The High Tide of Colonialism

Sovereignty and Governmentality at Sea

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On November 21, 1924, the high commissioner of Egypt Lord Allenby occupied the Alexandria customs house. Yet he did so without explicit instructions from Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain. Nevertheless, Chamberlain felt obliged to support Allenby as Egypt teetered closer to war.[1] Allenby was responding to the assassination of Sir Lee Stack the Sirdar of the Egyptian army by Egyptian nationalists. He was hoping that a show of force would strangulate Egyptian nationalists, asking that an "additional warship at Alexandria H.M.S. Benbow"[2] be dispatched to Alexandria to assist with the occupation of the customs house. This was strange considering that the head of the nationalist government of Egypt—Saad Zaghlul—had agreed to pay the half-million-pound indemnity and resign.[3] Chamberlain was frustrated, but he told Allenby that "His Majesty's government feel[s] bound to support you in the action that you have already taken in this emergency."[4] Allenby's justification was simple. Deterrent measures had to be put in place so that no "other murders or serious breaches of public order may occur." For that he outlined that he would like "hostages to be taken if another Englishman or foreigner is murdered and to be shot if murders continue,"[5] along with the seizure of the tobacco customs at Alexandria, even if done without the authorization of the Home Government.[6]

What effect was it that Allenby had achieved in the six days seizure of the Alexandria customs house?[7] It would take several years for this unsanctioned action to be historicized in the British military reports of Egypt.[8] Soon enough though it became one of the chief tactics that were used to rein in Egyptian nationalists again in 1927–28. For the British "the sequestration of State finances is a type of humiliation which Egyptians understand."[9] What had started off as an unsanctioned reprisal seizing the Alexandria customs house had become a way to seize and also control autonomous centers of revenue calculation away from Egyptian nationalists, postponing and thwarting local Egyptian attempts at accounting. These centers of calculation witnessed a fight between the British, on the one hand, and the nationalist Egyptians, on the other, who wished to challenge the carte blanche that the British had by virtue of managing these maritime conduits of goods. "Customs dues," to borrow from a *Balagh* newspaper article, were "the main source of revenue of the Egyptian treasury, being, because of the Capitulations, 'the only taxation Egypt is free to increase or decrease according to her interest.'"[10]

As a facet of governmentality, naval accounting was one way that British suzerainty of the seas was supported. The old adage that "the British would expand by trade and influence if they could; but by imperial rule if they must" could only work through an accounting arsenal that managed these trade entrepots.[11] Ports and customs houses were thus strategic sites for supporting the British fleet. But they also doubled as conduits of goods and finances; making them key targets of British colonial envy. Seizing these entrepots, as the case with the occupation of the Alexandria customs house in 1924—and its potential repeat in 1927 and 1928—[12] shows how British sovereignty at sea was supported by a pervasive attempt to seize local autonomous centers of calculation.

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But one cannot attempt to understand this naval genealogy of governmentality without exploring sovereignty at sea. For if indeed free trade merchants were "warlike legions that go forth to *conquer* remote regions," as British trade emissary John Bowring wrote, then "they exercise a far less *enduring* influence, and maintain their territories by a far feebler hold than do the peaceful missionaries of commerce who quit their native land to *colonize*."[13] In other words, to conquer territory navally was one thing; to control it and colonize it, like Allenby did as he ruled Egypt, was quite another. Controlling overseas territories required a colonial and governmental accounting arsenal that could second autonomous centers of revenue management to British accountants in a way that was not readily apparent. Britain could only afford to be "the Sovereign of the seas"[14] by fine-tuning its governmental mechanisms that supported its navy.

This article presents a naval genealogy of governmentality as a colonial technology of control. Rather than conceive of accounting as a technology of surplus extraction alone,[15] it looks at its deployability in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century colony of Egypt by the British. It argues that governmentality was created in the colonies, in this case in nineteenth-century Egypt, through a naval node that worked to support British suzerainty at sea. Colonial bureaucrats and experts were then repatriated to the metropole where they introduced their colonial governmental modes of rule as modern government. Thus calculation, that quintessential trait of capitalism and technology of government, in fact had a naval and colonial genealogy.[16]

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What is curious about this form of naval sovereignty is its imbrication with technologies of control and discipline. Many know the utilitarian philosopher and prison reform advocate Jeremy Bentham of the panopticon, the inspiration for Michel Foucault's theorization of discipline and governmentality.[17] But few know of his brother, Samuel Bentham, who was the source of inspiration for the panopticon. Samuel built a shipyard wood mill in 1784 Kirchev, Russia, during the Russo-Turkish naval war of 1787–92 for the Russians, inspiring his brother to carry over the observation principle that would later become the panopticon and applying it to the Royal Navy's shipyards when he returned to England as inspector general of the admiralty.[18] Thus one can follow Giorgio Agamben and state that naval sovereignty also had a governmental aspect,[19] since aboard a ship there was no king to rule it. Instead, his agents, shipwrights, and shipmasters ashore functioned as a well-oiled machine.

Part of the problem of detecting this naval form of governmentality and sovereignty is that Middle East studies still sticks to terra-centric conceptualizations of sovereignty in general,[20] neglecting the naval components of Middle East history. If one looks away from terra-centric genealogies of sovereignty one discovers that a different form of sovereignty was being constituted in the early nineteenth century. This form of sovereignty challenges the view of a shared free Mediterranean in the nineteenth century held by geographers that in the "industrial era brought about the classic 'capitalist' spatiality . . . one in which tendencies and capital fixity were associated with capitalists alternately investing in . . . discrete locations on the earth's surface."[21] Rather than assume that this age of free-flowing spatiality was later rolled back by postmodern capital in the coming twentieth century, a colonial genealogy of the seas contests it from the get-go. By considering a countervailing form of colonial sovereignty at sea, older terra-centric genealogies of sovereignty can be rethought away from land and army-based narratives that mirror Charles Tilly's history of the birth of the state.[22] In other words the raison d'être behind the rolling back of spatiality in the sea was not due to postmodern capital but colonial-era forms of governmentality.

Likewise, part of the reason that a naval genealogy of sovereignty and governmentality has remained elusive is disciplinary. As a discipline, naval science has written out its own violent and colonial genealogy. The minute focus of naval science on imperial rivalry has come at the expense of exploring certain colonial conflicts in the Mediterranean. This has meant that periods of colonial war have been written out of history as periods of peace. The Levant Crisis of 1839–41 is not only considered to fall within a European period of peace,[23] despite witnessing the mobilization of the armies of the Sublime Porte, Austria, Mehmet Ali, France, and Britain, but it is normally thought to be a conflict between the pasha of Egypt and his Ottoman suzerain. Looking at the naval component of the conflict demonstrates that not only did the Concert of Europe have a stake in the conflict, but that it used its mastery of the seas and sovereignty over the Mediterranean to declare the Mediterranean mare clausum to force Mehmet Ali to yield. The seaborne genealogy of sovereignty thus stands to change much of our conceptualization of history, and even Middle East history, if we change our gaze from

land to sea. The Fraser campaign of 1807 and the Levant Crisis of 1839–41 present us with two precursory episodes of the colonization of Egypt that predated administrative colonialism in 1876 and the occupation of Egypt in 1882. Such colonial episodes receive little or no engagement in the writings of naval admirals, making naval sovereignty and governmentality more difficult to detect.

