. In the U.S., the

Islamophobia trend is the most concerning in terms of scale. Racist graffiti, pig carcass dumping, threatening mail, Holy Quran defacing, physical assaults, and verbal insults are among the frequent incidents. Also, quite recently in the U.S. there was an atmosphere of overwhelming chaos, as the early days of President Trump's administration had made clear that Islam is a major public enemy. Among the most notorious instances was the issuance of a xenophobic order that flies in the face of America's self-proclaimed values of freedom and equality. The policy was called Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, and it suspended entry for nationals of certain Muslim countries. Meanwhile in Europe, the bleak picture of Islamophobia was seen in intense campaigns waged by populist right-wing parties amidst ongoing elections.

Responding to the Issue

Finding a comprehensive solution to Islamophobia relies on collective work and active contributions from stakeholders, including governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, civil societies, religious leaders, and communities. Due to the complexity of the issue, an effective strategy should therefore be set up as a multilayered approach comprising measures at different fronts.

Layer 1: On the *Dialogue* Front

The strategy should focus on efforts to increase the role of religious and community leaders to

curb extremism through the promotion of ideals of tolerance, moderation, mutual respect, and peaceful coexistence. The same efforts should also be directed toward strengthening existing mechanisms for interreligious and intrafaith dialogue, to help avoid misperceptions and promote better understanding and mutual respect within and among all religions.

Layer 2: On the Media Front

Stakeholders must work together with the media to promote the understanding of responsible use of freedom of speech, while governments need to make xenophobic media accountable for perpetuating hate speech and extremism. Also, a variety of communication channels could be used to expand public debate and engagement, especially among youth.

Layer 3: On the Development and Security Fronts

Governments, particularly in Western countries, need to expand the outreach of development programs to deprived Muslim immigrant communities. There is an urgent need for multilateral and bilateral talks to review the issues of discrimination in employment, opportunities, and social integration, in order to deter unemployed Muslim youth from falling prey to extremist ideologies. This approach is pertinent because to address the issue of Islamophobia, the measures need to move beyond a sole focus on anti-terrorism and military solutions; development goals should be incorporated into deradicalization and counterterrorism efforts.

Layer 4: On the Education and Society Fronts

It is critical to integrate peace education by incorporating human rights and multicultural values into schools' curricula. In parallel, there is a need to implement programs and to mobilize resources to support community engagement for peace. Continued research and policy dialogue are needed in order to have a better understanding of the modalities and strategies used to spread extremism, including the social and value-based drivers of extremism. Stakeholders should make efforts to ensure that policies and programs in

countries address social cohesion and plurality by highlighting the role of families in countering extremist attitudes and encouraging reconciliation in communities. It is also important to engage religious communities in addressing extremism and sectarian divides, and to find common values on which understanding and cooperation can be built. Governments and international organizations need to engage civil society organizations that have experience in conflict resolution, cooperation, and political reconciliation.

Layer 5: On the International and National Fronts

Islamophobia is among the major contemporary global challenges that intertwine and intermingle with other issues, such as terrorism, extremism, radicalization, human rights, conflicts among religions, intrareligious tensions, religion-based genocide, etc. Therefore, in addition to the above-mentioned approach, the international community should work hand in hand to collectively tackle the scourge of Islamophobia, extremism, and intolerance with resolve and strength. At this stage, the impact would be significant if stakeholders put into practice the formula and recommendations prescribed by U.N. Human Rights Council Resolution 16/18.

Resolution 16/18 is a sign of hope for global action on tackling discrimination, intolerance, and stigmatization based on religion and belief; hence it is very important that stakeholders make a commitment to ensure progress on this international consensus. There is a follow-up mechanism in the form of annual sessions of the Istanbul Process, but unfortunately, this mechanism thus far has not been given enough visibility and prominence by many governments. Therefore, at the national level it is important that governments enforce necessary legislation against acts that lead to incitement of hatred, discrimination, and violence against people based on their religion.

Some Major Obstacles

Muslims have been targets of negative stereotyping and prejudice in all its forms and manifestations for quite some time. Particularly since the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the phenomenon

has increased drastically at a global level. The rise of ISIS in the last few years has made the situation even worse, as Islam was then portrayed as a religion of intrinsic violence whose disciples had a tendency to spread harm to the followers of other religions. In many Western countries, Islam is even considered an “alien” religion prone to bloodshed, a stigma that triggers intolerant attitudes among non-Muslims. This negative stereotyping eventually resulted in negative sentiments, dread, or hatred of Islam that includes multiform discrimination against its adherents, manifested into the exclusion of Muslims from economic, social, and public life.

Islamophobia, therefore, is not an issue that “stands alone”; it is very closely connected with other issues that reciprocally feed the phenomena. In simpler words, 9/11 was a problem of terrorism, ISIS was a problem of radicalization and violent extremism, while Islamophobia was actually something else, but has been affected by those issues. Terrorism and violent extremism both have boosted Islamophobia, and rapidly growing Islamophobia has in turn nurtured extremism and terrorism. By consequence, addressing the issue of Islamophobia must be undertaken in parallel with efforts to tackle other “related issues,” which unfortunately is not an easy matter.

In the context of creating strategy for countering Islamophobia, those parallel issues can be regarded as “obstacles”; based on the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s observations during the latest few years, three major issues have been identified as having a strong symbiosis with Islamophobia: (1) the rise of the far right in the U.S. and Europe; (2) the refugee crisis and the issue of immigration; and (3) the continued wave of terrorism in Europe.

The Rise of the Far Right in the U.S. and Europe

Donald Trump has been widely seen as an icon of the “far right” in the U.S., and his ascension to the presidency has left Muslims living in the U.S. with deep concerns. Since very early on, Mr. Trump had stood in opposition to Islam

and Muslims, a position clearly shown in his political campaign. After declaring that “Islam hates Americans,” Mr. Trump proposed banning Muslims from entering the country and heightened surveillance of mosques across the nation. He embraced the hateful language of Quran-burning rallies and anti-mosque protests. As a result, within a week following the election, a large number of Islamophobic and racist harassment and intimidation incidents were reported.²⁸² Interestingly, such a growing xenophobia was not only targeting

The international community should work hand in hand to collectively tackle the scourge of Islamophobia, extremism and intolerance with resolve and strength.

Muslims but also Jews and some other ethnic and religious minorities, such as black and Hispanic Americans. Nevertheless, it was a relief to note that Islamophobia in the U.S. had shown a declining trend since May 2017. President Trump himself seemed to soften his tone on Islam. When sitting among 55 Muslim world leaders in Saudi Arabia, Mr. Trump delivered a moderate speech on Islam designed to reset his relationship with the Muslim world. Mr. Trump’s speech distanced himself from the divisive anti-Muslim rhetoric he employed to appeal to voters during his election campaign.

Mr. Trump’s election bolstered right-wing forces elsewhere in the world, particularly in Europe, where a significant reordering of the political landscape was underway. This situation was quite predictable, as countries in this region have been struggling with serious debt issues and high levels of unemployment since the economic crisis hit in 2008. Such a circumstance in turn led to domestic debates about “hot” issues such as immigrants, non-European foreigners, assimilation and integration, national identity, etc., which was worsened by the surge of refugees fleeing the Syrian civil war and periodic terrorist attacks on European cities. These ingredients created the environment for right-wing parties and figures to prosper. As a consequence,

282 Christopher Mathis, “2016 Elections Coincided With Horrifying Increase in Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes, Report Finds,” The Huffington Post, May 9, 2017, [https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/anti-](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/anti-muslim-hate-crimes-2016-council-on-american-islamic-relations_us_5910ac4e4b0d5d9049e96d5)

[muslim-hate-crimes-2016-council-on-american-islamic-relations_us_5910ac4e4b0d5d9049e96d5](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/anti-muslim-hate-crimes-2016-council-on-american-islamic-relations_us_5910ac4e4b0d5d9049e96d5)

anti-EU, anti-immigration, and anti-Muslim platforms have gained ground, sending Islamophobic sentiment soaring in Europe. Right-wing parties continue to gain support in France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Hungary, and Italy.

The Refugee Crisis and the Issue of Immigration

Western countries, particularly in Europe, continue to be affected by strong anti-immigrant and anti-refugee backlash and negative attitudes toward Muslims. The anti-immigration and anti-Muslim rhetoric also entered the electoral agenda, as rightist populist parties scapegoat migrants and refugees, particularly Muslims, for every ill in society. This has negative consequences for Muslim minority communities already living in Europe, many residing for generations and established as citizens, as well as for new migrants and refugees coming from Muslim countries.

Obviously, the far-right parties in several EU countries are setting the tone of the migration debate, focusing on Muslim migrants, capitalizing on a falsely perceived link between immigration and security. What is notable is that this rhetoric is even coming from the EU members with the smallest Muslim communities, i.e. Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.

Most of the recent terrorist attacks in EU countries were carried out by European citizens, but the constant implication of immigrants resonated strongly in Europe. Those who blamed immigrants for crimes and terrorism have created a social and political climate that hampers the integration of migrants already in Europe. Furthermore, negative attitudes against Europe's Muslim minorities and new immigrants or refugees also contribute to their alienation from their host societies, and in the process might even radicalize a number of them.

Meanwhile, European countries highlighted security and employment issues to justify restrictions on the reception of refugees and the granting of asylum applications. Yet countries like Jordan, Lebanon, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey continued to receive the highest proportion of refugees²⁸³ from

conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan, a fact mostly ignored in the European migration debate. Similarly, the contribution of migrants to the growth of the economies of Europe, which are increasingly in need of labor in a context of demographic decline, is not well reflected or shared with the society. In contrast, populists are eager to declare that migrants are taking jobs and that Muslims in particular are creating security threats. Ultra-right parties are supplementing xenophobic fanaticism with nationalism to argue against immigration, particularly Muslim immigration, on security and economic grounds.

The Continued Wave of Terrorism in Europe

Amid the concern of violent extremism related to ISIS, a new wave of terror has been brought into the heart of Europe through a series of violent attacks targeting cities in the continent, an unfortunate trend that has stoked Islamophobia. Particularly in Europe, innocent Muslims have been victimized, facing immediate backlash as fear transformed into a bold stigma: that Islam encourages violence, that the religion is not really compatible with liberal values, that Muslims are prone to be extremists and terrorists, that Islam is an out-of-date religion which needs reform to adapt to modernity, and so on.

A number of consequences have arisen from the recent wave of terrorist attacks in Europe:

Firstly, this terror widened the issue of Islam in Europe beyond the frame of integration. Islam was now seen as not only a threat to European identity, culture, demography, and society, but also as a political and security threat for the Western world. The current debates and discourses in Europe revolve around the issue of Islam's compatibility with Western values.

Secondly, the wave of terror multiplied the level of Islamophobia in Europe, leaving Muslims with many uncertainties, especially as terror attacks are sometimes followed by a massive backlash toward Muslims and Islamic attire. A large number of attacks against Muslims were recorded during the latest 24 months, showing significant impact on the lives of Muslims living in Europe.

283 "Refugees," The United Nations, accessed April 6, 2018, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/refugees/>

[un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/refugees/](http://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/refugees/)

Thirdly, this new wave of terrorism has once again brought the issue of freedom of expression into the milieu of public debate in Europe, and unfortunately the constructive debates on freedom of expression vis-à-vis its limits and manifestation tended to be overridden by the strengthening

anti-Islam sentiments. Public opinions were overshadowed by the idea that free speech is a “fixed price” for European societies, and there should not be any space for negotiation with other ideologies, including Islam.

Recommendations

Islamophobia is a complex issue, and there are major obstacles that may impede us from having an effective strategy to combat it. Therefore, I offer a series of practical recommendations, in hopes they might help stakeholders inform their policies or take necessary measures:

- Emphasize fundamental human rights and freedoms in combating Islamophobia
- Use existing U.N. treaties on religious freedoms, freedom of expression, prohibition of racial discrimination, etc. as tools to combat Islamophobia
- Ensure progress on the existing international consensus in the form of the Action Plan of U.N. Human Rights Council Resolution 16/18, which establishes a policy framework for states to address intolerance, discrimination, and violence against people based on religion or belief
- Encourage governments to revive the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations initiative, giving special attention to the Muslim-Western divide fueling Islamophobia
- Adopt integrated rather than geographical approaches in countering Islamophobia
- Establish strong links among groups that fight religion-based discrimination, including Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and Christianophobia, while creating alliances with other groups that have been marginalized and dehumanized on the basis of racism and xenophobia
- Create centers for the study of Islam in Western societies—similar to the few that already exist at Georgetown and Harvard universities.
- In Muslim societies and countries, internally address issues and factors that contribute to negative images of Islam and Muslims, and emphasize the importance of proper Islamic education for young children to avoid ignorance of religion among the new generation

- Create initiatives toward developing a healthy national/religious identity to increase young Muslims’ contribution to the wider community without denying their religion
- Engage with civil society and young people in implementing government programs and actions to address religion and discrimination
- Engage in a constructive and meaningful dialogue (interreligious, intercultural, and intercivilizational) toward cohesive and harmonious societies
- Create more space to facilitate social interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims
- Work toward changing the hearts and minds of non-Muslim Westerners to believe that immigrants are not necessarily a threat to their values and principles
- In Muslim countries and communities, work more for displaying to the world what Muslims are, rather than simply denying what the extremists have been saying or doing
- Challenge the ongoing myth of “Islamization” of the West as nurtured by xenophobic, populist parties that have been on the rise across Europe and elsewhere
- Encourage legal and civic advocacy to oppose normalization of Islamophobia in mainstream political and media discourses, particularly in Europe and the U.S.
- Work to counter media reports that propagate stereotypes and stigmatize Muslim populations
- Insist governments draw a line and take concrete action to end conditions that stigmatize and alienate Muslims, while developing mechanisms to counter all types of discrimination
- Continue condemning all acts of terrorism irrespective of where they take place and who commits them

Narratives of Securitization: Islamophobia and Counterterrorism Policies in Educational Institutions in the UK

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The British state in its efforts to counter terrorism and prevent radicalization has drawn public institutions such as schools and universities increasingly into its fold. The Counter Terrorism and Security Act (CTSA) of 2015 has strengthened the state's security agenda in these institutions under its "Prevent" program through imposing a "statutory

referred to a "Channel program"—a "voluntary," "multiagency" initiative that includes a panel "chaired by the local authority, and attended by other partners, such as representatives from education and health services" who "discuss the referral, assess the extent of the vulnerability, and decide on a tailored package of support."²⁸⁵ With the most dominant threat coming from terrorist groups such as Daesh (and Al Qaida in the past), Prevent in educational institutions has predominantly focused on Muslim students.²⁸⁶ In universities, Islamic Student Societies (ISocs) in particular have been singled out.²⁸⁷ Instead of helping individuals who are "vulnerable" to terrorism, the implementation of Prevent in universities has increased Muslim student vulnerability toward Islamophobia. My work focuses on biographical narratives of Muslim students, in particular women and members of ISocs who share their experiences of Islamophobia and the British state's counterterrorism strategy in universities and in their communities. This paper explores these narratives to understand in depth the impact of counterterrorism policies on individuals and communities, and to provide insights and recommendations on how to work against extremism and terrorism without inciting Islamophobia, especially in institutions such as schools and universities.

Instead of helping individuals who are "vulnerable" to terrorism, the implementation of Prevent in universities has increased Muslim student vulnerability toward Islamophobia.

duty" on educational institutions to report on any student who is "vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism."²⁸⁴ "Prevent" is part of the British government's four-pronged approach (that includes Protect, Pursue, Prepare) under its CONTEST strategy, a counterterrorism program that was created in 2003 but whose scope has since widened in the aftermath of terrorist attacks and threats in the U.K. The aim of Prevent is to stop individuals from becoming terrorists by intervening at an early stage, at which point the suspected individual is

284 Her Majesty's Government (HM Government), Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015. (UK: Crown).

285 Home Office, Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Program, April 2015 to March 2016. Statistical Bulletin 23/17 (2017).