Take the writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Mahan concerning the basic principles organizing naval science, such as competition for control of the seas. As an author, Mahan was arguably one of the inaugural figures of naval science. His magnum opus, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, is dedicated to the study of seafaring from the seventeenth century until the French Revolution and after. For over a century, it was one of the key texts of naval science. If the German kaiser read Mahan, annotated the pages of his book, "and placed copies in every ship of the German fleet,"[24] then Mahan's influence is to be found not just at sea, but also in his writing. It was in such writing that the first seeds of naval science, and its cardinal belief in the necessity of preparing for armed naval conflict, were sown. With such a wide audience of readers for the admiral, and wide acclaim for his writings, Mahan's writings spread several key beliefs, such as the necessity of having overseas naval stations and colonies. These beliefs, owing to his sheer readability and acclaim, would be disseminated to naval admirals around the world. Instead of talking about plans for colonization and its potential complications, imperial bureaucrats would now merely need to focus on the creation of "naval stations." To understand how governmentality and sovereignty emerged through the seas requires that we survey and reappraise the naval history of Egypt. Only then will we understand how naval science packaged and hid such colonial conflicts under a disciplinary veneer.

Naval Science: *Alfred Mahan and the Mighty West*

Alfred Thayer Mahan enrolled at Annapolis's Naval Academy on September 30, 1856.[25] By the time Mahan would graduate, twenty-nine of his forty-nine classmates had dropped out. Mahan's acclaim was recognized overseas. He received honorary degrees from Oxford and Cambridge, and, as he began to write, became particularly known as a theoretician of the seas. On his first missions, Mahan took charge of the USS *Pocahontas* and participated in the bombardment of Port Royal in South Carolina against the South in the Civil War during 1861.[26] Following post–Civil War US imperial designs, Mahan exclaimed, "I am an imperialist simply because I am not isolationist."[27] Indeed, in 1899 he was a fervent defender of the Monroe Doctrine at the first Peace Conference at The Hague,[28] which stipulated that America should stake out a sphere of influence for itself in the Caribbean and Central and South America. Given that Mahan is often portrayed as an anti-colonial and conservative politician,[29] one ought to ask if his imperial designs were merely defensive, or, more importantly, if this conceptualization of defensive imperialism holds.

Having dedicated an essay to the benefits of "'theoretical' versus 'practical' training,"[30] Mahan was aware of the power of writing. In fact, his own intervention ended up changing the predominant view of the US Naval Academy that practical training was more important. In this witty essay, Mahan claimed that there was never such a hard and fast distinction between "practical" and "theoretical" knowledge. "It was said to me by some one," Mahan remarks, that "if you want to attract officers to the College, give them something that will help them pass their next examination."[31] But what is the biggest test of all for Mahan? "The test of war."[32] "Navies exist for war," wrote Mahan "and the question presses of an answer: 'Is this neglect to master the experience of the past, to elicit, formulate, and absorb its principles, is it *practical*?'"[33] Through war, and war alone, would naval officers learn the true meaning of pragmatism at sea.

"To secure to one's own people a disproportionate share of such benefits," Mahan argued, "every effort was made to exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory regulations, or when these failed, by direct violence."[34] We see here in Mahan the fundamental impetus behind the need to hold overseas territory. Even in peacetime, "the necessity of a navy, in the restricted sense of the word, springs, therefore, from the existence of a peaceful shipping, and disappears with it, except in the case of a nation which has aggressive tendencies."[35] Thus naval convoys in peacetime are a necessity for Mahan. For even in peacetime, according to him, there is a natural progression toward naval bases and eventually colonies. When a seaman set out to trade in faraway and dangerous locales, he "intuitively sought at the far end of his trade route one or more stations, to be given to him by force or favor."[36] Since for these seamen "there was immense gain, as well as much risk, in these early voyages, such establishments *naturally* multiplied and grew until they became *colonies*; whose ultimate development and success depended upon the genius and policy of the nation."[37] Omitted from the writing of Mahan are the

actors, the natives of these islands, and how these "navigators" often took their knowledge from the natives.[38]

Mahan glossed over the accounts of the invasion and colonization in the Mediterranean—such as the French and British campaigns in Egypt in 1798 and 1807.[39] In the former, Napoleon invaded Egypt because of the alleged abuse of French merchants.[40] In the latter, the British invaded Egypt to prevent a return of the French, which the British had helped to defeat in 1801. The British "station" in 1805 Alexandria was no mere innocuous undertaking. Victualling Lord Nelson's fleet that was chasing its French counterpart meant that Alexandria had to be in Nelson's grip. This is the curious detail that demonstrates how naval governmentality and victual accounting was necessary for naval supremacy at sea.

"Thus 20,000 men would be fixed again in Egypt. . . . Who would turn them out?" Nelson wrote to the secretary of war.[41] Mahan's theory glossed over such banal details in the buildup of British forces in Alexandria in their newly created station. The presence of this "innocent" and innocuous station would be costly. Mahan appears to have missed that in 1807 the rulers of Egypt would face a British invasion at Alexandria and that such a station would turn into an occupying garrison. Like the seizure of the Alexandria customs house, this victual station was necessary for Nelson to service his fleet and maintain his deployment at sea.

On the 9th of Muharram 1222 AH (ca. March 19, 1807), forty-two British ships sailed to Alexandria. Upon their arrival they summoned the governor of Alexandria and the British consul. They demanded access to the port of Alexandria and its fortress under the guise of free navigation, free trade, and the manning of naval stations. Previously, the Ottoman sultan ordered his Mediterranean domains to grant access to the British fleet as it fought off the French invasion of Egypt in 1798. The British hoped to seize this concession and carry on in their seafaring expedition in the Mediterranean.[42] Naturally, the ruler declined their request and asked them if they had an Ottoman firman permitting them to land. The Fraser campaign of 1807 then attempted to seize control of Egypt only to flee in the face of local resistance led by Mehmet Ali. The British had in fact demanded access to the ports of Egypt before and disrupted its trade as the French were quitting Egypt, prompting forbidding warnings from the Sublime Porte. Later, in 1808, they repeated their request for port access despite objections from the Sublime Porte.[43] The creation of "stations" for admiralties—be they coaling or victual stations—was far from a natural process. It carried material repercussions that could spell the colonization of a port. Naval science was thus used to rewrite these otherwise hidden narratives of naval colonial history in the first half of the nineteenth century—much before the arrival of settler-colonialism or extractive colonialism in late nineteenth-century Egypt. More so, it points to the benign and slow development of a different form of sovereignty than that of Hugo Grotius or John Selden, one that is colonial. Could Britain, "the sovereign of the seas,"[44] and the "Maritime Powers"[45] open and close the Mediterranean as they so wished?

Colonial Sovereignty: Mare Clausum . . . in the Nineteenth Century

As a concept, sovereignty at sea has been theorized legally using maritime custom. For Hugo Grotius, the question of a free sea and free navigation, *mare liberum*, was an extension of natural law. Those who violated this custom, and by extension those who attacked the allies of a state, could be attacked without a declaration of war. Grotius produced this argument in 1603 to argue before the Amsterdam Admiralty Prize Courts to keep the booty of the Portuguese *Santa Catarina*. The precursor of the Dutch East India Company, the United Amsterdam Company, was operating off the Malaysian Peninsula when its ally, the King of Johore, was attacked by Portuguese ships. Such an argument was enough reason for the seizure of the *Santa Catarina* and the enshrinement of the seas as a free space that was guarded by natural law.[46]

Let us consider the opposite argument of John Selden. Selden advocated for the ability of a polity to maintain a closed-off body of water, what is termed mare clausum, as part of the territory that belonged to it directly. Selden drew on the argument of several papal bulls, such as *Inter Caetra* of 1493, to introduce the concept of territorial waters. He sought to prove that the very issuing of these bulls, granting explored and unexplored territory to Spain and Portugal, rested on their proximity to the lines drawn by those papal bulls. Selden produced his work in the seventeenth century to safeguard English and Irish fisheries in the North Sea.[47] He cited the colonies under the control of Spain and Portugal as examples of the historic customs of closing off the seas—just as the Romans had done when they considered the Mediterranean as their own lake: mare nostrum. The seas were something that could be controlled, closed off, and drawn to their rightful ruler, their sovereign.

The Levant Crisis of 1839, to which this section turns, furnishes us with a third position, different than that of Hugo Grotius's *mare liberum* and John Selden's *mare clausum*. It presents us with a compelling case that points us to the naval and colonial genealogy of sovereignty and governmentality in the nineteenth century during an alleged period of peace. The conflict between the provincial governor of Egypt, Mehmet Ali, and his master the Sultan of the Sublime Porte—Sultan Mahmud II—has long been a controversial topic. Mehmet Ali's campaign to capture the Levant in 1831–33 began this bitter rivalry that nationalist historiography presents as the prelude to Mehmet Ali's odyssey for the independence of Egypt in 1839–41. Ultimately, in this narrative, Mehmet Ali is stopped by the European powers, who intervene to save the Sublime Porte. Others, however, downplay Mehmet Ali's resistance and instead emphasize his submission to the Sublime Porte in 1840. A third and more nuanced argument produced by Khaled Fahmy instead posits that Mehmet Ali did what any other ambitious Ottoman governor would have done at the time: he used Egypt as an extension for his household. "Rather than seeing Mehmet Ali as striving to achieve independence on behalf of the Egyptian Nation," Fahmy presents an incisive midway argument: "Instead of viewing Great Britain as the main obstacle in this endeavor," Fahmy adds, "Mehmet Ali was seeking the establishment of a secure personal rule for himself and his household in Egypt."[48]

Yet one piece of evidence challenges the terra-centric historiography found in all three renditions of the conflict. One clue as to the omitted naval dimension of the conflict survives till today in the form of a congratulatory statement issued to one of the British ship captains that participated in the campaign to "pacify" Mehmet Ali. Members of the Liverpool Association of Ship Masters issued a statement congratulating Commodore Napier, who had conquered Acre and executed a successful landing, while repelling Mehmet Ali's forces and executing a victory for the British Empire and all of human civilization.[49] These were the unsung heroes that made that victory successful. These shipwrights and artificers worked hard and were managed by naval commissioners through a governmental and financial form of discipline, a system that was inherited from Samuel Bentham's managerial scheme that built the wood mill inspection house—or the naval panopticon.

British sovereignty over the seas was yet again witnessed by all the "Maritime Powers"[50] of the conflict who had weighed in and intervened; proclaiming to merchant ships in the Levant that a blockade was in effect.[51] They foreclosed the possibility of reconciliation between Mehmet Ali and the Sultan while blockading the Mediterranean until the London Convention could be implemented. The question is not if Britain was an obstacle to independence, for it was both villain and friend, but what it had done at sea to force Mehmet Ali to accept its diplomatic terms. These were the naval dimensions of the conflict that demonstrate Britain's position as the sovereign of the seas, to borrow from Bowring, in executing her colonial designs.

In 1839, the ruler of Egypt Mehmet Ali aimed to legitimize the territories he acquired from the Ottoman Empire by force. The Ottoman Empire, distraught by this renegade province that was growing in power and moving toward recognition by the Great Powers, struck against Mehmet Ali in the Levant. The Great Powers—France, Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia—sought to rein in Mehmet Ali after his army defeated the Ottomans at the battle of Nizib in 1839. Subsequently, Britain drew up the London Convention for the purposes of pacifying Mehmet Ali. The annex of the London Convention of July 15, 1840, created a united navy among the British, Ottoman, and Austrian admiralties to engage the forces of Mehmet Ali and his navy. It spelled out certain conditions for the pacification of the Levant: withdrawal and evacuation of all provinces save for Egypt, return of the Ottoman fleet that had defected to Alexandria after the battle of Nizib, and the submission of Mehmet Ali by applying Ottoman law, treaties, and the payment of tribute.

It was at that moment that the Great Powers of Europe positioned themselves as the *Maritime Powers* in order to safeguard the Bosporus but also use their power to force Mehmet Ali's hand. The fear that Mehmet Ali could reconcile with the Sultan owing to his popularity was real. The Kapudan Pasha of the Ottoman Empire, Ahmed Fevzi Pasha, had defected to Alexandria in the middle of the conflict. Distraught by this "treachery," the British used their most powerful means to influence the diplomatic trajectory of the conflict. The lords commissioners of the admiralty received new instructions to blockade the port of Alexandria and use any means at their disposal to convince Mehmet Ali to release the treacherous Ahmet Fevzi Pasha along with his fleet.[52] Should Mehmet Ali refuse, "Sir Robert Stopford should have recourse to any measures of compulsion which he may think within the extent of his power."[53] This included the seizure of Egyptian merchant ships. Such measures were to be used to compel Mehmet

Ali to release the ships and also persuade the Turkish mariners to return of their own accord; it was not contemplated that these mariners would want to stay in Egypt.[54] The combined fleet of Mehmet Ali and the Kapudan Pasha was the only thing that stood between the Maritime Powers and the Ottoman Empire in terms of maritime domination. Its return to Istanbul was the way to close the Levant Crisis while maintaining European maritime domination of the Mediterranean.

To enforce their decision to reign in Mehmet Ali, the Great Powers decided to officially declare the straits to the Bosporus as *mare clausum* while moving to blockade the major ports of the Eastern Mediterranean and mobilizing their fleets South.[55] In effect, the Mediterranean itself had become an entire lake that was under their control. A united navy under the control of the British would blockade the ports of the Eastern Mediterranean to initiate a landing. With British and Austrian corvettes cruising in the Mediterranean, Ottoman soldiers disembarked and engaged Mehmet Ali's army in the Levant and in Beirut. British captains took command of what remained of the Ottoman Navy. A British officer by the name of Charles Smith became *Serasker* for all Ottoman forces on land while Captain Baldwin Walker became naval admiral of the Ottoman Navy and became known as Yaver Pasha.[56] Alexandria was blockaded into submission by the combined allied squadron. Landing parties began to make way in Beirut under the protection of the British fleet with Ottoman forces aboard and behind them in their ships. Under the combined flag created by the London Convention, British and Ottoman troops landed in Beirut and proceeded to the mountains as they supplied rebels with muskets and victuals. A coaling station and supply depot were set up in Cyprus where 10,000 Ottoman regular troops were dispatched.[57] Money was poured into the procurement of dromedaries, financed by the British admiralty. The Ottomans empowered the British to hand the emirs of the mountains near Beirut new firmans while telling them that Mehmet Ali had been removed as pasha.[58] The aim was to reinstate Ottoman sovereignty by closing off and controlling the Mediterranean and treating it—as the Romans had done—as the Western Powers' own lake that they could close: mare nostrum.

The measure of "deposing Mehmet Ali, was founded upon the concluding line of section VII. in the separate act [of the London Convention]," which was meant to "pacify" the Levant Crisis.[59] Other measures included the investiture of all the provinces in his domain to other Viziers; in the meantime, a blockade would begin. Now that these provinces were being dismembered from the House of Mehmet Ali, an Austrian corvette went to Candia to deliver the firman of investiture for the new pasha.[60] The HMS *Cyclops* of the British admiralty made sure that the emirs received their muskets and gave cover to the men who descended from the mountains to attack Ibrahim's army. The British were to "organize a Guerilla warfare, which will destroy Ibrahim's corps." In Beirut 7,000 men began to maneuver against Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Mehmet Ali and head of the Egyptian army, under the covering fire of the *Cyclops*.[61] Through the officers of the "Maritime Powers," the self-anointed label of the Great Powers that appears in the correspondence, a rebellion was being engineered in the domains of Mehmet Ali. Finally, Mehmet Ali Pasha submitted to the British and a firman was proclaimed on June 1, 1841, which granted Mehmet Ali the hereditary right to rule Egypt.[62] For Europe, this was a small price to pay to conclude a conflict that threatened its mastery of the Mediterranean Sea.