286 See T. Saeed and D. Johnson, "Intelligence, Global Terrorism and

Higher Education: neutralising threats or alienating allies?" British Journal of Educational Studies, 64(1), (2016): 37-51.

287 Tufyal Choudhury, "Campaigning on Campus: Student Islamic Societies and Counterterrorism," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 40(12), (2017): 1004-1022.

Muslim Women and Securitization

In media representations and political rhetoric, Muslim women oscillate between a victim in need of being rescued from a primitive religion and a dangerous terrorist hidden in broad daylight behind a veil, ideologically and physically disrupting the progressive “Western” way of life. While Muslim men are simply stereotyped as dangerous, presenting a direct physical threat, Muslim women oxymoronically are stereotyped as the “vulnerable fanatic.”²⁸⁸ Reports of British Muslim women joining Daesh further reinforce this fear.

These stereotypes have actual consequences for Muslim women in their day-to-day lives, resulting in experiences of Islamophobia in neighbourhoods, as well as schools and universities. The extent of this experience varies, dependent on their “degrees of religiosity” determined by their physical appearance: women wearing the full face veil (niqab) are the most vulnerable to such attacks, followed by those who wear the headscarf (hijab); women wearing cultural dresses that are linked to a Muslim country can also be subject to Islamophobic abuse; but women who are practicing Muslims without any physical religious signifiers face another type of Islamophobia: They have to prove their Muslimness to both non-Muslim and overtly practicing Muslim groups, constantly questioned about their religiosity.²⁸⁹

The level of abuse ranges from Islamophobic slurs such as niqabi women called “ninja” in a derogatory manner, or Muslim women called “Osama bin Laden’s wife,” the more common being labeled “terrorist” but also being called a lesbian as an insult. While the link between media and political rhetoric on terrorism and Muslims can explain these insults, the term “lesbian” reveals a different form of Islamophobic prejudice that overlaps with homophobia. “Lesbian” is often shouted

at young Muslim women in a hijab or niqab who are either walking alone or in a group with other women. Young women who have been called “lesbian” as an insult believe it stems from the idea of Muslim gender segregation, and the assumption that Muslim women are sexually repressed in line with a heteronormative ideal of sexuality and normality.²⁹⁰

Muslim women have also been subject to physical attacks and are more vulnerable to Islamophobic behavior in the aftermath of a terrorist attack or threat, but also most recently in the aftermath of Brexit, the U.K.’s decision to leave the European Union after the 2016 referendum. According to the organization Tell

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MAMA (Measuring Anti Muslim Attacks), 1,223 reports of Islamophobia were made in 2016, with 64 percent taking place “offline,” in which 56 percent of the victims were women.²⁹¹ Their research also highlights “surges” in these reports after Brexit and terrorist attacks in the U.K. While Muslim women often become scapegoats for the actions of terrorists who are as much a threat to the Muslim community as they are to the rest of the British population, the normalization of Islamophobia is evident through the implementation of the Prevent duty in universities in Britain.

288 K. Brown, “The promise and perils of women’s participation in UK Mosques: The impact of securitization agendas on identity, gender and community,” *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, 10 (3), (2008): 472–491; E.M. Saltman and M. Smith, “Till Martyrdom Do Us Part’ Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon,” *Institute for Strategic Dialogue* (2015); P. Werbner, “Honor, shame and the politics of sexual embodiment among South Asian Muslims in Britain and beyond: An analysis of debates in the public sphere,” *International Social Science Review*, 6 (1), (2005): 25–47; T. Saeed, *Islamophobia and Securitization. Religion, Ethnicity and the Female*

Voice (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 59–63.

289 T. Saeed, *Islamophobia and Securitization. Religion, Ethnicity and the Female Voice* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

290 T. Saeed, *Islamophobia and Securitization. Religion, Ethnicity and the Female Voice* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

291 Tell MAMA, *A Constructed Threat: Identity, Intolerance and the Impact of Anti-Muslim Hatred*, Tell MAMA Annual Report 2016 (UK: Faith Matters, 2017).

Securitization and Islamophobia: ISocs and Muslim Students

Universities came under the radar of British security agencies in the aftermath of the July 7, 2005, terrorist attacks in London. The attack dispelled the belief that terrorists were poor individuals shunned from society as more was learned about the terrorists, especially Shehzad Tanweer, a British university graduate.²⁹² Over the years other educated individuals were found to have turned toward terrorism: Umar Farouk Abdulmuttalab, an alumnus of a London university and the former president of its ISoc, attempted to blow up a plane headed to the U.S.; Roshonara Choudhry, a student of another London university, dropped out a year before graduation and went on to stab and

These instances reinforce insecurity around what is legitimate language and ideology for Muslim students, which is perceived to be different for other students.

wound a British member of Parliament as revenge for the Iraq War; not to mention the problematically termed “jihadi brides” that included young students leaving the comforts of their homes in Britain to support Daesh fighters abroad.²⁹³ There was no link established between the students’ time at their universities and their turn toward terrorism, yet university officials were already working with security personnel and experts on a voluntary basis. However, CTSA 2015 made it a “statutory duty” to report on students at risk of radicalization and terrorism.

This “Prevent duty” has been widely criticized

by academics and civil rights activists for promoting an atmosphere of surveillance and censorship within academic institutions.²⁹⁴ Muslim students have fallen into what O’Donnell has called a “pre-crime” zone,²⁹⁵ since they have yet to commit a crime or a terrorist act, yet under Prevent they can be stopped from taking that route if they show a sign of vulnerability, as if such a course is an inevitability for Muslim students. What those “signs” entail, or whether university personnel can truly identify these “signs” without subjective bias, continues to be debated.²⁹⁶ The threat that they pose takes the form of what Jackson calls the “Rumsfeldian ‘unknown unknown’” drawing on Donald Rumsfeld’s famous quotation where members of the Muslim communities pose a persistent threat, if not today, then tomorrow, of becoming the “would-be” terrorist.²⁹⁷ While this atmosphere of surveillance has been reinforced through the CTSA 2015, it already existed in universities, especially in the aftermath of the Abdulmuttalab attempted attack.

Muslim students in my study reported that they felt they were “studying under siege.”²⁹⁸ There was a perception that they were always considered suspicious not only by university management, but also at times by fellow students and professors. In their academic performance, they became more careful about the topics they researched, especially after the case of Rizwaan Sabir. Sabir was a student who was reported to the authorities for downloading the Al Qaida manual for his research that was widely available in local book shops. Despite his supervisor’s clarification to the authorities about his research, Sabir was held in police custody for nearly 10 days. Sabir’s arrest took place in 2008, and only after Sabir took the police force to task about his wrongful arrest was an apology

292 “Suicide bombers’ ‘ordinary’ lives,” BBC News, July 16, 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4678837.stm>.

293 “Profile: Umar Farouk Abdulmuttalab,” BBC News, October 12, 2011, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-11545509>; V. Dodd, “Profile: Roshonara Choudhry,” The Guardian, November 2, 2010, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/nov/02/profile-roshonara-choudhry-stephen-timms>; L. Dearden, “Isis’ British brides: What we know about the girls and women still in Syria after the death of Kadiza Sultana,” The Independent, August 12, 2016, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/isis-british-brides-kadiza-sultana-girls-women-syria-married-death-killed-aqsa-mahmood-islamic-state-a7187751.html>.

294 “Counter-terrorism and security bill is a threat to freedom of speech at universities,” The Guardian, February 2, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/>

education/2015/feb/02/counter-terrorism-security-bill-threat-freedom-of-speech-universities.

295 A. O’Donnell, “Securitization, Counterterrorism and the Silencing of Dissent: The Educational Implications of Prevent,” British Journal of Educational Studies, 64(1), (2016): 53-76.

296 Open Society Justice Initiative, Eroding Trust. The UK’s PREVENT Counter-extremism Strategy in Health and Education (US: Open Society Foundations, 2016).

297 R. Jackson, “The epistemological crisis of counterterrorism,” Critical Studies on Terrorism, 8(1), (2015): 33-54.

298 T. Saeed and D. Johnson, “Intelligence, Global Terrorism and Higher Education: neutralizing threats or alienating allies?,” British Journal of Educational Studies, 64(1), (2016): 37-51.

made and settlement reached in 2011.²⁹⁹ Muslim students were aware of Sabir's case and often cited it as one of the reasons why they avoided controversial subjects that could put them in a similar situation. However, after the CTSA 2015, Mohammed Umar Farooq's case highlights the ease with which such mistakes can be repeated. Farooq, who "looks" Muslim, was reported for reading a book on terrorism in his university library, a book that was a requirement of his graduate course work on terrorism.³⁰⁰ There have been cases of students in schools being reported to the authorities for exhibiting vulnerability toward terrorism, where in one case a student was reported for supporting the Boycott, Divest and Sanction (BDS) movement against Israel, and in another instance using the term eco-terrorism in a discussion about the environment.³⁰¹ These instances reinforce insecurity around what is *legitimate language* and ideology for Muslim students, which is perceived to be different for other students. In my study, students reiterated the fact that this problem was a direct consequence of counterterrorism policies, media, and political rhetoric that reinforced an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion about the Muslim student body.

ISocs in particular have been subjected to Islamophobia. ISocs serve an important welfare function for Muslim students, many of whom are away from their families for the first time. They look after the specific needs of Muslim students, with many ISocs having successfully campaigned for the option of halal food to be served in their university cafeterias, or prayer rooms provided for Muslim students. For many it is a space where students do not need to explain their beliefs and practices to others, a home away from home especially during the Muslim month of fasting, Ramadan, or during the Eid festivities. However, ISocs also organize seminars and talks, inviting Muslim speakers, that have been flagged by security agencies. The Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS), which is the umbrella

organization representing all university ISocs in Britain, has been accused of not doing enough to counter radicalization by allowing ISocs to host such events.³⁰² There have been instances reported of speaker events being canceled at the last minute by university authorities; difficulty with middle management in finalizing a university venue for such events; speaker events being monitored by university personnel—where distrust is triggered more by the administration's inability or reluctance to communicate these changes to the ISocs.³⁰³ Such policies create a trust deficit when students are not given an explanation or an opportunity to debate the merits of such actions. The university should be a space where such dialogue should take place, where students should be critical about rules and regulations, especially when they consider them unjust. The atmosphere created by counterterrorism policies such as CTSA 2015 reinforces this distrust and fosters an atmosphere of suspicion.

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This suspicion is evident in the experiences of ISoc members when they try to promote an event within the university. Fellow students accuse them of being terrorists, or recruiters for terrorists; Muslim students who claim to be moderate avoid them as they do not want to be labeled a terrorist through such an association. In the aftermath of the Abdulmutalab case, even parents advised their children to avoid ISocs, not because they believed

299 "Police agree £20,000 payment over Rizwaan Sabir arrest," BBC News, September 14, 2011, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-nottinghamshire-14923411>.

300 R. Ramesh and J. Halliday, "Student accused of being a terrorist for reading book on terrorism," *The Guardian*, September 24, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/sep/24/student-accused-being-terrorist-reading-book-terrorism>

301 T. Saeed, "Muslim Narratives of Schooling in Britain: From 'Paki' to

the 'Would-be Terrorist,'" in M.M.A. Ghail and C. Haywood (eds.) *Muslim Students, Education and Neoliberalism: Schooling a 'Suspect Community'* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

302 H M Government (2011) Report to the Home Secretary of Independent Oversight of Prevent Review and Strategy by Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C. UK: Crown.

303 T. Saeed, *Islamophobia and Securitization. Religion, Ethnicity and the Female Voice* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

their members were terrorists, but simply because these would be targeted or under surveillance by security agencies. While ISocs have struggled to prove their innocence, they have been active in attempting to reclaim their rights as student organizations to be both religiously and in some cases politically active.

The need for “normalization” shows the extent to which the Muslim student presence has become “abnormal” under the security agenda, where different standards of behavior are perceived to exist for Muslims against their fellow students.

ISocs and Muslim Student Voice(s)

One of the strategies that have been encouraged by FOSIS and different university ISocs is to “normalize Muslim student presence in university campuses.” The need for “normalization” shows the extent to which the Muslim student presence has become “abnormal” under the security agenda, where different standards of behavior are perceived to exist for Muslims against their fellow students. This normalization is achieved by encouraging Muslim students to become involved in other student societies outside of ISocs, but also to be involved with the university Student Union. This is not to suggest that Muslim students were not already part of other student societies, but many were often mostly involved with ISoc events. There was a concerted effort to show the university and students that Muslim students were no different. This change was clearly evident in many universities as more and more Muslim students took part in university student politics, but the success was clear when Malia Bouattia became the first Muslim female president of the National Union of Students (NUS) in the U.K., though her

term was not without controversy.³⁰⁴

The effort to “normalize” Muslim student presence stems from a realization amongst Muslim students (though not all) that there is a need for Muslims to take control of the narrative that informs their day-to-day lives. There is also an awareness of the problem of terrorism that organizations such as FOSIS do not shy away from, evident in the fact that they have organized conferences inviting government officials, security personnel, academics, civil rights activists, as well as students to facilitate cooperation and a way forward. There is a realization that more Muslims need to be involved not just in politics at the university, but at the local and national levels. There is a recognition of the need for Muslim voices to become part of mainstream media in order to provide a different perspective about Muslims and their diversity in the U.K. While students have also argued the injustice of such an expectation, placing the onus of defending and changing the narrative about Muslims on innocent Muslims, there are nonetheless pockets of resistance amongst Muslim students through the democratic system against such stereotypes. There is also an effort to continue working with allies, especially in campaigns, such as the student-led “Preventing Prevent” initiative.³⁰⁵ However, it is important to highlight that not all ISocs may be equally politically active, but there are members across ISocs who are attempting to change the narrative. These are the voices that need to be recognized, where there is a willingness to engage in the democratic process, but only if Muslim students are considered as individuals in their own rights, rather than dismissed as vulnerable groups constantly in need of being monitored or rescued.

Implications and Recommendations

The responses of Muslim students to the problem of Islamophobia in relation to the Prevent strategy varied, highlighting a diversity of Muslim student experiences and voices that cannot be placed in a single category. This diversity of not only the

304 A. Topping and S. Marsh, “Divisive NUS president Malia Bouattia defeated in election,” *The Guardian*, April 26, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2017/apr/26/malia-bouattia-shakira-martin-nus-national-union-of-students-president-election>.

305 NUS Black Students, *Preventing Prevent. A Student Handbook on Countering the PREVENT Agenda on Campus* (London: NUS, 2015), <http://www.nusconnect.org.uk/resources/preventing-prevent-handbook>.

Muslim student, but also the Muslim community needs to be recognized instead of simplified as a homogenous single entity called British Muslims. In recognizing this diversity there is an opportunity to allow multiple voices and points of view from within Muslim communities to be heard.

Educational spaces have the important role of promoting debate and critical engagement about difficult and controversial topics. Therein lies the strength of such institutions, and especially universities, in countering both Islamophobia and any form of “vulnerability” that a student may have toward any extremist ideology. In order to counter terrorism of any form, this fundamental role of the university needs to be strengthened. O'Donnell highlights this problem by observing that “[i]f education is not seen as a space that invites open dialogue and free speech, students will not engage and they will not open up to the kinds of transformation and questioning that the pedagogical encounter can bring in its wake.”³⁰⁶

ISocs and other student societies provide the ideal opportunity for these debates to be organized in collaboration with Muslim students. The narratives of the participants in my study highlight the unwritten rule of self-censorship in a securitized educational setting as the only way in which a Muslim student can escape the web of “vulnerability” cast around his/her experience. Such self-censorship also reinforces a feeling of alienation, where Muslim students are aware of the double standards that dictate their existence as students, particularly as ISoc members, in comparison to other students or student organizations. It is in the context of educational spaces such as universities where the importance of democratic values and institutions should be reinforced

for all students, where political activism should be encouraged, and where controversial topics should be debated, rather than brushed aside or silenced.

It is also important to recognize the counternarratives that have emerged from young Muslims. Campaigns such as “Preventing Prevent,” or #NotInMyName³⁰⁷ are initiatives started by young Muslims to reclaim the dominant narrative about their place in society. These campaigns are built on democratic principles of protest that need to be strengthened. Local bodies, educational institutions, and even security personnel need to work with such campaigns, recognizing and valuing the experience of young Muslims who are law-abiding citizens, instead of securitizing and rendering them vulnerable and voiceless.

There is a recognition of the need for Muslim voices to become part of mainstream media in order to provide a different perspective about Muslims and their diversity in the U.K.

Lastly, educational institutions have a “duty of care” toward all students and a responsibility to ensure that no student is unfairly targeted, to ensure in this case a no-tolerance policy toward Islamophobia. This “duty of care” can be compromised where the security agenda dominates the institution, to the point that innocent students feel “under siege.” Educational institutions need to uphold this “duty of care,” which can be unfairly brushed aside as the *Prevent duty* takes precedence.

306 A. O'Donnell, “Securitization, Counterterrorism and the Silencing of Dissent: The Educational Implications of Prevent, British Journal of

Educational Studies, 64(1), (2016): 71.

307 #NotInMyName <http://isisnotinmyname.com>.

Toward a Counter-Islamophobia Toolkit: Drawing on Best Practices in the European Union

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Introduction

Across the globe, there is a recognized proliferation and intensification of Islamophobia. Islamophobia increasingly permeates a range of spheres; it affects (but is not restricted to) policy and legal measures, media, and also verbal and physical violence against Muslims, presumed Muslims, and Islamic spaces. Examples of such incidents include attempted arson attacks on mosques and Muslim cultural centers;³⁰⁸ the targeting of non-Muslims, such as Sikh-Canadian politician Jagmeet Singh; and—at their most abhorrent—the murder of Muslims, including three members of the Barakat family in Chapel Hill, N.C., in February 2015 and Mohammed Saleem in Birmingham, England, in April 2013, to name but a few. In addition to specific events, statistical evidence demonstrates the consistent growth of Islamophobic incidents. For example, in France the *Collectif Contre l'Islamophobie en France* reports an 18.5 percent increase in recorded Islamophobic incidents between 2015 and 2016,³⁰⁹ and in Belgium the *Collectif Contre l'Islamophobie en Belgique* reported 36 incidents in a one-month period during March–April 2016.³¹⁰ Yet undeniably these events and figures represent just the tip of the iceberg.

Islamophobia is also spread via narratives of Muslim “otherness” promoted online, in media, and in popular culture, examples of which are often found in the satirical comics of *Charlie Hebdo* in France, or the sensationalist headlines of tabloid newspapers such as *The Mail* or *The Sun* in the United Kingdom. While these are not responsible for the creation of such narratives, these media create channels for the widespread diffusion of Islamophobic narratives. Civil society initiatives increasingly seek to challenge this. For example, the British group Muslim Engagement and Development has devised the Holding our Media to Account: The Media Monitoring Toolkit and also regularly circulates calls to action to its members.³¹¹

The intensification of Islamophobia is also seen at the institutional level in political discourse, at the judicial and executive levels, and in the enactment of legislative measures. Examples of this include the 2004 French *Loi Stasi* regarding “ostentatious faith symbols,” which has disproportionately affected young Muslim women in education,³¹² and the recent European Court of Justice preliminary judgments regarding the dismissal from the workplace of Muslim women who wear the headscarf.³¹³ Or, markedly less

308 See the annually published European Islamophobia Report for more detailed nationally based examples. E. Bayrakli and F. Hafez, *European Islamophobia Report Istanbul*, SETA (2017); E. Bayrakli and F. Hafez (eds.), *The State of Islamophobia in Europe*, Istanbul SETA (2017).

309 Annual Report 2015, CCIF, C. C. L. I., (Paris: Collectif Contre l'Islamophobie en France, 2016).

310 Rapport d'Activités 2016, CCIB, (Brussels, Belgium: CCIB, 2017).

311 “Holding our Media to Account: The Media Monitoring Toolkit,” in: MEND (ed.) (London, UK: MEND, 2014).

312 Legifrance, “Loi du 15 mars 2004-228 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le porte de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics (France)” (Paris: Legifrance, 2004).

313 Case c-157/15 Samira Achbita and Centrum voor Gelijkheid van Kansen en voor Racismebesirjding v. G4S Secure Solutions. European Court of Justice, 2017; Case C-188/15 Asma Bougnaoui. Association de Défense des Droits de l'Homme (ADDH) v. Micropole Univers. European Court of Justice, 2017.

gendered, was the recent unanimously supported bill set to outlaw ritual slaughter (both *halal* and *kosher*) in Belgium's Flemish and francophone regions.³¹⁴

As detailed further in this paper, there is a range of academic research and civil society initiatives dedicated to recording, reporting, and theorizing Islamophobia and its diverse manifestations, much of which reaches the conclusion that more should be done to effectively and systematically counter Islamophobia. In this regard, we observe that although the aforementioned endeavours constitute an essential and indispensable aspect, there remain limited research and outputs in the field of countering Islamophobia. This contribution outlines work being led by the University of Leeds, United Kingdom, toward the development of a counter-Islamophobia toolkit and also highlights some of the initial project recommendations.

Background

The Counter-Islamophobia Kit is a two-year European Commission action grant-funded project (JUST/2015/RRAC/AG/BEST/8910), which seeks to create a transferable toolkit to effectively counter Islamophobia. The project draws on best practices as seen across the European Union.³¹⁵ It is based on the detailed examination of eight case studies: the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. This selection of cases offers an exciting range of examples, varying from the study of those with large Muslim communities arising from postcolonial migration (U.K., France, Germany, Belgium), to countries with a distinctly newer and comparatively smaller Muslim presence (Hungary and Czech Republic), and finally those with comparatively small Muslim communities but also some degree of historical relationship and national imagination with Muslims (Greece and Portugal). Nonetheless, while these cases form the basis of this project, it is envisaged that the findings which emerge from the work will not be limited to these countries, or indeed even just the

European Union. Rather the messages that emerge will be of global significance.

The Counter-Islamophobia Kit project began in January 2017 and is divided into four principal work streams, each lasting six months. The first dealt with establishing dominant Islamophobic narratives in each of the cases studied. Work stream 2 sought to establish an overview of the most effective practices in countering Islamophobia in each country studied. The remaining two components of the project will involve the development of the Counter-Islamophobia Toolkit and its dissemination to policymakers, experts, and practitioners at the local, national, and international level via conferences, workshops, and academic and policy-related outputs.

Prevailing Islamophobic narratives construct Muslims as being culturally or morally incompatible and therefore incomplete citizens unable to assimilate with Western society.

Toward a Counter-Islamophobia Toolkit

In spite of the geographical, historical, and normative differences across the eight cases studied within the remit of this project, convergences in the nature of Islamophobic narratives emerged. These include the fixed construction of Muslims as posing a demographic threat, as having a desire to “Islamize” the West, and as posing risk of violent threat. The dominant Islamophobic narratives identified also construct Muslims as having non-normative values surrounding gender and sexuality: Muslims are seen as being promoters of gender inequality and quashing women’s rights along with the rights of sexual minorities, and also are seen as being sexually perverse. Ultimately, prevailing Islamophobic narratives construct Muslims as being culturally or morally incompatible and

314 A. Easat-Daas, “Islamophobia in Belgium: National Report 2017,” in: E. Bayrakli and F. Hafez (eds.) *European Islamophobia Report* (Istanbul: SETA, 2018).

315 See the Counter-Islamophobia Kit for regular updates on the project, including downloadable working papers—www.cik.leeds.ac.uk.

therefore incomplete citizens unable to assimilate with Western society.³¹⁶ In turn the normalization of perceived Muslim alterity is then cited as justification for regulating the Muslim community at various levels.

Within the second phase of the Counter-Islamophobia Kit project, each national team conducted a range of fieldwork activities, including interviews with key experts and activists, to establish the best practices. Meta-analysis of the eight national case studies has revealed a series of convergences in the best practice in countering Islamophobia in the field.³¹⁷ First and foremost, across the cases studied it was emphasized that counter-Islamophobia narratives should distinctly

This narrative of threat could be deconstructed via emphasis on the cultural compatibility of Muslims and Western societies – to state that Muslims are not at odds with society but rather are very much part of society.

avoid the danger of reproducing Islamophobic tropes by attempting to engage with these narratives at a very basic level in order to prove them as false.³¹⁸ Furthermore, it was highlighted that recording, monitoring, and cataloging Islamophobia in a systematic and methodologically sound manner were prerequisites to being able to engage with and then subsequently tackle Islamophobia in a coherent manner. The annual publication of the European Islamophobia Report documenting Islamophobia across the continent since 2015 represents one example.³¹⁹ There exist numerous national projects with a similar focus, including the Counter-Islamophobia Collectives in France and Belgium.³²⁰

In regard to combating the ideological bases of dominant Islamophobic narratives, our reports highlighted the importance of challenging notions of Muslim threat. This narrative of threat could be deconstructed via emphasis on the cultural compatibility of Muslims and Western societies—to state that Muslims are not at odds with society but rather are very much part of society. This would contribute to countering ideas of a desired Muslim takeover or Islamization of the country or dispelling myths surrounding Muslims and gender/sexuality or the threat of violent attacks. In addition, since the narrative of threat also functions on the basis of a presumed Muslim monolith, efforts should be undertaken to highlight the plurality and heterogeneity of Muslim communities. In sum, the narrative of threat and “otherness” should be replaced by an increased emphasis on the humanity of Muslims in order to foster the building of inclusive futures. This proposed method of countering fits well with the understanding of Islamophobia adopted in this project, which recognizes that “... more than an expression of hatred or fear, Islamophobia needs to be understood as an undermining of the ability of Muslims, as Muslims, to project themselves into the future.”³²¹

In order to maintain optimal efficacy, counter-narratives to Islamophobia should allow for the challenging of institutional Islamophobia. This strand of countering Islamophobia maps onto wider projects that seek to deracialize and decolonialize the state. Examples of this include actions against direct legal measures that limit Islamic practices, such as the combined lawsuit lodged by the Coordinating Council of Islamic Institutions in Belgium and the Belgian Federation of Jewish Organisations, along with the European and World Jewish Congress, against the introduction of a ban on ritual slaughter in Belgium.³²² An alternative

316 See E. Mescoli, Work stream 1: Dominant Islamophobic Narratives - Comparative Report. Leeds, UK: University of Leeds, 2017, for an overview and analysis of the dominant Islamophobic narratives identified in the first stage of this project.

317 See I. Law, A. Easat-Daas, and S. Sayyid, Dominant Counter-Islamophobia Narratives - Comparative Report. Leeds, UK: University of Leeds, 2018.

318 “Annual Report 2015,” CCIF, C.C.L.I. (Paris: Collectif Contre L'Islamophobie, 2014).

319 See www.islamophobiaeurope.com for all previous editions of the European Islamophobia Report as edited by Bayrakli, E., and Hafez, F.

320 “Rapport d'Activités 2016,” CCIB (Brussels, Belgium: CCIB, 2017); “Annual Report 2015,” CCIF, C.C.L.I. (Paris: Collectif Contre L'Islamophobie, 2014).

321 S. Sayyid, “A Measure of Islamophobia,” *Islamophobia Studies Journal*, 2 (2014): 10-25.

322 “Belgian Muslims, Jews Challenge Slaughter Ban,” *About Islam*, January 18, 2018.

example is the way in which the *Collectif Contre l'Islamophobie* in France seeks to empower French Muslims with knowledge of their legal rights and facilitate individuals' pursuit of legal action where appropriate — most often seen in cases relating to Muslim women's dress.³²³

In the initial phase of the Counter-Islamophobia Kit project, it was determined that dominant Islamophobic narratives alleged gender inequality. Therefore, with regard to counternarratives to Islamophobia across the cases studied in this report, it was found that strategies for countering Islamophobia must allow for the creation of Muslim spaces for the expression of Muslim voices. Such spaces may be ones in which Islamicate feminism³²⁴ may grow and flourish, thus allowing Muslim women to reclaim the currently highly "Orientalized"³²⁵ discourse surrounding their agency and position. These spaces may also allow for the use of creative and artistic expression as a mode of transmission of Muslim voices. One such highly accessible example by Muslim women includes the Brussels-based initiative *Bruxelloise et Voilées*.³²⁶ The collective uses social media as a tool to diffuse its monthly video recordings in which they profile a Muslim woman from the Belgian capital who wears the headscarf and detail the everyday aspects of her life (without focusing excessively on the headscarf). *Bruxelloise et Voilées* stated: "The objective is to promote a multicultural society by fighting against discrimination and stereotypes, in particular against Muslim veiled women. It's both an artistic movement and a militant initiative that aims... to show our diverse identities by speaking about everything but the hijab."³²⁷

In a similar vein, an alternative example of countering Islamophobia more broadly is apparent in the 2017 U.K. film *Fresia*. The film was funded by the Joseph Rowntree charitable trust. The film's creator, Conor Ibrahiem of Arakan Creative, asserts that the film is the first specifically counter-Islamophobia film. The film is commendable given its creative, emotive, and accessible mode of

transmission of narratives that counter stereotypes regarding Muslims, beyond typically academic outputs. Ibrahiem has also stated that he intends to transform the film into a toolkit which can be used by schools to broach difficult issues surrounding Islamophobia, far-right radicalization, and more, thus highlighting the potential longevity of creative endeavours.³²⁸

In addition to the analysis of best practices employed in relation to countering Islamophobia, the project has also engaged in an ongoing analysis of the use of European human rights law and its existing application in Islamophobia, and perhaps most importantly as the basis of understanding its potential application in the countering of Islamophobia in the future.³²⁹ This legal approach, combined with the meta-analysis of best practices in countering Islamophobia in the field, will serve as the basis for the development of a transferable toolkit which may be applied by policymakers, experts, and practitioners in the European Union and beyond.

Concluding Remarks

By way of conclusion, this contribution has outlined the work of the Counter-Islamophobia Kit project, namely identifying the basis of dominant Islamophobic narratives in Europe and best practices for combating them. Although derived from the European context, it is undeniable that these strategies offer avenues for countering growing rates of Islamophobia across the globe. These examples therefore form the basis of the recommendations presented below:

- Continue standardized and thorough reporting of Islamophobic incidents at the level of victim reporting and at local and national levels. These endeavours must be supported and legitimized wherever possible. However, given issues pertaining to legitimacy, these must be from grass-roots initiatives rather than state-controlled measures.

323 "Collectif Contre L'Islamophobie en France," CCIF, accessed December 27, 2017, www.Islamophobie.net.

324 Originating from within Muslim societies/the "Muslim world," rather than being externally imposed.

325 See Edward Said, *Orientalism*, London Routledge, 1978.

326 The organization is set to change its name to the *Cann'elles* as of

March 2018.

327 A. Easat-Daas (ed.), *Islamophobia in Belgium: National Report 2016* (Istanbul: SETA, 2016).

328 Personal communication with C. Ibrahiem (August 2017).

329 See I. Trispiotis, *Islamophobia in European Human Rights Law* (Leeds, UK: University of Leeds, 2017).

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- Counter narratives of the alleged Muslim threat by allowing for the expression of Muslim humanity, plurality, and normalcy.

Create projects that stress an inclusive approach, whereby Muslims are constructed as an integral part of both the local/national current and future projections.

- Create projects that stress an inclusive approach, whereby Muslims are constructed as an integral part of both the local/national current and future projections.

- Effective and coherent challenging of institutional Islamophobia, whether it is present in political discourses or legal measures, for example. This approach relies on the empowerment of Muslim communities.
- Creation of Muslim spaces—including those that promote and respect Islamicate feminism and also creative expression of Muslim voices.