What separates the view of the sea as mare clausum in the Levant Crisis, from the conceptualizations offered by Selden and Grotius, however, is its foundational character for the creation of a new maritime sovereign order.[63] The annex to the London Convention broke ancient custom and opened the Bosporus Straits to the Great Powers.[64] Simultaneously, the straits to the Bosporus were declared mare clausum while the rest of the ports of the Eastern Mediterranean were blockaded. Mehmet Ali experienced a form of maritime colonization from afar—without settler, administrative, or extractive colonialism. This was different than the Spanish cases that Selden cited that involved settler colonialism. The Mediterranean was thus sealed off and Mehmet Ali was made to submit to the Great Powers. Alexandria was blockaded and its maritime borders were dismembered from it. The power to open and close seas was no less than an act of sovereignty by the Great Powers.

The Levant Crisis enshrined a new political order that set certain conditions for Mehmet Ali to receive the hereditary right to rule Egypt that he so keenly fought for. In this political order, Alexandria was not the port that it was before, nor did it have a mighty navy to protect it. Henceforth Mehmet Ali's navy, which fought in Navarino against Europe in 1827, would be diminished de jure in exchange for recognition. The investiture firman of Mehmet Ali was issued by the Sublime Porte with these same conditions repeated. Most noteworthy was the maritime dimension to these conditions:

Mehmet Ali was forbidden from building ironclads. Mare clausum was not a concept of the seventeenth-century past, but it survived until the nineteenth century. To Mehmet Ali, the Mediterranean would become a foreign body of water in which his diminished navy could not sail securely as it did before 1839. To enshrine this foundational moment, his successor Abbas I would send a ship each year to the Sublime Porte as tribute; symbolically pledging the naval allegiance to the Sultan.[65]

It is worth considering how a terra-centric conceptualization of sovereignty not only omits these details, but arrives at a limited understanding of this foundational moment. Similar to the work of Giancarlo Casale,[66] the maritime genealogy of sovereignty in the Levant Crisis demonstrates how Ottoman rule was mediated through a maritime encounter at sea. Sticking to standard histories of the rise and decline of empires through land battles, taxation, and conscription runs the risk of telling a story that largely mirrors that of Europe's own emergence,[67] a story that has—as of late—been disputed.[68]

In Egypt, land-based histories and conceptualizations of sovereignty focus on the acquisition of territory and the birth of a bureaucracy through the army after the 1822 decree mandating conscription.[69] In 1831–40, Mehmet Ali was at the apogee of his rule after he enlarged his fiefdom—capturing territory in Sudan, Hejaz, Crete, and Yemen—through an army that even threatened the Sublime Porte. Deploying the standard rise and decline paradigm of imperial history, Mehmet Ali's fiefdom was diminished following the conclusion of the Levant Crisis and he returned as a loyal Ottoman vassal. A seaborne genealogy of sovereignty, in contrast, shows that the House of Mehmet Ali, and the first birth pangs of Egypt as a territory recognized by the Great Powers in 1841, was a stillborn birth. In this way, the sovereignty of the Egyptian province was first mediated through the seas in 1840 and subsequently enshrined by the Maritime Powers in the London Convention. But curiously, this version of sovereignty had certain limits, making it in effect subservient to European colonial designs. In exchange for recognition, Mehmet Ali's navy had to be dismantled and so too were its arsenals along with his ships that were broken up.[70] What most people think of as a land-based genealogy for sovereignty—meaning recognition of a territory, the raising of a standing army, and a monopoly on the use of force—[71] all emerged through a maritime war. In this way, the quintessential unit of analysis for sovereignty and governmentality, the army and the barracks that Foucault wrote about,[72] may not help further our understanding of how government was first produced. But instead, could the ship hold the key? This is what the next section turns to.

Governmentality at Sea and in the Colonies

To control the seas, as well as extend sovereignty over them, required powerful ships. What kept the British admiralty during the Levant conflict afloat, however, as a well-oiled and well-funded machine were its governmental commissioners, accountants, and magistrates on land, in its arsenals, and in its dockyards. Like the Liverpool ship-masters' association, these were the unsung heroes that victualled its ships, repaired them, and made sure that there were enough resources and credit to finance these expeditions. The discipline of these seamen was key to maintaining Britain as "the Sovereign of the seas."[73]

More importantly, it required well-disciplined sailors who could man these ships. Before the modern and Foucauldian concept of discipline emerged, there was the older concept of naval discipline.[74] Indeed, the cardinal definition of naval discipline given by admirals in the eighteenth century was "the management of each individual ship in action," and so too the concept applied to individuals themselves.[75] In this way governmentality too was negotiated through a naval encounter that emerged through the ship but in a chimerical way. There was no transition similar to that which occurred on land where the sovereign's right to punish was checked. Rather, it involved a mélange of both sovereign and governmental power fused into one. To be the sovereign of the seas required a well-oiled navy that disciplined its sailors, victualled its ships, and repaired them—the prison was not the first archetypal institution of discipline that produced governmentality.

Naval custom treated ship captains and commanders as kings of their ships because of their ability to hand down, and dispense with, the law to discipline their seamen. The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century license of admirals to hold trials exemplified this *ex nihlo* sovereign power that was delegated to them: "For the better maintaining a proper government and strict discipline in the squadron under your command," read the instructions; "we do hereby authorize and empower you to call and assemble courts martial as often you shall see occasion."[76] Ship captains were their own sovereigns who legislated their laws aboard these ships in order to rule over their sailors. The specter of mutinies and the

loss of heavily prized and costly ships meant that certain measures had to be put in place to prevent the fall of Royal Navy ships into the hands of the enemy. Where land armies could drill their platoons into discipline the ship could not, and so it had to rely on this system of corporeal punishment.

Ships also needed naval discipline to make sure sailors could account for unknown winds and tides that could turn the ship over.[77] Naval discipline was also necessary to keep the ship from falling to enemy hands and defecting, as was the case with the Ottoman fleet in the Levant War. The ship was a proto-state that had its own king—its captain—and its own government that ran these individuals. Indeed, one could also argue that many of the functions of modern government had a countervailing seaborne genealogy through the figure of the ship.[78]

The late Foucault was not far off from arguing just this when he stated "that government is concerned with things understood . . . is readily confirmed by the inevitable metaphor of the ship." To be able to enshrine political order and sovereignty at sea required a well-functioning ship. Governmentality, like terra-centric genealogies of sovereignty, also had an originary tale at sea. "What is to govern a ship?" Foucault asked. His answer was extensive: "What characterizes government of a ship is the practice of establishing relations between the sailors, the vessel, which must be safeguarded, the cargo, which must be brought to port, and their relations with all those eventualities like winds, reefs, storms and so on."[79]

The figure of the ship was also where government, in the form of financial ingenuity, began. Previously, authors such as Charles Tilly argued that the state emerged in Western Europe through the monopoly on the use of force. This monopoly of force was used through an army to enforce the ability of the state to tax its citizens and spend that money as legislated by parliament. In this narrative, accounting and the monopoly on taxation by the state emerged through the development of an army. But is that the case for an island state such as Britain? British naval historians provide one of the most important interventions into the history of the state. They convincingly argue that in the case of Britain it was the navy, before the army, that guaranteed a steady supply of revenue to the treasury through the protection of merchant fleets.[80]

Governmentality at sea was not just about discipline aboard ships. Naval ships required financial discipline and a continuous surveillance of expenditure through accounting to guarantee they were in tip-top fighting condition. It should come therefore as no surprise that British naval historians demonstrated that in managing the revenues of the merchant fleet, and the British Navy's resource at large, its accounting institutions predated those of the British state. In doing so, they inverted the Gladstonian narrative of liberal parliamentarianism as the motor force behind the development of fiscal discipline of the British state. Indeed, their contribution demonstrated that the institutions of finance normally associated with fiscal discipline, such as the Bank of England, emerged first to manage the Navy's floating debt.[81] Accounting historians took for granted the claim that with the rise of liberal parliamentarianism the British state produced the necessary accounting mechanisms to manage its taxes and expenditure, as evidenced by the 1866 British Exchequer and Audit Act of 1866.[82] In contradistinction, the admiralty conducted audits and had a chief comptroller general as early as the seventeenth century.[83]

Once William III of Orange conquered England in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, he set about to reorganize the Navy. Not only did William disband the "army,"[84] but he also disbanded James's childhood office: the board of admiralty. In its place would be the commissioners board of the admiralty. As a commissioner's office that had members of parliament (MPs) in addition to Navy lords, William wanted to make sure the Navy—the real fighting machine of the sovereign in England—would be in his hands. He thus put it under the auspices of parliamentary commissioners, and so began a sort of shift in the Navy from sovereign power to governmental power.