These recommendations are not exhaustive. Rather, there should be emphasis on continued growth and development of concrete and actionable strategies. Furthermore, in this regard support from the European Commission and the Carter Center initiative must be welcomed and commended going ahead.

Islamophobia: From Challenge to Opportunity

Debbie Almontaser

Bridging Cultures Group Inc.

Islamophobia is not a phobia that developed in the aftermath of 9/11, but existed long before 9/11. Arabs and Muslims in the U.S. have long faced negative stereotypical portrayals in the media and popular culture; Shaheen documented the demonization of Arabs and Muslims, dating back to black-and-white silent movies.³³⁰

The 9/11 attacks, however, gave Islamophobia greater societal weight and consequently allowed Islamophobic expressions to have more societal acceptability. Allen noted that, just a few days before the 9/11 attacks, the United Nations formally recognized Islamophobia as anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic prejudice, discrimination, and hatred.³³¹ Allen stated that the United Nations' recognition of Islamophobia confirms that anti-Muslim sentiment was a growing global concern. Allen argued, however, that the attacks have heightened tensions and increased the dissemination of fear of Muslims. The media frames of reference within which Muslims and Islam are portrayed are overtly negative, and sadly have become very problematic. The negative portrayal of Muslims has been normalized to the extent that it has become common sense, truth, and reality for many. Allen stated, "And, it is this normalization in the wider understanding that makes the continuation and suggestion of such anti-Muslim ideas and expressions acceptable."³³²

In the aftermath of 9/11 the backlash and discrimination against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians was enacted in law. Legislation, such as the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, led to the detention and deportation of thousands of Muslims under the guise of the "War on Terror." The negative coverage of Islam and Muslims in the years after 9/11, including the number of terrorist attacks committed by individuals who identify as Muslim, and government legislation and investigations completed under the war on terror, abroad and at home, have been continuous.

In the last 17 years, right-wing bloggers, neoconservative academics, Tea Party members, and conservative politicians have engaged in media smear campaigns against Arabs and Muslims who are seeking to expand their leadership positions. Just to name a few climaxes: The most prominent smear campaigns in the last 10 years occurred in 2007, when the Khalil Gibran International Academy, the first Arabic dual-language public school in the U.S., and its principal made front-page headlines as a so-called *publicly funded madrasa* that sought to train homegrown terrorists.³³³ In 2008, Sen. Barack Obama was painted a *secret Muslim* who was seeking to convert America to Islam.³³⁴ In 2010,

330 Jack Shaheen, *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People* (New York, NY: Olive Branch Press, 2001).

331 Christopher Allen, "Justifying Islamophobia: a post-9/11 consideration of the European Union and British contexts," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 21, no. 3 (2004): 1-25.

332 Ibid., 22.

333 Lorraine Ali, "Speech Impediment," *Newsweek*, October 1, 2007, 14.

334 Jim Rutenberg, "The Man Behind the Whispers About Obama," *The New York Times*, October 12, 2008. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/us/politics/13martin.html>.

the announcement of a proposed Islamic cultural center in Lower Manhattan drew controversy that coined it the *Ground Zero* mosque. Bloggers and politicians fueled the flames of bigotry by dividing the nation into two groups: a group who believed in religious freedom anywhere and a group who believed the building of a mosque near ground zero would desecrate the memory of those lost in 9/11.³³⁵ In 2011, Rep. Peter King, chair of the House Committee on Homeland Security, called for a hearing titled “The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and That Community’s Response.” King was quoted in a *Slate* article as saying the hearings were to address “the radicalization of the American Muslim community and homegrown terrorism.”³³⁶

Muslims in New York City in particular faced a great deal of backlash and discrimination in the aftermath of 9/11. While faced with great challenges, Muslims were at the same time able to make newfound friends that then became allies.

Muslims in New York City in particular faced a great deal of backlash and discrimination in the aftermath of 9/11. While faced with great challenges, Muslims were at the same time able to make newfound friends that then became allies. Muslim New Yorkers and their allies turned these challenges into opportunities of solidarity, which in turn created authentic coalitions that have made a difference in their lives and the lives of their neighbors. There is no better quote to speak to this than that from Franklin D. Roosevelt: “If civilization is to survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationships—the ability of all peoples, of all kinds, to live together and work together, in the same world, at peace.”

Over the course of the years, these coalitions spurred intersectional and intercommunity work

when an issue impacting a community within these coalitions arose. The driving factor was ensuring racially and economically just communities that upheld the civil rights of all citizens. We saw this work evolve over the years with opportunities of genuine collaboration among these diverse communities.

What were these opportunities that allowed intersectional and intercommunity organizing to emerge?

- War on terror detentions, deportations, and NSEERs (National Security Entry-Exit Registration System actions) of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians resulted in mass demonstrations and rallies across the city in the name of the U.S. Constitution.
- State standardized testing on Muslim holidays resulted in the Campaign for Muslim Holidays, where over 40 organizations of every ethnic, racial, and religious group coalesced to incorporate Muslim holidays into the school calendar.
- The NYPD Muslim Surveillance Program resulted in intersectional organizing among allies to end the NYPD “stop and frisk” of black and Latino young men, as well as lawsuits initiated by the Muslim community against the NYPD.
- The protests against the “Ground Zero Mosque” mobilized New Yorkers to stand up for religious freedom, resulting in the formation of New York Neighbors for American Values, a coalition of more than 130 organizations and thousands of individuals from a broad swath of the city’s diverse population, including good government, religious, service, advocacy, neighborhood, labor, and professional organizations.
- The opposition to CVE and Strong Cities Network being introduced by city government resulted in engagement with officials on terms set by the American Muslim community and their allies.
- A case where the NYPD had become lawless by not confirming or denying the existence of

335 Laurie Goodstein, “American Muslims Ask, Will We Ever Belong?” *The New York Times*, September 5, 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/06/us/06muslims.html>.

336 William Saletan, “Muslim-Bait and Switch,” *Frame Game*, *Slate*, March 11, 2011. http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/frame_game/2011/03/muslimbait_and_switch.html.

classified documents on Muslim Americans when Freedom of Information Act requests were made resulted in both a lawsuit and a coalescing with Black Lives Matter activists demanding release of documents in similar cases, such as that of Eric Garner, who died after New York City police officers placed him in a choke hold.

These challenges that turned into opportunities pushed Muslim leaders in NYC to become civically and politically engaged to advocate on behalf of their community, as well as other communities. We realized we needed our local government to partner with us to counter Islamophobia, pushing us as a community to become a part of the political process. This resulted in registering people to vote, supporting candidates, and running our own Muslim, Arab, and South Asian candidates.

We engaged local government to counter Islamophobia in the following ways:

- We hosted Ramadan/Eid celebrations in City Hall.
- We introduced curriculum for public schools on Muslim holidays.
- We proposed an anti-Islamophobia bill in the City Council.
- We encouraged elected officials to call out Islamophobes whenever needed.
- We initiated a Commission for Human Rights educational campaign in social media and subway ads.

Recommendations for Combating Islamophobia

In Schools and Universities

- Hire Muslim chaplains and Muslim guidance counselors or culturally competent counselors who understand diverse Muslim communities
- In the K-12 setting, lobby to incorporate culturally responsive education in schools, which requires teacher training
- Establish more academic centers that specialize in Muslim American history and culture

At the Community Level

- Help mosques become a community resource for non-Muslims through open houses and interfaith engagement. The Muslim Community Network (MCN) devised a program titled Connecting Communities to pair up a mosque with a church or synagogue
- The Muslim Community Network also created community service projects under its MCN Serves program to engage American Muslims and their allies
- MCN also developed youth-designed programming for Muslim American youth to have a voice titled MY-NYC, short for Muslim Youth New York City

- Muslim mental health providers calling themselves Thrive NYC developed culturally sensitive social and mental health services
- Work with cultural institutions to host exhibits and educational programs on Muslims and Islam in America (Children's Museum of Manhattan, City Museum of NY, Brooklyn Historical Society)

At the State and National Levels, with Government Support

- Sponsor public service announcement campaigns on diversity and tolerance, with the goal of promoting integration of immigrant Muslim Americans; this was done with the NYC Commission for Human Rights
- Provide language access in city agencies (NYC has a translation service for 80 languages)
- Hire more Muslim Americans in all areas of government to contribute to a better and more skilled America
- Publicly work with Muslim community leaders to set an example and show that Muslims are an integral part of their community

continues

Recommendations for Combating Islamophobia (continued)

- Invite Muslim American professionals and youth to trans-Atlantic and national dialogues to share their experiences and best practices

In the Media

- Hold seminars for anchors and producers to find authentic approaches to Muslim Americans by engaging national Muslim American institutions and well-recognized scholars
- Deter bigotry in the media by holding producers accountable who rely on self-proclaimed experts on the Middle East and Islam
- Boycott advertisers when media outlets don't respond positively
- Make our own media using social media; when the media doesn't attend an event, we stream it on Facebook Live
- Create a media speaker's bureau of reliable spokespeople who have media training

I firmly believe Islamophobia is a manifestation of the institutional and structural racism that has existed for hundreds of years in society and is perpetuated by white supremacy against black and brown people. When we acknowledge the institutional and structural racism that black and brown people have experienced and work to combat it, Islamophobia, along with other phobias of minority communities, will dissipate.

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Countering Islamophobia

Arno Michaelis

Author, "My Life After Hate"

It is crucial to understand the symbiotic relationship between violent Islamist extremism and Islamophobia. The objective of the so-called "Islamic State," Al Qaida, Al Shabaab, et al. is to sow strife between all 1.8 billion Muslims on earth and everyone else. Terror attacks against civil society are designed to bring about social conditions where all Muslims are viewed as capable of committing similar attacks. The narrative of Islamist ideology requires a stark separatism between Muslims and non-Muslims to function, as does the narrative of Islamophobia. When Muslims and non-Muslims see each other as good neighbors and co-citizens, neither narrative has purchase. Thus, the most effective means of countering both Islamophobia and the Islamism it depends on is to cultivate a civil society that values and includes Muslims.

As charity/service is one of the Five Pillars of Islam, service projects are a practical and effective means of both demonstrating what Islam is all about and including Muslims in society.

The following article examines the fear that drives all forms of hate and presents the story of how a hate crime was transformed into an ongoing process of kinship and togetherness that inoculates communities against Islamophobia and provides an antidote to those already stricken with it.

All Are Welcome: Five Years of Relentless Optimism in Response to Hate Crime³³⁷

Groton, Massachusetts, and Oak Creek, Wisconsin, have a lot in common.

Both are quintessential American towns, embodying middle-class values and work ethic. The kind of places where anyone would be happy to raise a family. Decent jobs and great schools are the norm, as are nice grocery stores and quaint shops.

The citizens are good, hardworking people and

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good neighbors, happy to lend each other a hand. The sort of folks who love to get together for a weekend barbecue or a football game.

For generations, diversity meant going to a different denomination Christian church or having ancestors from a different part of Europe. The few Italian and Greek families were cherished for their exoticness and their cuisine, and Moose Lodges were surpassed only by the VFW.

Over the past few decades, new waves of

337 First published on mylifeafterhate.com, August 5, 2017

immigrants came to Oak Creek and Groton, departing from northern and southern India, respectively. One would imagine that these new neighbors would fit in just fine, being as good and as hardworking as anyone. Like all European immigrants to the United States, these immigrants from India left beloved homelands and ancient cultures to forge better lives via the American Dream.

But despite such shared values and experiences, everyone didn't welcome the immigrants.

In Groton, as Hindus proposed to build Mandirs, their houses of worship, some citizens voiced concerns. Some saw the new arrivals as a threat to the way of life they had become accustomed to. What if they take our jobs? What if some of them are terrorists? Will our schools suffer because some of those new kids don't speak English? There was a laundry list of rationalizations, but they all broke down to fear. Fear of change.

We discovered that we had so much more in common than otherwise, despite being from opposite ends of the globe and seemingly disparate cultures. It struck us that such common humanity was the prerequisite to solve all of the problems we face as a human race.

Oak Creek, being a bit larger in population and a bit closer to the city, seemed to be better suited for the many Punjabi families that moved there. A gurdwara, or Sikh temple, was built, and that holy place became a beacon to guide more Indians to Wisconsin. The zeal for work that is a hallmark of the Sikhs earned them acceptance among many, but the Sikhs' tendency to keep to themselves also served as fodder for suspicion.

On Aug. 5, 2012, Wade Michael Page, a self-proclaimed white power skinhead, shattered the beautiful summer Sunday morning by executing two brothers with a 9 mm pistol as they walked out of the Gurdwara. He then marched inside and kept shooting, murdering four more people and wounding others, one of whom was Baba Punjab

Singh, an elderly holy man who remains in a coma to this day. Lt. Brian Murphy of the Oak Creek Police Department was the first to respond. He got into a firefight with Page and was shot 15 times before Officer Sam Lenda arrived and wounded the shooter, who then took his own life.

The man who committed this atrocity was a member of the white power skinhead gang I had helped to start back in 1988. He was the person I used to be.

I was busy waging war against humanity for seven years back then. Looking back, I can see it was me who I really hated. My inability to love myself manifested as volatile hostility that did immense harm to the world. I was incredibly lucky to encounter targets of my hatred who refused to be subject to my fear and ignorance. They demonstrated the way human beings should treat each other for me. While I never followed those leads on the spot, I couldn't escape the basic goodness of our human experience indicating how wrong I was. Growing knowledge of that wrongness added to a growing exhaustion that ultimately led me to leave "the movement" after becoming a single parent and losing a second comrade to street violence in 1994.

I've been sharing My Life After Hate since 2010, hoping that others could avoid making the same mistakes. Kindness, gratitude, and forgiveness have led me from a loveless living hell to a place where I'm overjoyed to be alive and to be able to help my fellow humans heal.

The last person murdered on Aug. 5, 2012, was a man named Satwant Singh Kaleka. He fought the gunman with a butter knife, buying time for the police to arrive and saving the lives of the many children and elders who hid in the Gurdwara during the shooting. Satwant's eldest son Pardeep reached out to me in October of 2012, wanting to understand how someone could do such a thing as murder people in their house of faith.

My well-educated guess was that Wade Page had driven himself so miserable by practicing hate and violence for over a decade that nothing but homicide followed by suicide seemed to make sense. We become familiar with whatever we practice. This can result in a great golf game, or a hell of a guitar player, or a stinging aversion to love,

kindness, compassion, and all of the noble human qualities that make life amazing. That last part is what happens when we become familiar with hate.

Par and I talked for five hours over Thai squash curry the night we met. We discovered that we had so much more in common than otherwise, despite being from opposite ends of the globe and seemingly disparate cultures. It struck us that such common humanity was the prerequisite to solve all of the problems we face as a human race.

The concept of Serve 2 Unite was born within days of the shooting at the Gurdwara. Pardeep, his younger brother Amardeep, and other survivors came together to conceive an organization based on seva, the Sikh principle of service to others, and Ik Onkar, the concept of One Supreme Reality that all life is part of.

In April of 2013 Pardeep and I launched Serve 2 Unite in schools, with a lot of help from a brilliant Milwaukee nonprofit, Arts @ Large. Since then we have worked with young people from second grade through college in over 50 schools, cultivating common human identity through service learning, global engagement, and the arts. This opportunity to teach and learn from young people of all backgrounds has been one of the greatest gifts I've ever received, along with the gift of traveling with Pardeep to share our stories and demonstrate the possibility of love as it was once demonstrated for me.

In April of 2017 we traveled to Groton, Mass. The local interfaith group, in partnership with town government and the police chief, had organized a screening of "Waking in Oak Creek," a beautifully crafted short documentary by Not In Our Town about the Aug. 5 shooting and how the Oak Creek community came together in response. After the film, Par and I joined Groton Police Chief Donald Palma and President of the Groton Interfaith Council Shua Khan Arshad for a panel discussion. We had a great conversation with each other and the audience, exploring ways for us to think past fear to reveal true understanding of the value and wonder of human diversity.

Turns out that town Selectman Jack Petropoulis had introduced a measure to place stone monuments saying "All Are Welcome" at all of the intersections leading into town as part of an

initiative to welcome new immigrants and ease townsfolk's concerns. We suggested adding service projects that all could take part in, and, taking a page from our Serve 2 Unite students, partying together every chance they got. As Petropoulis shared his frustration with some resistance to the idea, we implored him to keep pressing with love and devotion, with faith that it would reach through the doubts.

A few weeks after we got back to Milwaukee, I received this email:

Hi Arno and Pardeep

I want to thank you for visiting our community last week, to tell you what it meant to me, and to tell you what I think it meant in a larger sense.

First of all, thank you. I understand that you took time for us, and I appreciate the commitment that it takes to do that.

Secondly, your message was heard loud and clear. Your encouragement to carry on buoyed my spirits and caused many of us to see things in ways that we have never experienced before.

Lastly, I want you to know that your talk inspired me to bring forward our "All Are Welcome" article to our town meeting with renewed commitment to the importance of the effort. Your comments of "even if it does not pass you will have moved the bar" were so true. More importantly, your recounting of, and response to, the events of August 2012 served as both a warning and a roadmap for all of us. I went into our Town Meeting determined to carry the torch that I picked up that evening regardless of the outcome. I took the liberty of using your talk, your history, and your encouragement in my message at our Town Meeting. The vote passed by 27 in a room of 300. I know for a fact that there were people who came in ready to vote "no," thinking that they knew all they needed to know about the initiative, who changed their minds and voted in favor. You can see the presentation on our town website beginning at 1:33:20

Within two minutes of the vote of approval, we

were getting text messages with donations.

These signs will be placed at the town line on each of the major roads coming into our town. As fate would have it, that is exactly where our new temple is located.

You made a difference in our town. Thank you very much.

Jack

One of the many reasons Pardeep and I get along so well is that we both like to cause a bit of trouble. My taste for troublemaking almost killed me and others back in the day, but now Par has shown me how to make trouble in the best way possible: by defying hate and violence. Pardeep says that to him, forgiveness is vengeance. Kindness is the most devastating weapon against the suffering

Kindness is the most devastating weapon against the suffering that all violence stems from. Love is the antidote to the fear and loneliness that seed hate.

that all violence stems from. Love is the antidote to the fear and loneliness that seed hate.

Wade Page sought to terrify the Sikh community into submission, which in his eyes would have looked like a reflection. He wanted them to be violent. He wanted them to be hateful. He wanted them to renounce their faith in Chardi Kala—relentless optimism, especially in the face of struggle.

He failed. Miserably.

Because of his pathetic attempt to sow strife and discord, the Sikh community of Wisconsin and of the world is that much more engaged with everyone else. More people than ever know what Sikhs are all about: faith, love, and hard work.

Because of Wade Page's desperate assault on everything that is good about being human, the town of Groton now has stones that say, "All Are Welcome" at every intersection leading into town.

That's how we respond to violent extremism.

Whether it comes from white supremacists, far-right, far-left, or religious fundamentalists of whatever persuasion, we follow the universal truths of our common humanity to cultivate solutions defined by what we're for—kindness, gratitude, forgiveness, compassion, courage, wisdom, love—to soundly destroy what we're against. We don't let hate dictate the terms of engagement.

Building on the foundation of relentless optimism, the following article is a response to the "Unite the Right" march that took place in Charlottesville, Virginia, 10 days after the fifth anniversary of the Oak Creek Sikh Temple shooting. It is a recipe to foil neo-Nazi rallies, a plan that could just as effectively be organized in response to events rooted in Islamophobia or any other sort of fear and ignorance display. Fun interfaith, multicultural fundraiser events are also a great way to build community and kinship to prevent violent extremist mindsets of any kind from taking hold.

How to Smash Neo-Nazi Events³³⁸

Organize a fundraiser for a peacebuilding nonprofit across the street from their event or somewhere close by.

Make it revolve around something seriously fun. Arts, music, food, sports. Get as many diverse people together as possible, doing something fantastic, and empowering organizations that serve other human beings.

Get the private sector involved. Conscious businesses will leap at the opportunity to help, as will celebrities, athletes, even politicians from across the spectrum. Make the tent as huge as possible. Include everyone who wants to see that the hate groups don't succeed. Media can help promote. Restaurants can help feed. Everyone has something to contribute.

Organize an engine of what diversity has to offer and how much happier life is when we're not afraid of each other.

Run the event concurrent with the hate rally. All the media they attract will be drawn to the fundraiser. Essentially, the neo-Nazis will have peacebuilding fundraisers built around everything

338 First published on mylifeafterhate.com August 15, 2017

they do. They won't be able to make a peep without feeding some homeless veterans or helping gang members turn their lives around.

I can picture a life-size cardboard cutout of David Duke presenting one of those big checks for \$50,000 to Parents for Peace, helping parents guide their children away from violent extremism.

In order for this to work, the neo-Nazis would have to be soundly ignored. Like people would be flocking to the amazing fundraising event right past the KKK like they weren't even there. Like absolutely no acknowledgment of the hate message. No signs. No typical counterprotest. And yes, so sorry antifa homies, no attacking them either.

If that can be agreed upon by everyone truly seeking to counter white supremacist or any other kind of violent extremist group, and all energies can be directed toward the fundraiser, this could literally stop hate gatherings in their tracks.

I'll say it again: violent protest of these fools helps them. Let's not help them. Let's redirect their voice to help other human beings in a magnificent display of what is most beautiful about our great human family.

They will totally hate that. =)

Example organizations to raise funds for:

Homeboy Industries

I am such a Father Greg Boyle fanboy. Homeboy Industries provides hope, training, and support to formerly gang-involved and previously incarcerated

men and women, allowing them to redirect their lives and become contributing members of our community. Each year over 10,000 former gang members from across Los Angeles come through Homeboy Industries' doors in an effort to make a positive change. They are welcomed into a community of mutual kinship, love, and a wide variety of services ranging from tattoo removal to anger management and parenting classes. Full-time employment is offered for more than 200 men and women at a time through an 18-month program that helps them re-identify who they are in the world: job training is offered so they can move on from Homeboy Industries and become contributing members of the community—knowing they count! <https://www.homeboyindustries.org>.

Veterans Outreach of Wisconsin

VOW serves homeless veterans in Racine, Wisconsin, and beyond, inspired by the founder's love for his son, a veteran of Afghanistan who returned with PTSD. VOW operates in devoted human kinship to all of the people it serves, providing mental health, addiction, employment and life skills counseling, along with access to health care, food, and shelter. VOW has a tiny home community in progress, where homeless veterans will be given their own tiny home and as much time as they need to get on their feet. They have an amazing service animal program! <https://vetsoutreachwi.us>.

Turning Challenges Into Opportunities in Our Current Environment

Soumaya Khalifa

Islamic Speakers Bureau of Atlanta

Many surveys over the years have shown that Islamophobia, or the irrational fear and hate of Islam and Muslims, is on the rise. This is very true and personal for me and my family. My three children have encountered Islamophobia firsthand. My oldest son, an eye surgeon, was once accused by a nurse of using code words for ISIS when he used a German word in the operating room. My younger son has the misfortune of having the name Osama. While working as a pharmacy technician during his high school years, a customer called the store when she read his name on her prescription. She demanded that he be fired or she would no longer be coming to this pharmacy. My daughter while in high school was taking a business course. Her teacher was speaking with the class about the up-and-coming languages for business around the world, and he mentioned that Arabic is one of them. A fellow student replied, "That is not the language for business but the language for terrorism."

There are many more stories that I hear day in and day out. This is not only happening to Muslims, but also to people who are perceived to be Muslims. One of the first victims following the horrific 9/11 attacks was an Egyptian Coptic Christian. In recent years, members of the Sikh community have fallen victim to attacks as they are incorrectly perceived as Muslim.

One of the findings of the surveys such as the Gallup Poll is that this fear of Islam and Muslims

is more prevalent with individuals who have not been in contact with Muslims.³³⁹ This was the exact reason why a group of Atlanta Muslims started the Islamic Speakers Bureau of Atlanta (ISB) on Aug. 18, 2001. You read this right—it was exactly three weeks before 9/11 happened. When 9/11 happened, the organizers thought it might be a good idea to wait it out, but thankfully people had learned about the organization and we started receiving requests for speakers as our fellow Americans wanted to know about Islam and Muslims.

The ISB started off as an educational organization that trained and certified speakers on how to present about Islam and Muslims such that content can be presented in any setting to any audience and still comply with the spirit of the First Amendment of the Constitution, even when in public schools or government agencies. This means that the speakers teach rather than preach. They are a source of living information about how an American Muslim lives his or her life. One point that we stress in our training is that the information is readily available all around but what is most important is to connect with our audiences. As Maya Angelou once said, "People will forget what you said, people will forget what you did, but people will never forget how you made them feel." This is continuously emphasized with our speakers.

The ISB faced many challenges as we began; some were internal while others were external.

339 "In U.S., Religious Prejudice Stronger Against Muslims," Gallup, January 21, 2010, [http://news.gallup.com/poll/125312/religious-prejudice-stronger-](http://news.gallup.com/poll/125312/religious-prejudice-stronger-against-muslims.aspx)

[against-muslims.aspx](http://news.gallup.com/poll/125312/religious-prejudice-stronger-against-muslims.aspx)

Some of the challenges are listed here:

1. The ISB is a virtual organization and not the usual brick-and-mortar organization that the Muslim community was used to. This made it hard to raise the necessary operating funds.
2. In 2001, there were not many women-led organizations within the Atlanta Muslim community.
3. The Muslim community readily invests in mosques and disaster relief, but it is harder to get members to donate to different kinds of organizations like the ISB.
4. We all had the best of intentions for this organization but had no idea where we were going—no idea where this organization will be and what it will mean in 10 or 15 years.

As candidates are trained and certified to become ISB speakers, it is made clear that the purpose of our work is not “dawah” oriented or to proselytize. Our purpose is to connect with our audiences, answer their questions, and build bridges of understanding.

In addition to ongoing presentations, the ISB’s initiatives over the years have included the following:

1. 100 Influential Georgia Muslims (2014)
2. Making a Difference Essay Contest (2015)
3. 40 Under Forty Georgia Muslims (2016)
4. Change Makers Awards Gala (2017)
5. Atlanta Mayor’s Ramadan Iftar (2017)
6. Summer Lunch Program in Fayette County (since 2006)
7. Atlanta Food Bank’s Annual Hunger Walk (since 2007)
8. Ongoing Muslim Friday prayers at Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport (since 2007)
9. Interfaith Speakers Network (2012)
10. Straight Talk (2015)

Here I will group the initiatives into the following: 1. Providing alternative narratives about Muslims; 2. Empowering Muslim youth; 3. Recognitions; 4. Giving back to the community;

and 5. Supporting the Muslim community. I will give a brief description of these initiatives along with some background, challenges, and opportunities that we have faced.

Providing Alternative Narratives About Muslims

100 Influential Georgia Muslims is an initiative for the Georgia Muslim community to tell its own narrative. The community has excellent unheard success stories from people in the sciences, medicine, engineering, IT, philanthropy, arts, media, and much more. The ISB wanted to showcase these individuals and their narratives. The tag line for this initiative was “Continuing the Legacy and Changing the Narrative.”

My oldest son, an eye surgeon, was once accused by a nurse of using code words for ISIS when he used a German word in the operating room. My younger son has the misfortune of having the name Osama. While working as a pharmacy technician during his high school years, a customer called the store when she read his name on her prescription. She demanded that he be fired or she would no longer be coming to this pharmacy.

The idea initially received a lot of pushback, including: 1. Do we want to put ourselves out there in this current environment? 2. What about people who are not selected? How will they feel? 3. How do we ensure that we have representation from the diversity of the Georgia Muslim community?

All the concerns were addressed in how the ISB solicited the nominations and the judges who selected the finalists. We made a concerted outreach effort to diverse Muslim communities. We had an online nomination process, and the judges were leaders from outside the Muslim community who selected the finalists based on achievements and contributions to their field of work, community, and the world. The judges used

a rubric designed to assess the nominee's impact in his or her area of specialty as well as his/her wider community engagement. A dinner gala was held and the finalists were recognized. The honorees were presented by Georgia leaders related to their field of interest. We also produced a book that showcased all the finalists with a picture and a bio. The book was sent to lawmakers, the governor of the state of Georgia, and U.S. presidential nominees at the time. The Influential Georgia Muslims were honored at the Georgia Capitol with a Georgia House resolution.³⁴⁰ We produced a video about the selection process and what it means to have the 100 Influential Georgia Muslims recognition.³⁴¹

The video sharing the honorees was used for promoting the gala.³⁴²

Programming such as networking lunches and breakfasts were held throughout the year to keep the honorees engaged.

40 Under Forty Georgia Muslims followed the same process as 100 Influential Georgia Muslims. For the inaugural year, there were 25 finalists. They were also recognized in a gala and a book was produced. They were recognized at the Georgia Capitol with a resolution,³⁴³ and the governor greeted them and had a picture taken. A video showcasing the honorees was used during the gala and in social media.³⁴⁴ We also produced a video to highlight the impact of the 40 Under Forty Georgia Muslims that was shown during the gala.³⁴⁵

Empowering Muslim Youth

The **Making a Difference Essay Contest** was for Georgia middle and high school students of any faith tradition. The objectives of the essay contest included (1) Getting students to become familiar with the contribution of Muslims in the state of Georgia, and (2) To encourage thinking about their own goals and how to achieve them. The students were to choose one of the 100 Influential Georgia Muslims and write about why they chose

this person; how they can be a role model; their own goals in life; and how they plan to achieve their goals. The prizes were \$500 for first place winners, \$350 for second place, and \$250 for third place. A teacher or parent had to sign off on their entries. The winners were announced at an awards ceremony, where the keynote speaker was Dr. Mostafa El Sayed, a world leading authority on nanotechnology and one of the 100 Influential Georgia Muslims.

Straight Talk focuses on middle and high school-age youths as it pertains to maintaining their Islamic identity. In the current environment, many Muslim youths are dealing with racist stereotypes and derogatory comments on a regular basis. They deal with it in school among their peers as well as outside school and what they see in the media. As a result, Muslim youths start to question their identity, which can lead to self-esteem issues. Low self-esteem then leads to a variety of other personal issues, ultimately resulting in a poor quality of life.

The program is divided into two workshops, one geared toward youths and a second for their parents.

In the youth workshop, they are provided a venue where they can share what they are facing in the current environment. Areas of focus in this first workshop are as follows:

- Talk about self-esteem, to understand what it is and how it is impacted. At the beginning of this workshop the audience will take a self-esteem survey. This survey will help ISB understand how the Muslim youths fare when it comes to self-esteem in different communities.
- Developing friends and being an influencer. The concepts here come from Dale Carnegie's book "How to Win Friends and Influence People." The workshops go over the six concepts that the youths can use to develop their friendships and be a positive influencer.
- Discuss how the Islamic faith teaches Muslims

340 "100 Influential Georgia American Muslims; commend," Georgia General Assembly, HR 575 (2015-2016 Regular Session), <http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-US/display/20152016/HR/575>

341 ISB Atlanta—100 Influential Atlanta Muslims, September 30, 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRDUf9YXgrA&t=10s>

342 Islamic Speakers Bureau of Atlanta, September 9, 2014, <https://www.facebook.com/ISBAtlanta/videos/925484474147675/>

343 "Commending the 40 Under Forty Georgia Muslims," Georgia Senate, SR 345 (2015-16 Regular Session), <http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20172018/167232.pdf>

344 "40 Under Forty Georgia Muslims," IBN 40 Under 40 Gala, August 5, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j44r2btNhkc>

345 ISB 40 Under 40, October 1, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hj2SDS8uGW0&t=14s>

to be tolerant of other faiths and backgrounds, showing specific examples. This is to show youths that stereotypes and negative comments are often misconceptions.