There was no line that separated the civilian and military aspects of the navy. The office of the admiralty was created in 1690 to run the navy with the title of lord high admiral at its head.[85] The signatures attached to the act creating the office of the admiralty bear one of its future commissioners: Sir John Houblon. As the first governor of the Bank of England he also served as a commissioner on the board of admiralty. The finances of the island of Britain were thus intertwined with its Navy.

With the shift to government via commissioners, the sovereign's control over the navy was lessened, paving the way for governmental control of the admiralty. The reorganization of the admiralty as an office was a necessary arrangement that complemented the creation of the commissioners board of admiralty in 1689, promulgated in 1690 as an act by King William and Queen

Mary. The first lord of the admiralty was also its chair; it consisted of seven other commissioners between 1770 and 1820, with only three of them seamen.[86] Later during the third Dutch war and the war with the French in 1689, none of the commissioners were seamen but all were civilians who were primarily members of parliament, or "placemen."[87] Such a fact casts doubt on the narrative of the navy as solely a military force, rather than a well-oiled machine managed by civilians.[88]

Among the first audits conducted by the board of admiralty commissioners was one in 1703. Its purpose was to appraise the system of victuals. The findings indicted several victual contractors: payments to victualling merchants were made without any method of verification, and credit slips were not signed correctly. By 1706 verification methods of supplied victuals were recorded in the accounts since each ship had a subaccountant and a purser, upon whose receipt of the goods a payment slip would be issued.[89] A clerk of the check would be in each port to collect the subaccountants' payment slips.[90] Accountants, as much as the admiralty's fleet, enabled the navy to function properly. By the nineteenth century, the commissioners of the admiralty liaised with the House of Commons through an assistant financial secretary in order to approve the Navy's budget estimates. Where did these figures come from and did they, as with the case of Samuel Bentham, have a colonial genealogy as well? To answer that question requires a look at the career of one clerk that traversed both worlds and who became an assistant financial secretary: Gerald Fitzgerald.

As an army accountant clerk in 1864–66 Britain, Fitzgerald first went to India in 1869 as assistant comptroller-general and rose to the rank of accountant general in 1872. He occupied the post of accountant general in India until 1876. Fitzgerald then departed for Egypt in 1877 to become *sous-côntroleur des recettes* as part of a colonial control commission over Egyptian finances: the Caisse de la Dette Publique. In 1879 he subsequently became director general of Public Accounts, where he remained until 1885. He then returned to the metropole as the chief accountant of the Navy and assistant financial secretary until 1896. As he grew in stature from India to Egypt, Fitzgerald became the embodiment of an imperial bureaucrat. His return to the metropole and repatriation of his expertise, like Samuel Bentham's toward the end of his career, is what made him stand out.

Fitzgerald was not the first colonial official to be rewarded with a post back at the metropole. Lord Northbrook, the first lord of the admiralty was sent to Egypt in 1884 to inquire into the state of its finances, demonstrating how the admiralty acted as a conduit for financial experts. George Goschen, another first lord of the admiralty, was rewarded with the post after being sent to Egypt in 1876 as a representative of the bondholders of Egyptian debt.[91]

In Egypt, Fitzgerald's work merited a special mention in the Earl of Cromer's *Modern Egypt*. At first, "when the English took Egyptian affairs in hand, the accountants in the employment of the Egyptian Government were almost exclusively Copts. Their system of accounts was archaic."[92] The British, Cromer explained, "[were] to introduce order into the Accounts Department. This work was undertaken by Sir Gerald Fitzgerald, who, by dint of untiring industry and perseverance, overcame all the very formidable obstacles which he had to encounter. The Egyptian Accounts Department is now thoroughly well organized. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this achievement."[93] Cromer's interest in accounting is worthy of consideration without comparing it to that of Gerald Fitzgerald. This could be explained by the fact that his own colonial career in Egypt started in March of 1877. In Egypt, Cromer, or Evelyn Baring then, was a young captain and commissioner of the Caisse de la Dette Publique, where he worked with Fitzgerald. Before that, he was in India as a secretary to Lord Northbrook. In Egypt, he rose to the rank of comptroller general in 1879–80 and subsequently consul general of Egypt. The link between both positions, comptroller general and consul general, is no coincidence. It demonstrates how finance was the prism through which the British looked when ruling Egypt.

Both Fitzgerald and Cromer arrived in Egypt together on March 12, 1877. They were empowered by a November 18, 1876, decree in which dual control by France and Britain was established over Egypt for the repayment of her loans on behalf of the bondholders of Egyptian debt. This involved two commissioners appointed to the Caisse de la Dette Publique between England and France; one commissioner for expenditure and another for receipts. As part of these offices, there would also be two comptroller generals for each commissioner.[94] Even in official correspondence, Cromer holds the same view of Fitzgerald as he does in his recollections, exclaiming that "this important reform" that Fitzgerald instated was "an absolutely essential preliminary before further improvements in the fiscal system could be undertaken."[95] The ability to exact such "preliminary" reforms, to Cromer's mind, spelled the beginning of a long and complex power grab by Britain of Egypt.

The story of how Britain came to control Egyptian state finance through the "dual control" decree of November 18, 1876, and the breakup of the Khedival household, is known.[96] Less known is what happened at a lower level to the Egyptian accounts. Were they, as was represented by Cromer, the result of a series of modernization efforts? To answer that question requires a look at how the reforms of Fitzgerald, as opposed to officials such as Cromer, were received.

Controlling Egyptian Finance

Fitzgerald worked to standardize finance in Egypt. He authored a long report on the state of irregular taxes in 1878 which reflected the different taxation schemes that each province was subject to. Instead of the *yamwiya*, *matlubat*, and *'uhda* accounting ledgers, Fitzgerald recommended abolishing them. In so doing he also recommended doing away with the prevalent system of credit whereby each province could postpone its debts by issuing credits to another department. In many ways, this was the precursory step to formulating a central bureau that controlled the finances of a country. Instead of following the inundation of the Nile, and maintaining tax collection in kind and relative to the fertility of the land, Fitzgerald recommended collection of taxes in cash and complained of the cost of tax collection in kind. Fitzgerald also called for the organization of a census of cattle in order to better collect the animal-husbandry tax while calling for general reform of the census's machinery to increase its ability to collect taxes. He complained of how the census was ineffective and not accurate, preventing the government from collecting the real amount of taxes owed.[97] Accounting was linked to both the census and colonial irrigation bureaucrats. It was the complimentary governmental mechanism to British colonial irrigation officials' attempts to contain, manage, and produce the water of the Nile.[98]

Fitzgerald's modern financial reforms were used to rule Egypt and dictate the bounds of what the British would accept politically. Before Khedive Ismail was removed in 1879, an attempt was made by Egyptian nationalist Sherif Pasha to rule the country by assembling a cabinet compromised of "genuinely Egyptian components (*d'éléments veritablement Égyptiens*)."[99] The "rational" financial plan, which was presented by the minister of finance and encouraged by the foreign powers, was rejected by the Khedive for it had "raised national sentiment against the cabinet (*achève de soulever contre le Cabinet le sentiment national*)."[100] As such, Sherif Pasha was entrusted with forming a government in 1879, enacting an electoral law, and implementing the nationalists' counter-plan. Yet things did not go as expected—pressure did not come from above—but rather from below.