- Role-playing scenarios. Here the audience will be split into different groups that will be assigned a role to play (a topic related to maintaining your identity). The objective is to hear how youths would respond to those scenarios and coach them on the optimal way to handle the situation based on what was discussed in the workshop.

At the end of the youth workshop, the audience walks away with a toolkit on how to maintain identity and how to become a positive influencer in their respective social circles.

The second workshop, for parents, is to discuss anonymously what was shared with the youths and go over the survey results. Why are we addressing the parents here? The simple reason is that no matter what workshops are conducted, youths need a support structure that will help them with these concepts. The parents are that support structure. Ultimately, it is the parents who must reinforce what has been taught and keep an eye out for low self-esteem issues.

At the end of this workshop, the parents walk away with a better awareness of what Muslim youths are facing and feel more confident on the approaches being shared. This is a collaborative workshop where parents talk with each other on identity issues—a crowd-parenting approach.

Recognitions

Atlanta Mayoral Ramadan Iftar is one of the few such events across the nation. Because the ISB is proud of our city and because we know that the city embraces its diversity, the ISB reached out to the Mayor's Office of Cultural Affairs and Welcoming Atlanta to start a new tradition of the mayor hosting a Ramadan Iftar. Invitees to the inaugural Iftar dinner included leaders from diverse Muslim communities; ISB partners, members, and donors; Muslim employees of the city of Atlanta; and members of the mayor's Cabinet. The organizers, the mayor, and all attendees had a very

positive experience. This is an initiative that the ISB will continue doing in partnership with the mayor's office.

Change Makers Awards Gala. The ISB recognized four individuals who immensely contributed to the city, communities, country, and the world. The 2017 honorees were the Honorable Sally Q. Yates, former acting U.S. attorney general; Bishop Robert Wright of the Episcopal Diocese of Atlanta; Arthur Blank, co-founder of The Home Depot and owner of the Atlanta Falcons and Atlanta United FC; and Dr. Mokhtar Bazaraa, a leading academician and businessman. The ISB historically held the Building Bridges Awards Gala, but in 2017 it was very clear that the individuals honored are more than bridge builders. The ISB Change Makers Awards Gala is one of Atlanta's most diverse events. It brings together leaders from all backgrounds to meet and interact.

Because the ISB is proud of our city and because we know that the city embraces its diversity, the ISB reached out to the Mayor's Office of Cultural Affairs and Welcoming Atlanta to start a new tradition of the mayor hosting a Ramadan Iftar.

Giving Back to the Community

Summer Lunch Program—Fayette County was started over 10 years ago as an interfaith initiative with many faith communities providing summer lunches to underprivileged Fayette County students. These students wait to have their lunch delivered. Some tell our volunteers, "This is the only meal we are getting today." Each participating organization raises the funds needed, recruits, and trains volunteers to buy the food, assemble the lunches, and deliver them. This is a truly interfaith effort with Muslims, Christians, Jews, and others coming together to help feed these students.

Atlanta Food Bank's Hunger Walk. For the past seven years, the ISB has participated in the Hunger Walk, one of Atlanta's largest walks/runs. Participants are there to raise money for the

Atlanta Food Bank to fight hunger in the city. Over the years, the ISB has brought together many Muslim organizations under its umbrella to participate. The last two years, there were over 600 participants from the Muslim community who raised over \$25,000 for the Food Bank. In addition to the money raised, the organizations collect nonperishable foods at their locations for the Food Bank. Each year, hundreds of pounds are collected. This effort is coordinated by the ISB.

Supporting the Muslim Community

Muslim Friday Prayers at Atlanta's Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport is one of a few such services across the country. There are many Muslim employees at the airport who do not have enough time on Friday to perform the congregational prayers because of limited break times and distance they have to travel to attend such a prayer. In addition, there are countless Muslim travelers at the world's busiest airport. The ISB saw this as an opportunity and worked with the Interfaith Chapel's leadership to start coordinating the Friday service. The ISB selects and schedules the *khateeb*s, or person leading the sermon and the prayer. We have received a lot of positive feedback from the travelers and the employees on how valuable the service is.

Interfaith Speakers Network provides audiences with representation of up to six faith traditions—Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Sikhism. The ISB partnered with the Faith Alliance of Metro Atlanta to start the Interfaith Speakers Network in 2012. All speakers are trained on how to present about their own faith tradition within the context of the First Amendment so that they teach rather than preach.

Suggestions for Activists

1. **Anyone can achieve what they would like to achieve.** This is an important premise to keep a focus on. One will achieve what they set their mind to.
2. **Have a passion about what you are doing.** This is hard work, and without passion it can be painful.

3. **Do the hard work!** Yes, hard work, difficult decisions. Be grounded in SMART goals on what you want to achieve.
4. **Build relationships** with individuals and organizations with missions and goals that align with yours and those who might be influencers to further your work. Not all relationships are going to be popular with your support groups but be wise about them. Set understandings with the partnering organizations on what you are looking for and what your limits are. Agree to disagree at times on certain topics or areas.
5. **Establish win-win relationships.** Be able to give to others; sometimes it is just giving and not receiving anything in return.
6. **Have a group of people to support you and provide advice.** This will be mentors, community leaders from different communities who would be personal advisors. This can be in addition to your board of directors.

Suggestions for Policymakers

One underlying premise here is the presence of authenticity and creating win-win relationships.

1. **Get to know the communities you represent—invest the time.**
 - Attend community events.
 - Set up one-on-one meetings with leaders.
2. **Hold informational sessions about what your organization does.** What is not known is feared! The more the communities know about your structure, what your mission is, how you do the work that you do, the better for you and for the communities. This is also a way to build trust.
3. **Recruit from diverse communities for better and deeper understanding of diverse voices in your organization.**
4. **Build trust.**
 - This takes time.
 - Deliver on what you said you will deliver on.
 - Keep communities engaged.
 - Have periodic communications.

5. Connect diverse communities and leaders.

- Enrich your experience and the communities' experience by introducing diverse communities to each other with you and your team being the initiator.
- Leverage the different communities' strengths to achieve a greater good for the wider community.

6. Showcase that you value diversity.

- What does your social media tell the world about you and your team—is there an inclusive message?
- Does your website show your commitment to diversity and what diversity you have in your organization?
- Who are your spokespeople to different communities?
- Is your diversity just for looks or is it a functional diversity?

Our goal as an organization is to work every day to make a positive impact through education, engagement, collaboration, and building lasting authentic relationships. When I started the ISB, I knew that we would educate, but I never imagined that we would be involved in so many different initiatives over the years and have a greater impact than we originally imagined. My personal life was also changed as a result. I have had many opportunities, such as being invited to the White House, working with the World Council of Churches in Geneva on a Christian Muslim Dialogue for world leaders from both traditions, participating in the Carter Center Symposium on Islamophobia, and receiving many awards and recognitions such as the Phoenix Award, the highest award given to a civilian by the mayor and city of Atlanta. I am truly humbled and awed by the experience and the opportunity to serve in the capacities that I do.

How Muslims Can Change Others' Inaccurate Perceptions

Youssef Chihab

Alliance for Freedom and Dignity

At a time when Islam is receiving negative press and anything to do with the religion is considered suspect, I am convinced that Muslims are citizens who owe it to themselves to stay proactive and to act as agents of change in the environment in which they live. If Muslims do not act and speak for themselves, others will, for various reasons, speak for them.

If Muslims do not act and speak for themselves, others will, for various reasons, speak for them.

In this essay, I will set out my vision on the issue of “Muslims speaking out” at a time when social media has established itself as the place where everything happens. I am not speaking as a media specialist, but as a human rights activist on one hand and as a community actor who is active in various organizations in Belgium and Europe on the other.

The first observation is that the vast majority of intellectuals in France and Belgium avoid addressing the question of the impact the media

has on the rise of Islamophobia. It is even acceptable to deny this type of racism by claiming the right to blaspheme and criticize religions. Nevertheless, I am convinced that if those who control the media do not quickly come to realize the potential damage of their coverage on the population, we risk facing rather catastrophic situations in the near future. In fact, in Belgium and France, we have witnessed several cases of attacks on Muslim youths³⁴⁶, adults,³⁴⁷ and women,³⁴⁸ and vandalism of places of worship.³⁴⁹

Considering the violence of statements made in the press following the attacks in Paris and Brussels, I am personally astonished and pleasantly surprised by the reactions of a large number of citizens, including Muslims, who came together to counter the xenophobic demonstrations that took place the day after the tragic attacks in both capitals. In Belgium, more than 15,000 people came together to reject xenophobia, calling their initiative “the march against terror and hate.”³⁵⁰

Secondly, I would like to take stock of the messages that have been conveyed since the 1920s. Since that time, Islam and Muslims have been the target of extremely denigrating campaigns. Muslims have continually been presented in various media

346 Natacha Mann, “Islamophobie: un jeune musulman agressé à cause de sa religion,” rtbf.be, March 27, 2016, https://www.rtb.be/info/regions/detail_islamophobie-un-jeune-musulman-agresse-a-cause-de-sa-religion?id=9253691

347 “Rouen: un musulman septuagénaire agressé,” Le Figaro, July 7, 2016, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2016/07/31/97001-20160731FILWWW00089-rouen-un-musulman-septuagenaire-agresse.php>

348 “Insultée et violente: Soumaya victime de la première agression anti-musulman après les attentats,” DH.be, March 31, 2016, <http://www.dhnet.be/actu/belgique/insultee-et-violente-soumaya-victime-de-la-premiere->

[agression-anti-musulman-apres-les-attentats-56fc2b5b35702a22d5e5c810](https://www.dhnet.be/actu/belgique/insultee-et-violente-soumaya-victime-de-la-premiere-agression-anti-musulman-apres-les-attentats-56fc2b5b35702a22d5e5c810)

349 “En 48 heures, les attaques contre les mosquées se sont multipliées,” Le Figaro, August 1, 2016, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/01/08/01016-20150108ARTFIG00116-serie-d-actes-anti-musulmans-au-lendemain-de-l-attentat-contre-charlie-hebdo.php>

350 “Plus de 10.000 personnes ont marché contre la haine à Bruxelles, selon les organisateurs,” La Libre, April 18, 2016, <http://www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/plus-de-10-000-personnes-ont-marche-contre-la-haine-a-bruxelles-selon-les-organisateurs-57111cbd35702a22d66986f5>

as misogynist and violent. The study conducted by Dr. Jack Shaheen of the University of Southern Illinois speaks for itself. After watching a thousand films,³⁵¹ Dr. Shaheen noted that “Arabs are depicted as bloodthirsty brutes, terrorists who want to attack the good westerners.”³⁵²

These types of messages have undoubtedly had an extremely negative effect on the image that Americans, and Westerners in general, have had of Arabs for decades. Those Muslims who were teenagers in the 1980s remember the shame they felt after seeing these films. This feeling of frustration hindered the integration process for some of them.

Conflicts in the world have been a way for the media to deal with the question of Muslims, and that has certainly fed resentment toward Muslims. Thomas Deltombe described the situation very well, and he reminds us in his book *“L’Islam imaginaire”* [Imaginary Islam]³⁵³ how the French media have used conflicts around the world to present Muslims in an extremely negative light. He notes that the Iranian Revolution of 1978, Khomeini’s takeover in 1979, the Rushdie affair in 1989, the civil war in Algeria that lasted from 1992 to 1997 and caused thousands of deaths, as well as the debate over the veil in schools and the tremendous blow that was Sept. 11, 2001, have been the essential elements that informed all the subjects covered by the media. He also describes how, since that period, the media have used imagination to turn the French population against those who are called Muslims. Before, no one talked about Muslims, but rather about immigrants. Today, no one is shocked anymore to hear on a public channel at prime time that Muslims are dangerous individuals and that Arabs are bloodthirsty, misogynist, and/or violent.

As I mentioned above, the real-life consequences have had an impact on Muslim citizens’ physical safety, but not only that. Different studies conducted in Belgium have shown that

discrimination toward men of Arab origin is the strongest and it strikes in various areas.

This has translated into decades of flagrant discrimination in terms of education, hiring discrimination, housing discrimination, and interactions with the justice system.

With regard to unemployment statistics, it has been shown that the unemployment rate for youths living in the municipality of Molenbeek (Brussels) is between 30 percent and 50 percent, while the national average is 10 percent. Belgian authorities do not deny this fact. The labor office website states: “A study conducted at the request of the ILO shows that native Belgian candidates and candidates of Moroccan origin are treated differently during the hiring process.”³⁵⁴ Several studies conducted by the King Baudoin Foundation in partnership with the Interfederal Centre for Equal Opportunities (Unia)³⁵⁵ and by universities such as the Free University of Brussels (ULB) and its Dutch-speaking partner, the VUB, have confirmed this situation on several occasions.³⁵⁶

As for the issue of the justice system, according to Andrea Réa, professor of sociology at the Free University of Brussels and director of the Study Group on Ethnicity, Racism, Migrations and Exclusion, the way the justice system handles cases connected with this population provides a good illustration of the way Muslims and Arabs are perceived more broadly. Several studies have shown that young people of Moroccan origin are treated differently and are more likely to be put in pretrial detention, and receive heavier sentences, than their native-born peers who commit the same type of offense. In addition, judges grant remissions and apply alternative sentences less often in cases involving citizens of Arab origin.

So, what is my assessment?

The media are responsible for this situation. To sell papers and advertisements and maintain high

351 Jack Shaheen, *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People* (New York: Olive Branch Press, 2001).

352 Jhally, Sut, Jeremy Earp, Andrew Killoy, Mary Patierno, Simon Shaheen, and Jack G. Shaheen. *Reel bad Arabs: how Hollywood vilifies a people* (2006; Northampton, MA: Media Education Foundation), mp4, <http://www.documentarytube.com/videos/reel-bad-arabs-how-hollywood-vilifies-a-people>

353 Thomas Deltombe, *L’Islam imaginaire* [Imaginary Islam] « La construction médiatique de l’islamophobie en France 1975-2005 » [The Media Construct of Islamophobia in France 1975-2005], La découverte, 2005.

354 Discrimination en raison de l’origine ethnique, “SPF Belgium,” accessed January 30, 2018, <http://www.emploi.belgique.be/defaultTab.aspx?id=24200>

355 “For equality, against discrimination,” UNIA, accessed February 2, 2018, <https://www.unia.be/en>

356 Discriminations des étrangers et des personnes d’origine étrangère sur le marché du travail de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale : Recherche dans le cadre du Pacte social pour l’emploi des Bruxellois, Université Libre de Bruxelles, January 2005, <https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/17021/1/dp-0133.pdf>

ratings, they have covered events by seeking out what is sensational and agreeing to invite onto their platforms specialists and politicians who use these events to gain publicity and get the votes of those they have frightened.

Politicians also share a significant portion of the responsibility, but they currently refuse to acknowledge their responsibilities and past failures in terms of education policy, employment policy, management of public spaces, and so forth. The only response they offer us today is to apply law and order and further stigmatize a significant minority of the population.

The third observation is a reflection for the

I therefore think we need to work with the young generations and give them tools that will help them express their feelings and tell their stories, experiences, and ways of seeing the society in which they live.

Muslim community and its various components (associations, intellectuals, imams, etc.), who must also play a role by speaking out in the media. I am aware that this is complicated. They have been collectively humiliated, discriminated against, devalued, stigmatized, denigrated, and hurt, but in spite of all that, their role is essential.

Today, organizations from the Muslim “community” are often hesitant and in many cases incapable of speaking out. When an organization does speak out, it is too often denigrated by its peers who claim it does not represent the community, is not up to the job, or is not legitimate. I therefore think we need to work with the young generations and give them tools that will help them express their feelings and tell their stories, experiences, and ways of seeing the society in which they live. We also need to constantly remind them of the importance of denouncing the miscarriages of justice they witness or are victims of, because, on one hand, that will teach members of our society that fundamental rights

are inalienable and infringing on them is a crime and, on the other, that will allow victims to avoid frustrations that over time can turn into forms of violence. Furthermore, we need to teach them to get indignant about injustices again in order to counter the banalization of violence that we see more and more is the fruit of our modern societies.

Young people lack role models; everything around them is nothing but failure. It is extremely important for them to realize that some succeed. Business and organizational leaders, academics, and intellectuals should act as role models by speaking out and setting an example and also by taking the time to share their experiences with them. I work a great deal with young people on issues of engagement, and every time it’s an opportunity to give them tools that will help them be agents of change wherever they are. Every time, it’s a mix of what we give them and their own experiences that they have gathered throughout their lives. We remind them that it’s by being there on the ground, on the web, and/or on social media that, over time, they will develop skills they can pass on to future generations. We must also remind them that being an agent of change means not only succeeding at things, but also making mistakes, because that is what will allow them to learn. As the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche said, “That which does not kill us makes us stronger.”

The example of Belgian comedian Ismael Saïdi, who spoke out by publishing an op-ed in the Belgian press, is quite interesting. Saïdi’s article was a response to a question that many Belgians were asking themselves, which was: “Why didn’t Muslims take to the streets en masse after the Brussels attacks?” His answer was disconcertingly simple, but it needed to be written and published in order for many people to acknowledge the reality. In summary, it responded by describing the functions that Muslims fulfilled on the day of the attacks. It reminded readers that some of the victims were Muslim and that emergency medical technicians, police officers, and drivers of taxis, buses, and subway trains were also Muslim. It also reminded them that Muslim mothers were waiting for their children to come home that day, and that those children never came home. This response

was a success because it came from the heart and highlighted things that in the end were obvious.³⁵⁷

Other organizations do quality work on the ground and use social media to get their messages out to the greatest number of people. One organization in Brussels took the initiative to hand out roses on a commercial street in the capital. Each rose was accompanied by a “word of wisdom from the Prophet of Islam,” which highlighted Islam’s message of peace and tolerance. They released a video³⁵⁸ and the press covered the event.³⁵⁹ The video shows people reacting very positively to this initiative.

Those are the types of initiatives that can have a positive effect on those who watch them, regardless of their religion, and I believe they can help

present an image that is different from the one portrayed by certain media outlets. In conclusion, I am aware that this will not solve every problem, but it will give young people tools they can use when they find themselves faced with discrimination or injustice, or when they encounter obstacles in the course of their lives.

We must also remind them that being an agent of change means not only succeeding at things, but also making mistakes, because that is what will allow them to learn.

357 Ismael Saidi, “Pourquoi les musulmans ne descendent pas dans la rue pour condamner ? Parce que...” Le Soir, March 23, 2017, <http://plus.lesoir.be/32156/article/2016-03-23/ismael-saidi-pourquoi-les-musulmans-ne-descendent-pas-dans-la-rue-pour-condamner>

358 “Fleurs de 1400 ans,” Success Media, January 19, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pQOKEE-KwPE>

359 “Hicham agit, avec des roses: ‘J’ai un garçon de 6 ans et j’aimerais qu’il puisse grandir dans un milieu encadré et rassurant,’” January 23, 2016, <https://www.rtl.be/info/vous/temoignages/hicham-agit-avec-des-roses-j-ai-un-garcon-de-6-ans-et-j-aimerais-qu-il-puisse-grandir-dans-un-milieu-encadre-et-rassurant--694072.aspx>

The Mosque and the Building of Ramparts Against Islamophobia

Imam Hatem Achikhan

Paris, France

Introduction

I would like to point out that this paper is first of all a testimony and the thoughts of a local actor, and, for that reason, it does not meet the requirements of a scientific work. It is a reflection with heuristic emphasis on a reality and a lived experience with a set of proposals.

The Sept. 11 attacks marked the beginning of a new era: that of mistaking religion for terrorism. Since then, we have witnessed the rise of a certain political and media discourse that presents Islam as incompatible with Western modernity. Although not the sole and direct cause, this type of particularly aggressive discourse regarding Islam and Muslims encourages the proliferation of Islamophobic acts toward Muslim people and buildings, especially after the murderous attacks that struck France.

Thus, French Muslims have found themselves, on one hand, facing violent extremism that has a warped and corrupted interpretation of religious texts and plays upon humiliation, injustice, Islamophobia, and the like by drawing upon the frustrations of some young people. On the other hand, French Muslims face a demand that they denounce and collectively break away from these acts of violence as a community. This demand is often a matter of suspicion and stigmatization.

It is common knowledge that, in France, Muslims are not a community apart. There is no “homogenous community of individuals brought

together by common values and beliefs who adopt, in all circumstances, the same practices resulting from the strict observance of religion.”³⁶⁰ Rather, there are “communities.” First, there is the recent presence of Muslims on French territory, mainly arriving after the end of the Second World War and during the “Thirty Glorious Years” following the war, who established ethno-national ties with their countries of origin that are still active today. But there is also the fact that Islam, like other religions found on French territory, is not centrally organized and does not have an authoritative religious hierarchy.

This weak structure within Muslim communities in France hinders the creation of a community strategy or action to face rising Islamophobia. If we look at the actions of Muslim organizations, such as the work of the CCIF (Community Against Islamophobia) or that of the Islamophobia Monitoring Center (an arm of the French Council for the Muslim Faith), or actions taken by non-Muslims, generally on the left, such as the organizers of the international day against Islamophobia, most local actors, namely mosques and Muslim associations that manage places of worship, remain at a distance from actions that have a national scope. This is due to the weak structures of these organizations, the lack of a strategy at the national level, the lack of leading figures that French Muslims nationwide consider legitimate, or the reality of their power, which

360 Franck Fregosi, “Polyphonies et polymorphies musulmanes en France,” in *Le devenir de L’islam en France* Ghaleb Bencheikh ed. (Paris: Desclée de

Brouwer, 2013).

generally does not match that of local or prefectoral authorities.

The local space is relatively independent from the national space, and it is not automatically the sounding board for national debates and controversies. Because of this autonomy, local space allows for dispassionate and non-ideological debates and actions, and it allows local Muslim actors to build upstream actions and solidarity that can be ramparts against the rise of Islamophobia.

Thus, reflections on the training of imams, the mosque's civic action, its relationship with the local authorities, and its commitment to interfaith dialogue are all ways to further the promotion of living and working together and thereby create the conditions that will make it possible to face a sometimes ordinary, day-to-day Islamophobia.

The Training of Imams and Religious Leaders

As mentioned above, most mosques in the territory I am in are independent entities. They grew out of the needs of Muslims living in surrounding cities to provide themselves worthy places of worship and to be able to pray in respectable conditions. The reasons for building these places of worship are practically the same, and the emergence of an elite representing these places of worship is not the result of prior training or of a hierarchical appointment process undertaken by a national body. They learn the job of a religious leader on the fly, in addition to public speaking, how to negotiate with public officials, and administrative and financial management of a place of worship, etc.

What goes for the leader of a place of worship also goes for the officiating imam. There are, of course, imams sent by their countries of origin, mainly Morocco, Algeria, and Turkey, but, on one hand, their number is small (at 10 percent to 15 percent of all imams in France) and, on the other hand, their knowledge of the French language, context, and institutions is rudimentary and insufficient, even nonexistent and ineffective. Two training institutes for religious leaders exist today in France, but they are far from meeting the needs of mosques in terms of trained and competent religious leaders, and a good number of these trained

imams do not take the mosque path for the simple reason that imams have a low social status and receive little financial compensation.

Despite these unfavorable conditions, we have been able to establish an imam council for the country that meets two to three times per year to debate, discuss, consult one another, and share experiences.

Several programs are in place or will be in place to make our imams' speech audible, effective, and legitimate.

1. For imams who need it, access to university diploma programs in French as a second language.
2. Encourage imams and religious leaders to study for a university diploma in civics and civil law at the Sorbonne or the Political Studies Institute of Paris.
3. Create a digital documentation resource that is accessible to all imams.
4. Provide training in communication and public speaking, as well as use of social media and web publication.
5. Develop a discourse focused primarily on values and ethics. Advocate first the principles of peace, dignity, justice, unity, and common action.
6. Break down literalist discourse based exclusively on "halal and haram" by moving away from sterile polemics.

Civic Action of the Mosque

The mosque is the most emblematic manifestation of the presence of Islam in the public space. It is also one of the few institutions that can mobilize Muslims in France. As shown above, the "Muslim community" does not exist in France; there are instead "Muslim communities." This plurality is due to the ethnic origins of Muslims, their belonging to different branches of Islam in France, or simply related to the many different individual trajectories of key players in Islam in France.

Thus, a mosque in a well-defined local area becomes a community unto itself. It can get its message out and make its voice heard by hundreds,

if not thousands, of practicing Muslims through its efforts to bring believers together around its construction plan, the network of local donors it develops over time, the parents of pupils who look to the mosque to teach their children about the religion and the Arabic language, its publications of monthly newsletters and mailings, mobilization around holidays and religious activities, and so on. With this network and the ability to mobilize and unite, the mosque becomes a major player in society despite itself. It becomes a political player in the broadest sense of the word. In the preface to his article *Les processus de la politisation* (The Processes of Politicization), Jacques Lagroye writes: “Each society feeds [...] the political order from what it is, in other words, relationships maintained by groups and individuals and their concerns and beliefs. As specialized as the political space may be, it is made of the most diverse economic, religious, and cultural social activities.”³⁶¹

To say this is to show how important the mosque is for its involvement in the fabric of the local community and how it must no longer stand on the sidelines, at the margins of society, and must take on responsibilities commensurate with its real capacity to be a mobilizing, unifying, and constructive element—and do this while fully complying with France’s laws.

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The most basic manifestation of the civic engagement of places of worship is the ongoing call in every election season to register voters, go vote, and engage their elected representatives as citizens

and constituents. It is also the call for Muslims to get involved in the different political parties and associations and thereby develop a civic and political culture in keeping with a deep understanding of the local context. It is not a question at all, and it is absolutely not one of its missions, for the mosque to support a project or a particular political affiliation, nor is it a matter of speaking out to protect a supposed Muslim special interest or to defend “the interests of the community.”

The commitments to which the mosque is called are those of being involved at the local level in its neighborhood or city and of sharing the concerns of fellow citizens regarding education, solidarity, security, employment, and so forth.

The Relationship With City Hall

In general, the project of building a mosque is what forms the foundation of the relationship between the mayor, city council, and future representatives of the Muslim faith in the city. That being said, the city government is also responsible for managing other files related to the Muslim faith and to Muslim presence in the city. These might include Muslim areas in cemeteries, school cafeterias, the lending of public spaces for religious events, sometimes questions related to ritual slaughter, subsidies for Muslim cultural associations, and so on.

We noted above that what makes the local space important is its independence in relation to the national space. It has its own dynamic, allowing less ideological approaches not possible on the national level. However, it is also a new and paradoxical situation. On one hand, the French tradition of managing religious cases is very centralized and, on the other hand, the mayor as an elected local official faces a set of requests and applications of a cultural nature to which he or she must respond. It is necessary to recall that the management of a file for the construction of a mosque in a city is not simply about technical and urban management, as with any other construction file, or a simple response to a cultural need of the citizens.

361 Jacques Lagroye, “Les processus de la politisation,” *Política & Sociedad*

16.37 (December 2017): 18–35.

It is firstly a new interaction and mutual acquaintance that takes place in conditions of inequality. In her book *Le maire et la mosquée* (The Mayor and the Mosque), Françoise Duthu shows that the mayor and his or her views play a determining role regarding what form a place of worship or a mosque construction plan can take.³⁶² Franck Frégosi identified eight positions that mayors take in their policies regarding the Muslim faith from “ambitious voluntarists” to “security traditionalists.”³⁶³

The mayor also knows that he or she has a sensitive file in his or her hands and, generally speaking, his or her knowledge of the project’s promoters is sketchy, if not nonexistent. Depending on the mayor’s religious background, ideas about Islam and its adherents in France, electoral and political apprehensions, or simply his or her fear of delegating the case to “radicals,” he or she will make the decision of whether to work with the representatives of an association or the promoters of a project or not.

It is necessary to mention that, in spite of calls for diversity, the “photography” question is still an indicator of the lack of participation of people from “visible minorities” in the national and local elective fabric: “All you need to do is take a photograph of an elected assembly, whatever it may be, and a photograph of the population that elected it, and the difference will be obvious. In the first photograph (the elected representatives), the majority will be men who are fairly old and all white, while in the second photograph (the voters), there will be men and women of all ages and origins.”³⁶⁴ This is why Muslims need to be encouraged in a local context to take an interest in public affairs, get involved in local civic activities, and foster a saner, more just, and more realistic understanding of Islam and Muslims apart from the clichés conveyed by a set of dominant media outlets. It is necessary to encourage those who have the capacity and the desire to be elected to local government and to participate in the

formation of local public policy, not as exceptional Muslim representatives or defenders of a particular community, but rather as a symbol of Muslims’ incorporation in the national fabric and as proponents of proposals for the city outside the prism of the “Muslim issue.”

The commitments to which the mosque is called are those of being involved at the local level in its neighborhood or city and of sharing the concerns of fellow citizens regarding education, solidarity, security, employment, and so forth.

In addition, leaders of mosques and places of worship should be encouraged to build effective, frank, and constructive relationship networks with local, departmental, and regional authorities, as well as civic and religious actors in the city. Continued, cross-disciplinary training is necessary to succeed in this challenge.

Interfaith Dialogue

In his homily for the victims of the church of Saint Etienne du Rouvray, especially with the assassination of Father Jacques Hamel in atrocious circumstances, Cardinal André Vingt-Trois, former archbishop of Paris, said: “The unification of humanity cannot be built by hunting for scapegoats. One does not contribute to societal cohesion and the vitality of social ties by creating a virtual universe of arguments and verbal abuse. Little by little, but assuredly, this virtual abuse ends up becoming real hate and promoting destruction as a means of progress. The war of words ends too often with the trivialization of aggression as a way of relating to others. A society built on trust can only move forward with dialogue in which differences of opinion are heard and respected.”³⁶⁵

362 Françoise Duthu, *Le maire et la mosquée* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2008).

363 Franck Frégosi, “New Muslims: between overexposure and invisibility,” *Esprit* 5 (May 2014): 65-77.

364 Martina Avanza, “Qui Représent Les Élus De La ‘Diversité’? Croyances partisans et points de vue de ‘divers’,” *Revue française de science politique*,

60.4 (2010) : 745-767.

365 Cardinal André Vingt-Trois, “Homélie du cardinal André Vingt-Trois—Messe pour les victimes de Saint-Étienne du Rouvray,” The Catholic Church in Paris, July 27, 2016, <https://www.paris.catholique.fr/homelie-du-cardinal-andre-vingt-40311.html>.

This tone of conciliation, of not looking for a scapegoat, of moderating debate, and of putting importance on living together and social cohesion rather than of alarming, violent, and polemical discourse, is the hallmark of all the official speeches of the Catholic Church. In our city, the bishop of our department, who has become archbishop of Paris, welcomed us as a Muslim delegation. In his Christmas homily, he took up the meaning of these words from Cardinal Vingt-Trois not to confuse religion with terrorism, and to live together and reject the prospect of a confrontation between Islam and Christianity. The speech was heard and appreciated by hundreds of believers attending the Mass.

Interfaith dialogue, when it is transformed from a dialogue that can bring experts or national figures together into a dialogue of “actors on the ground,” bears fruit locally. This type of dialogue allows believers to express their daily concerns and existential anxieties. It is a dialogue that builds mutual confidence, shared respect, and constructive listening for believers and also for religious leaders.