As soon as the cabinet was formed, Sherif Pasha wrote to M. Bellaigues de Bughas—the commissioner of debt in the Caisse de la Dette Publique—asking him and Lord Cromer to serve as the controller-generals of expenditure and receipts. Sherif Pasha had to appoint foreigners to these positions to fulfill the obligations of the November 1876 decree; otherwise Egypt would be viewed as bankrupt. Bellaigues and Cromer both declined because they refused "to associate ourselves with a financial plan which in our eyes was impracticable, or with a change of system which was in contradiction to the engagements recently taken by the Khedive towards the British and French Governments."[101] The phrasing by Cromer is key, for it did not outline the logic of rational frugal account keeping—usually the veneer by which harsh accounting measures were taken—but instead it protested a departure from British and French styled "engagements." Such a "change of system," as Cromer put it, was not something that was up for contemplation. Egypt was to continue to follow the path set out for it by Britain. The question then was not of superiority of British modern account keeping, as Cromer claimed, but it was the presumed preference of European accounting that was at play. Immediately, Sherif Pasha informed Foreign Secretary Sir Frank Lascelles that "he considered our [Cromer's and Bellaigues's] refusal to take office [as having] freed the Egyptian government from any responsibility as the re-establishment of the Control."[102] The controllers, most notably Gerald Fitzgerald and the commissioner in charge of the cadastral survey, Sir Auckland Colvin, resigned. The rest of the story is known. Britain then moved to act in view of Egypt having broken its international obligations to repay its debt.

Although Cromer described this scheme as "impossible of execution," and how it "crumbled to the ground and, in failing, overwhelmed its author,"[103] this reflected British designs. Were Cromer's words true that "if he had been able to pay his debts, no excuse would have existed for further interference from abroad?"[104] A look at the accounting machinery of Fitzgerald shows otherwise. Insofar as Fitzgerald stood loyal to a British system of accounting, so too did he stand for British colonial designs. Accounting and governmental reform went hand in hand with British designs for colonizing Egypt. By usurping Egypt's coffers under the rubric of *modernization*, he was enacting a set of measures—or

precursory "reforms," as Cromer put it—to seize Egypt's assets and install an apparatus of information collection under the guise of accounting and auditing checks. What follows are the details of the legal and accounting regime that governed Egypt's loans.

Following these developments, a proposal was floated that Egyptian revenues be "placed in the hands of officers nominated by England and France exclusively."[105] Yet again the Khedive was to issue a decree and perform it without any authorship of its substance. The Caisse de la Dette Publique of 1876 was thus allowed to continue even if begrudgingly and under the veneer of financial expediency.

With Fitzgerald back in power, an audit was quickly ordered pending such information on June 1, 1879, addressed to the "superintending Consuls . . . in Upper and Lower Egypt, requiring them to furnish Her Majesty's Agency with full and accurate information upon all that is happening in the provinces as regards the collection of taxes and treatment of the peasantry."[106] Such a request came before the postoccupation census of 1897. The audit would be the means by which Fitzgerald, the accountant general, would be able to verify that payments made were reflective of Egypt's fiscal capacity. Previously, taxes were levied en masse by the Sheikh al-Balad of each village.[107] This meant that such information would only lie with him, and more important, the entire community shared the tax burden. The British audit undertaken in 1879 gathered information while helping to cement colonial tax reform, projecting a new form of colonial power under the guise of modern financial reform.

As Britain laid its hands on Egypt and gathered more information in 1879, it turned to the Khedive to confront him with his loan obligations. With this information in hand, the Rothschild Banking House asked for "additional security for their loan."[108] The Khedive could not counter this power of accounting and audit of his country even if he Egyptianized it. Mr. Vivian, the consul general, reported the conversation that he had when he traveled from Alexandria to Cairo with Sherif Pasha. He conveyed to Sherif Pasha that Egypt had to issue a decree besides that of the April 22, 1879.[109] Egypt could not merely assume to "regulate the debts of the State at its own discretion."[110] Thus the final nail had been struck in Ismail's coffin, with the British "officially recommending the Khedive to abdicate . . . *and promising him that we will concur in the assignment to him of a handsome Civil List* and that we will not disturb Prince Tewfik's succession."[111]

As a retired official, Fitzgerald sat on the board of several British joint-stock companies that operated in Egypt during the turn of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.[112] His legacy was intertwined with the mercantile largesse of colonial Egypt. With such colonial experience, he filled the London business world's need for a frugal manager and accountant to manage its overseas colonial investment portfolio.

The career of Fitzgerald was thus the embodiment of how governmentality was first experimented with in the colonies and repatriated to the metropole. He earned this reputation for what he did in Egypt, and later repatriated his expertise to the British Navy. When he returned, and became assistant financial secretary to the admiralty, he helped negotiate the Navy estimates in the House of Commons.[113] So great was his colonial expertise that it justified "the departure from established practice" of internal hire from within the Navy's own accountants.[114] While in England, Fitzgerald worked as the accountant general and then the assistant financial secretary to overhaul the Navy's accounting system. In 1886 he initiated an audit of several navy yards and their accounts while inaugurating a new system of labor punishments in the form of fines for "idleness at work, waste of stores and other offences." Fitzgerald also participated in audit committees themselves that looked into the Navy's own accountant general to adopt "measures to increase direct individual responsibility" and to reform the "relation of the Central Department to the Accountant Officers in the various Naval Establishments."[115] He was centralizing the Navy's accounting arsenal in the same way he had done in Egypt, bringing back his colonial expertise to inform that of the metropole. Fitzgerald and Lord Northbrook—who had also just returned from his trip in 1884 inquiring into the state of Egyptian finances—began an overhaul of the Navy's finance by instituting "a system of independent local examination of accounts by the Accountant-General's staff." Northbrook asked that the accountant general act as the assistant to the financial secretary and work with parliament to furnish statistics but also pass the naval estimates of each year.[116] The institutionalization of civilian commissioners in the admiralty, who were not officers but liaised with them to assure parliament some oversight was carried out, was being fine-tuned by Northbrook and Fitzgerald. What British naval historians saw as the steady march toward fiscal discipline through the navy had, as it turned out, come from Fitzgerald and Northbrook's experience in the colony of Egypt.

Modern accounting, and its bureaucratic counterpart of the audit, did not arrive to Egypt through benevolent British expertise. Rather, it came as a colonial method of rule. What may be attributed to the governmentalization of rule, in fact, had come not as a bourgeois technology but through a colonial encounter. Attending to this genealogy of sovereignty and governmentality through the seas thus shows the colonial nature of government.

Conclusion

The naval turn to the study of governmentality and sovereignty demonstrates a different and new genealogy in which the colony is situated not as laboratory,[117] but as the very first seed of governmentality that was later sown in the metropole. The story told here is one that shows how governmentality emerged as a chimerical counterpart of naval sovereignty. Such an attention to naval sovereignty shows that the Anglo-Egyptian naval and colonial encounters of 1807 and 1839–41 predated the conventional watershed of 1876 and 1882, when foreign colonial financial control was institutionalized and the British occupation of Egypt began. Instead, the story of the seas produces a different naval genealogy. It theorizes how concepts such as financial accounting and governmentality emerged through a naval encounter at sea in the same way that Jeremy Bentham's panopticon had its inception in his brother Samuel's wood mill inspection house in the colony of Kirchev at its arsenal. The difference being that in the case of the former, accounting was used to colonize and control the finances of colonies such as Egypt.

To be a sovereign of the seas required a strong financial accounting system, without which the British Navy could not be the lean mean fighting machine that it was. The 1924 Alexandria customs house seizure encapsulates how British naval sovereignty was predicated on these financial governmental tools that supported colonial designs. Customs houses doubled as key sights of government by levying customs dues and also as sites of financial governmental control. By placing British officers in certain key positions, such as head of customs in Alexandria, the British could control the port but also benefit from smuggling operations.[118] The power of calculation at ports—in collecting customs dues—was a contentious question in the early twentieth century in Alexandria. But it was more contentious because it was the Achilles heel of the nationalist government, which collected a good part of its revenue as customs dues.

Financial management of colonies, in the form of government, was made possible by naval accountants who repatriated their colonial expertise back to the metropole, showing the naval and colonial roots of governmentality.[119] Naval figures such as Gerald Fitzgerald and Lord Northbrook became key colonial figures whose careers did not end with retirement. Fitzgerald's work reshuffling Egyptian finance helped the British rule Egypt through accounting. Yet his power extended beyond his career and continued with the reform of the British admiralty and subsequent management of joint-stock companies. The work of Fitzgerald and Northbrook in Egypt embodied the imperial career of naval bureaucrats for whom British accounting and governmental reform—and the birth of fiscal responsibility in London—had its roots in the colonization of Egypt.

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Notes

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1. Majlis al-Nuwwab, *Majmu'at madabit*, 40.

2. The National Archives, (hereafter TNA), Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 407/199, "Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby, Foreign Office," November 22, 1924, No. 269, Richmond: Kew Gardens, UK.

3. Majlis al-Nuwwab, *Majmu'at madabit*, 40.

4. TNA, FO 407/199, "Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby," Foreign Office, November 22 1924, No. 268.

5. TNA, FO 407/199, "Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Mr. Austen Chamberlain," Cairo, November 24, 1924, No. 274.

6. TNA, War Office (hereafter WO) 287/40, "Military Report on Egypt 1937," 17.

7. TNA, FO 407/199, "Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Mr. Austen Chamberlain," Cairo, November 30, 1924, No. 376.

8. Interestingly the first military report after by the War Office issued in 1926 failed to mention Allenby's unsanctioned action but it was later noted in several military records as a possible measure in times of difficulty. See India Office Records (hereafter IOR)/L/PS/20/E87, "Military Report on Egypt 1926," St. Pancras, London: British Library; TNA, WO 287/40, "Military Report on Egypt 1937," 17.

9. TNA, FO 407/204, "Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain," Cairo, May 31, 1927, No. 118, p. 161; IOR/L/P/15/22/iii, "Summary of Political

Telegram for the Secret Information of the Dominion Governments." 26/27th April 1928, fols. 135–36, British Library: London, St. Pancras.

10. TNA, FO 407/217, "Memorandum on the Egyptian Press, June 9–15, 1933," Enclosure in No. 75, Cairo, June 16, 1933.

11. Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, *Africa and the Victorians*, 10. It is important to note that Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny's thesis was also canonized by Edward Said in his now classic text *Culture and Imperialism*. See Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 73.

12. IOR/L/P/15/22/iii, "Summary of Political Telegram for the Secret Information of the Dominion Governments." 26/27th April 1928, fols. 135–36, British Library: London, St. Pancras.

13. Emphasis original; in Bowring, *Political and Commercial Importance of Peace*, 4.

14. Bowring, *Political and Commercial Importance of Peace*, 19.

15. Even maritime genealogies of capitalism and modernity narrate the subsequent effects of colonization as a result of the drive to accumulate capitalism as opposed to seeing the outright precursory practices of colonization that were required to support free-trade and mercantilism. See Linebaugh and Rediker, *Many-Headed Hydra*.

16. Sombart, *Quintessence of Capitalism*; Yamey, "Accounting and the Rise of Capitalism"; Weber, *General Economic History*.

17. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.

18. To read Samuel Bentham's reforms in Russia during the Russo-Turkish naval conflict of 1787–92, see S. Bentham, "Notes on the Naval Encounters"; "Strength and Economy of Our Navy"; J. Bentham, *Panopticon, or the Inspection-House*, 2n1.

19. As John Law argued, the ship inaugurated one of the first concerted efforts and systems of "long distance control *in all aspects*," be they "the technological, the economic, the political, the social and the natural." The ship was a proto-state on water that moved with all its faculties. See Law, "On the Methods of Long-Distance Control," 237, and Agamben, *Homo Sacer.*

20. Ellis, *Desert Borderland*; Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*; Hanioğlu, *Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*. The exception that proves the rule are histories of the Mediterranean that do not broach the topic of sovereignty. See Khuri-Makdisi, *Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism*.

21. Steinberg, *Social Construction of the Ocean*, 110.

22. The classic accounts of this type of scholarship are Stuart Elden and Charles Tilly. See Elden, *Birth of Territory*, and Tilly and Ardant, *Formation of National States in Western Europe*.

23. The important intervention of Khaled Fahmy asks us to look at the inner workings of Ottoman politics and the "Ottoman context" of the conflict, but in so doing it has elided the naval genealogy of the conflict and the ability of the "Maritime Powers," as they called themselves, to use their mastery of the Mediterranean to make Mehmet Ali submit to their demands. Elrod, "Concert of Europe"; Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 22, 25.

24. Mahan and Westcott, *Mahan on Naval Warfare*, xv.

25. Mahan and Westcott, *Mahan on Naval Warfare*, viii.

26. Mahan and Westcott, *Mahan on Naval Warfare*, vii.

27. Cited in Russell, "Alfred Thayer Mahan and American Geopolitics."

28. Mahan and Westcott, *Mahan on Naval Warfare*, xi.

29. Russell, "Alfred Thayer Mahan and American Geopolitics," 119.

30. Mahan and Westcott, *Mahan on Naval Warfare*, 8.

31. Mahan and Westcott, *Mahan on Naval Warfare*, 10.

32. Mahan and Westcott, *Mahan on Naval Warfare*, 10.

33. Emphasis original; in Mahan and Westcott, *Mahan on Naval Warfare*, 10.

34. Mahan and Westcott, *Mahan on Naval Warfare*, 3.

35. Mahan and Westcott, *Mahan on Naval Warfare*, 18.

36. Mahan and Westcott, *Mahan on Naval Warfare*, 19.

37. Mahan and Westcott, *Mahan on Naval Warfare*, 19; emphasis mine.

38. For an example of how most sea voyagers omitted the native from their accounts, see Latour, "Force and the Reason of Experiment," 48–79.

39. See Mahan's discussion of the al-'Arish convention and ensuing deliberations only insofar as it involved France and England in Mahan, *Life of Nelson*, 18–19.

40. J. G., *Expédition de Buonaparte en Égypte*, 23.

41. Mahan, *Life of Nelson*, 282.

42. Abkaryus, *Al-Manaqib al-Ibrahimiyya wa al-Ma'athir al-Khidiwiyya*, 10.

43. Sami, *Taqwim al-Nil*, 2:146, 204, 222, 227–28.

44. Bowring, *Political and Commercial Importance of Peace*, 19.

45. TNA, FO 406/3, "Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston," No. 147, Vienna, July 10, 1839, 165–67.

46. The sale of the *Santa Catarina*'s booty raised a record £300,000, which went to the founding of the Dutch East India Company. See Van Ittersum, "Hugo Grotius in Context"; Borschberg, "The Seizure of the Sta. Catarina Revisited."

47. Muldoon, "Is the Sea Open or Closed?," 117–36; Rodger, "Law and Language of Private Naval Warfare," 5–16.

48. Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 311. See also Toledano, "Review Article"; Sayyid-Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*; and Rivlin, *Agricultural Policy*.

49. Add Ms 40028, "We the Members of the "Liverpool Ship-masters Association . . . William Rowett to Commodore Sir Charles Napier," *Napier Papers*, Vols. XI: "Admiralty letters, Comprising chiefly orders and instructions to Napier," British Library, London: St. Pancras April 20, 1841, f. 291.

50. TNA, FO 406/3, "Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston," No. 147, Vienna, July 10, 1839, 165–67.

51. Add MS 40028, "Admiral Napier to N. Moore," Beyrout, 31st August 1840, BL: St. Pancras, London, f. 156.

52. TNA, FO 406/3, "Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford," No. 296, Therapia, August 7, 1839, 327; Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford," No. 210, Foreign Office, August 7, 1839, 233.