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opinion are heard and respected.” It is a dialogue that brings to life community actions, shared commitments, and the enhancement of the societal impact of religious discourse. To love one’s neighbor is to be one with him, defend his dignity, and serve him as a brother in humanity.

I would also note the interest that local authorities and prefectural officials take in this interfaith civic dialogue. Beyond a mere interest in healing relations between the representatives of all faiths in the city, institutional promotion of interfaith dialogue shows its effectiveness in building ways of living together and its capacity to create social connections and combat the biases and clichés conveyed by the national media. Municipal halls open the doors to their public areas, and local leaders attend such events.

Conclusion

Finally, as you can see, the purpose of the paper is to show that, in the absence of a strong and legitimate national structure, and in the absence of comprehensive strategies and national scope to stem Islamophobia, these hundreds of independent mosques have an important role to play in implementing local actions capable of building ramparts against Islamophobia.

The preparation of practical kits on all the issues mentioned, including the training and accompaniment of imams, religious leaders, officials, and all other stakeholders in the management of worship in these mosques, is necessary and essential.

In this way we can progressively build the capacity for reflection, mobilization, and action while benefiting from the capabilities and opportunities that the local field allows.

Developing a Sustainable and Strategic Response to Islamophobia: Lessons From South Africa's Anti-Apartheid Struggle

Ambassador (ret.) Ebrahim Rasool

World for All Foundation

What makes the work of The Carter Center unique is its ability to resist following the herd, to view both sides of the coin, and to hold both causes and effects in perspective. Thus it is with their work on Islamophobia. The herd looks at violent extremism only by rushing at the symptoms, the effects. These are also of interest, but extremism in the name of Islam and Muslims is significantly contributed to by the severity of Islamophobia globally—given the ease with which occupation, dictatorship, and wars are foisted on Muslim majority lands—as well as discrimination personally and socially against Muslims in countries where they are a minority.

But it would be wrong for those Muslims leading the fight against Islamophobia to repeat the error of perspective committed by the herd by viewing Islamophobia as a stand-alone issue, devoid of its antecedents—a world of growing bigotry against all who are different—and in denial of consequences—that extremists do terrible and fear-inducing things in the name of fighting Islamophobia. It would be arrogant to see Islamophobia as the most important discrimination or the top priority in a menu of bigotries in the world. Islamophobia is a member of a family of pathologies, all of which must be combated.

The World We Live In: Domination and “Otherization”

The impact of globalization is that it integrates through technology and communication what historically may have been separated and

unrelated. Today, we are asked to connect seemingly disparate dots—phenomena, events, or influences that appear unrelated but may be profoundly related, or traced to a single source or origin. The veracity of this has never been more apparent than in this current time we live in. We are forced to deal with apparently competing ideologies, seemingly separate policy choices, ostensibly divergent causes in the mobility of people, or the presumably discrete applications of bigotry. They may well be a single integrated set of challenges.

We live in a world characterized by competing extremisms, one informal and dangerous, acting in the name of Islam and Muslims, while the other is mainstreamed and dangerous, elected to office and dispensing laws and commanding militaries. We live in a world where the Muslim surge for rights, freedom, and democracy has been blunted and, therefore, dictators and authoritarian regimes have a new lease on life. Mainstreamed extremism provides dictators with a license for impunity in the name of fighting the informal extremism.

We live in a world in which the greed of elites, the policy choices of decision-makers, and the effects of climate change conspire to impoverish greater numbers of people and condemn them to unemployment, hunger, and disease. The resultant growth of inequality happens both within countries and between countries and hemispheres.

And all of these, in turn, create patterns of migration within and between countries. Rural dwellers move to cities while residents of the developing world move to the developed world. Refugees of war and conflict join refugees of

poverty and oppression in a march toward beacons of opportunity. And this march is now increasingly met with hostility in the form of travel bans for those on their way and “otherization” for those already in the West.

Indeed, these phenomena are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.

The Nature of the Problem Has Changed

Given the pervasiveness and depth of the problems we face, it is safe to assume that the nature of the problem has altered fundamentally. The scale of migration, the numbers of refugees, the instantaneousness of communication, and the interconnectedness of these challenging phenomena mean that neither tinkering at the edges nor a big bang at the center holds much hope for progressively solving these crises.

When thinkers and practitioners gather to find solutions to one aspect of the problem — as we do to confront Islamophobia — then we have to respect its connections with other phenomena and we have to respect the profound nature of the problem.

When thinkers and practitioners gather to find solutions to one aspect of the problem — as we do to confront Islamophobia — then we have to respect its connections with other phenomena and we have to respect the profound nature of the problem. This is not business as usual.

Whereas before, we dealt with problems and crises that were recognizable because we had encountered them before, and they fell into the category of complicated but manageable, we must now admit that those crises we encounter today are complex because they are unprecedented. Whereas before, we were quite confident that we could resolve the problems and crises we confronted because they presented only a few unknowns, we must admit now that our crises

have no such available formulas and therefore fall into the intractable category. And whereas before, good management required that we harmonize competing aspects and interests within the problem and crisis, today we are required to exercise painful leadership to effect painful trade-offs when confronting our challenges.

Leadership With Integrity

The changed nature of the problems and crises confronting us requires a changed nature of the leadership we need to exercise. This leadership must be different from what we offered before: issue-based; constituency specific; stand-alone organizations; lopsided expenditure favoring infrastructure rather than programs on the ground.

On the other hand, our leadership needs to be distinct from those we are up against. We cannot mirror the populists we oppose: they peddle fear; they demonize whom they fear and oppose; they exploit the basest instincts of people; they know who and what they’re against; and they are focused only on the immediate short term. We need to be popular, not populist!

Being popular is the outcome of a process. What we need to do is connect people’s lived realities with deeper causes that are not immediately apparent. People see their own suffering, like Islamophobia, but not connection with the suffering of others — under racism; people dislike the cause of discrimination against them, but may themselves be perpetrators of discrimination against others — as with misogyny; people fear the perpetrators of the discrimination against them and may not see their own potential strength; and people may feel alone and lack the courage to oppose the discrimination unless they are shown the power of coalitions and alliances.

Leadership with integrity means connecting these seemingly disparate dots for people, revealing the connections, building empathy with others despite apparent or real differences, and through engagement, persuasion, and solidarities, making the initial, seemingly unpopular, increasingly popular. Popular leadership with integrity is not hiding truth from people but making truth palatable and popular. This is fundamentally different

from the nostalgic leadership paradigm—let’s return to the America that was a country of immigrants—or the demagogic leadership that is causing the problem now. We require strategic leadership.

Connecting Dots—the Genealogy of Bigotry

Bigotries generally have a single source. In our contemporary age we can trace processes of “otherization” to an original sin: colonial invasion, dispossession, and dehumanization. Justified by a combination of theology (the inferiority of those who are not Christian) and biology (the inferiority of non-whites in the evolutionary trajectory), this original sin otherized and dehumanized non-Europeans, allowing genocides, enslavement, and dispossession of such people. Such treatment was institutionalized where colonial authority was implanted in the colonized territories and is today institutionalized where the formerly colonized have taken residency in the colonial centers.

This original sin has been sustained, not merely with notions of inferiority of the other, but largely through ignorance of the very essence of the other and increasingly through fear. Fear and ignorance could be regarded as the grandparents in the family of bigotry. Fear, with its foundation in an irrational instinct, can often be excused as instinctive, but ignorance has no such free pass. In an age of hyperconnectivity, ignorance can be overcome by abandoning stereotypes and essentialization, and learning of the other’s community, religion, traditions, culture, and way of life, while remaining isolated in our global village can often be a self-imposed choice.

The succeeding generation to fear and ignorance is prejudice and discrimination. This generation has a life, whether formal—institutionalized like apartheid was—or informal in the everyday encounters between different people. Again, prejudice may be a natural, forgivable reaction when encountering difference, and in the absence of a sufficient knowledge base. One may tend to get by on stereotypes and generalizations gleaned from the abundance of caricatures that serve to represent the other. However, one does

not have the right to transform one’s prejudice into active discrimination, whether in personal interactions or societal institutions. The judgment one has in one’s heart or mind does not have the right to become hateful words, intolerant behavior, discriminatory social norms, legalized exclusion, or unequal institutional practice.

The offspring, in turn, of prejudice and discrimination are an unending litany of isms and phobias. These siblings possess the genetic combination of their entire genealogy: they are often the beneficiaries of the original sin and remain in denial of their complicity in it; they have preferred ignorance of the other for themselves and they cultivate fear among their own of any other; and they stand on their prejudices and seek ways to institutionalize discrimination. The result is that difference becomes division and diversity becomes discord.

The siblings, among which Islamophobia takes its place, include racism against darker-skinned people, sexism against women, anti-Semitism against Jews (while other Semitic people are excluded deliberately from this discrimination but may be covered under other forms), xenophobia against foreigners, and homophobia against those of a different sexual orientation. Islamophobia has come into focus more forcefully in recent years as both fear of, and hatred for, Islam and Muslims, driven historically by the persistent effects of the Crusades and Orientalism, and driven more recently by the colonial and Zionist projects in Muslim lands and the unfortunate resultant blowbacks in contemporary times in the forms of extremism and terrorism in the name of Islam and Muslims.

Fighting a Single, Integrated System of Evil

If we recognize Islamophobia as one sibling within a multigenerational lineage, and one phenomenon among a family of evil siblings, then it has implications for how we understand Islamophobia and how we combat it. This was a conceptual reality forced on South African Muslims in an apartheid society.

There was certainly Islamophobia throughout the history of South Africa. Islam as a religion

was banned for more than 100 years, its practice proscribed and punishable, and its leaders locally exiled within their exile from their places of origin, while its adherents were forced into subterfuge. During apartheid, Islam was not recognized as a religion (it was declared a “false faith”); its marriages, for example, had no status and the children of such marriages were registered as illegitimate. While Islamophobia was certainly pervasive, and its effects devastating for Muslims, it never became the dominant and overwhelming narrative among South Africans, nor even among Muslims in the country.

The leadership of South African Muslims resisted the temptation to monopolize or elevate their suffering under Islamophobia out of respect for the greater scale and depth of suffering of black South Africans under racism and mineworkers from other African states under xenophobia. Muslims understood that while they suffered under Islamophobia, the color of their skin also meant that they were also victims of racism, and as women, they were also confronted with sexism. These were the connected dots that illustrated the integrated nature of the evil we were confronting. This recognition allowed us to conclude that we

Liberation Movement echo with the names of Muslim heroes alongside others, because Muslims entered into alliances and coalitions with all ideologies to defeat apartheid. And it is for this reason that part of the post-apartheid South African state that was imagined was one that also gives Muslims the dignity, equality, and freedom to be Muslim, as well as protection against all discrimination, including Islamophobia.

Lessons From South Africa to Defeat Islamophobia

Learning from South Africa’s anti-apartheid struggle, and more particularly the way Muslims positioned themselves in this struggle, may be useful for the global Muslim community in conceptualizing the struggle against Islamophobia, in developing the skill set for it, in reaching out beyond themselves, and in conducting that struggle in inclusive, imaginative, and successful ways.

Firstly, fight Islamophobia, but don’t fetishize it! Fetishizing Islamophobia may involve separating it from other bigotries as if it has no connection, or monopolizing suffering as if there are no other victims of bigotry, or elevating it as if it is the worst of the bigotries afflicting society. This may be arrogant and self-centered, and it may lead up a strategic cul de sac. Islamophobia is best fought within the greater battles afflicting all of society, without surrendering the focus on it, or the need for specialized narratives, or the need for dedicated vehicles. But such specialized focus must always be in the context of a multidimensional fight against a single, integrated evil.

Secondly, reach in and reach out! Leaders in the fight against Islamophobia must mobilize Muslims as the primary target of Islamophobia so that they do not lapse into passive victimhood but gain agency against Islamophobia. But agency is truly gained when it is transformative: Muslims need to see the beam in their own eyes in terms of bigotries they themselves harbor like sexism and homophobia, let alone anti-Semitism. At the same time, leaders need to reach out to others who suffer racism and xenophobia, so that they are brought into solidarity with victims of Islamophobia, while feeling that Muslim mobilization is against both

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defeat Islamophobia when we fight the entire genealogy that birthed it and we defeat Islamophobia when we confront the most pervasive, inclusive, and dangerous of the siblings: racism! Every sibling in the family of bigotry is tailor-made for the community it chooses to oppress.

It is for this reason that the ranks of the

Islamophobia and the bigotries suffered by others.

Thirdly, learn the tools of working together! Working together is not an instinct. It is an acquired skill. When people are faced with the prospect of working together, it may come more easily when they do so with those who are the same, but they may find all manner of obstacles to work with those who are different. Learning to work together is a matter of understanding goals and methodologies: If you share fundamental assumptions and values of life, alliances to achieve those goals may be possible; if you differ about life-style values or theological principles but share an objective to defeat bigotry, then looser coalitions may become possible; and when you find very few commonalities of values and objectives, other than shared suffering, then your interests may converge on issues—deportations or travel bans—that may lead to issue-based cooperation.

Fourthly, avoid both passivity and recklessness! Sitting out a storm of bigotry and doing nothing to endanger an already tenuous existence is probably an instinct shared by the majority of people. They may theologize their passivity (the next life will be better) or ideologize it (I don't work with gays), but their fear of entering struggle must be minimized through responsible leadership that coaxes through measured language, proposes doable actions, and ticks off small but measurable achievements that speak of a conscious avoidance of recklessness, which otherwise would attract the most angry, adventurous, and extreme elements in the community.

Finally, occupy the missing middle! The global Muslim community is laudably strong on principle. They can often be high-minded to the point of being risk-averse when having to act, if it comes even close to compromising principles. Also, they may be quite cunning on tactics. This is the story of the ease with which extremists have grabbed the headlines in the name of Islam and Muslims. In search of some principle, they design sometimes the most dastardly of tactics, but ironically may defeat the very principle they purport to advance, like the beauty and mercy of Islam. What is missing in our calculus is the connective middle: strategy. How do we reach our destination—our principled goals—through a

sustainable pathway—the strategy—that requires partners and pragmatism and that in turn, shapes the actions we take—the tactics? It is strategy that reaches for principle and ensures that tactics are consistent with noble goals, and this has been the elusive middle for Muslims.

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Conclusion

The scale and nature of Islamophobia, and its connection with bigotries against all people who are different, suggest that indeed the challenges facing the “otherized” peoples of the world are unprecedented and seemingly intractable. There are no ready formulas in confronting bigotry, although there are examples from which to draw lessons such as the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa and the civil rights struggle in the United States. While the former was a struggle for national liberation by the majority population, the latter was one for political and socio-economic rights for a minority. Both, however, were struggles for citizenship.

In recognition of the idea that citizenship is at the heart of the struggle against Islamophobia, as with all bigotries, citizenship could be the glue that holds all people affected by all manifestations of bigotry together in its common pursuit. This is going to be crucial as bigotry increasingly makes itself respectable, as it occupies mainstream discourse, and as it finds the power to legislate itself. The time for strategic leadership is now in a battle for inclusive, equal citizenship with dignity. More citizens—even those who suffer no direct bigotry—may have a stake in removing bigots from power (as with Donald Trump) or impeding their march to power (Wilders and le Pen) or

reversing their impact (Brexit) for reasons other than a commitment against bigotry.

It is then when people discover the beginning of agency, agency to transcend themselves and reach out to others, and agency to participate in the epic struggles that define their generation.

The pervasiveness of Islamophobia and all bigotries may give the sense that they are supremely confident and invincible. But the pervasiveness may just be the overreach that convinces individual victims that their suffering isn't unique and that they must combine in a strategic battle against an entire system. It is then when people discover the beginning of agency, agency to transcend themselves and reach out to others, and agency to participate in the epic struggles that define their generation.

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