53. TNA, FO 406/3, "Sketch of the Proposed Instructions to the Two Admirals in the Mediterranean," No. 192, Foreign Office, August 3, 1839, 214.

54. TNA, FO 406/3 "Sketch of Proposed instructions to the Two Admirals in the Mediterranean," Inclosure 1 in No. 132, Foreign Office,

August 3, 1839, 214; A similar firman was issued asking Mehmet Ali to send back the ships from Alexandria to Istanbul. *Takvim-i vaka'i'*. No. 190, 19 Dhul Qa'da, 1255 [ca. January 23, 1840].

55. The phrase *mare clausum* is a new/old coinage which denotes a closed sea. It follows the phrase coined by John Selden, who wrote his treatise to legitimize the control of the seas by Britain in the sixteenth century. Selden's coinage followed the Roman coined term for "our sea," *mare nostrum*. TNA, FO 406/3, "Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston," No. 537, Paris, January 13, 1840, 581; TNA, FO 406/6, "Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston," No. 84, Paris, December 11, 1840, Kew Gardens: Richmond, 71; TNA, FO 406/6, "Commodore Napier to Boghos Bey," Inclosure 2 in No. 87, H. M. S Ship "Powerful," Off Alexandria, November 22, 1840, 72; Selden, Howell, and Nedham, *Mare clausum*.

56. TNA, FO 406/5, "Rechid Pasha to Viscount Ponsonby," Inclosure in No. 131, Sublime Porte, le 27 Décembre, 1840, 139; TNA, FO 406/5, "Admiral Sir Robert Stopford," Inclosure 1 in No. 142, Princess Charlotte, Marmorice, January 12 1841, 153; TNA, FO 406/5, "Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby," No. 143, Foreign Office, January 29 1841, 157, TNA, FO 406/5, "Reply of His Highness the Grand Vizier to Mehmet Ali," Inclosure in No. 152, 167.

57. TNA, FO 406/4, "Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston," No. 199, Therapia, September 10 1840, 214–15.

58. The four great powers had also withdrawn their consuls in order to strip Mehmet Ali of any residual feeling of recognition as a ruler. Britain's representations were now to be carried out by the Consul-General of the Netherlands. See TNA, FO 406/4, "Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges," Inclosure in No. 233, Therapia, September 16, 1840, 196; Emir Bashir El-Kasim, nephew of the Emir Bashir, was to be the "Prince of Druses, should the old Emir fail to return to his allegiance to the Sultan: a blank being left in the Firman for the date thereof, which Mr. Wood should be authorized to fill up, if it become[s] necessary to supersede a Firman just granted by which the present Emir Beshir is nominated Prince of the Druses." See TNA, FO 406/4, "Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston," No. 191, Therapia, September 1, 1840, 179–80.

59. TNA, FO 406/4, "Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston," No. 199, Therpia, September 10, 1840, 214–15.

60. TNA, FO 406/5, "Rechid Pasha to Baron de Stürmer," Inclosure 1 in No. 79, Sublime Porte, le 18 November 1840, 68.

61. TNA, FO 406/4, "General Jochmus to Viscount Ponsonby," Inclosure 8 in No. 257, Camp of Djounie [Jounieh], September 20, 1840, 287.

62. Mehmet Ali sought after this concession for many years. On the eve of his campaign to subdue Wahabi rebels in Arabia in 1810, he wrote to the Sultan asking to make Egypt into a special province, *eyalet-i mümtaze*, such as that of Algiers. Such a concession would have made Egypt autonomous. With his request denied, he focused on receiving the hereditary right to rule Egypt. See TNA, FO 406/6, "Viscount Ponsonby, to Viscount Palmeston," No. 46, Therapia, May 17, 1841, 48; TNA, FO 406/6, "Note signed by the Representatives of the Four Powers regarding the new Firman," Inclosure 1 in No. 48, 40–44; TNA, FO 406/6, "Firman addressed to Mehmet Ali," Inclosure in No. 49, 45; TNA, FO 406/5, "Sur les Conditions à la Concession du Gouvernement Héréditaire de l'Egypte que le Sultan a déclaré vouloir accorder à Méhémet Ali," Inclosure 1 in No. 161, 190; Abu-Manneh, "Mehmed Ali Paşa and Sultan Mahmud II."

63. British practices of port blockades to gain trade privileges and support metropolitan trade of course went back to the eighteenth century and even before as Chua et al. have shown. But the case of the Levant War is different for birthing a sovereign order, and a dynasty, out of a blockade that diminished Mehmet Ali's navy. See Chua et al., "Introduction."

64. Great Britain, *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant*, 698.

65. In 1850 Abbas I sent the Ottoman Sultan the Egyptian frigate *al-Sharqiyya*. Najm, *Misr fi 'Ahday 'Abbas wa-Sa'id*, 115.

66. Casale, *Ottoman Age of Exploration*.

67. Khaled Fahmy draws on Michael Howard's quotation, "Could a Nation, in any true sense of the word, really be born without war?" to demonstrate that Egypt's bureaucracy was born with Mehmet Ali's conscription reforms. But even beyond Howard, the parallels between Charles Tilly's history and Khaled Fahmy's history of Egypt—especially in their focus on conscription and taxation—evidence how most historians focus on the army as the fulcrum of reform. See Tilly and Ardant, *Formation of National States in Western Europe*; Fahmy, "Birth of the 'Secular' Individual," 329; cited in Khaled, "The Nation and Its Deserters."

68. Rodger, "From the 'Military Revolution' to the 'Fiscal-Naval State.'"

69. Darwin, *Empire Project*; Fahmy, "Birth of the Secular."

70. Previously, Mehmet Ali wrote to the Sublime Porte to ask for permission to build ships. See Sami, *Taqwim al-Nil* 2:204, 222.

71. Grimm, *Sovereignty*, 15–16.

72. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 140–42.

73. Bowring, *Political and Commercial Importance of Peace*, 19.

74. Spierenburg, *Prison Experience*; Spierenburg, *Emergence of Carceral Institutions*.

75. Patton, *Strictures on Naval Discipline*, 145.

76. Cited in Byrn, *Crime and Punishment in the Royal Navy*, 37.

77. Patton, *Strictures on Naval Discipline*, 12, 20, 25, 33, 76–77, 127, 145.

78. By the eighteenth century the word *government* and internal government aboard a ship, as used by Admiral Philipp Patton, did not mean a shift to a form of power that was autonomous from the sovereign. Similarly, but on land, Agamben critiques Foucault for overlooking the sovereign's ability to delegate the responsibility of determining who lives, and managing the biopolitics of a polity. In both critiques when sees the limits to land-locked Foucauldian notions of government that do not interrogate sovereignty as intersecting with government or with the concept of government aboard a ship. See Agamben, *Homo Sacer*; Patton, *Strictures on Naval Discipline*, 13, 61.

79. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 97.

80. Rodger, "From the 'Military Revolution' to the 'Fiscal-Naval State.'"

81. Morriss, *Naval Power and British Culture*, 9–10.

82. Funnell, "Victorian Parsimony."

83. Morriss, *Foundations of British Maritime Ascendancy*.

84. Though William would soon raise a militia yet again, one of his first acts after conquest was to dissolve James's standing army. See Gordon, Trenchard, and Moyle, *Discourse of Standing Armies*, 25, 32.

85. "Chief Clerks c. 1694–1870," in Sainty, *Office-Holders in Modern Britain*, 41–42.

86. Morriss, *Naval Power and British Culture*, 23.

87. Ehrman, *Navy in the War of William III*, 177.

88. "William and Mary, 1690: An Act Concerning the Commissioners of the Admiralty. [Chapter II. Rot. Parl. pt. 3. nu. 1.]," in Raithby, *Statutes of the Realm*, 218.

89. Morriss, *Naval Power and British Culture*.

90. Morriss, *Naval Power and British Culture*, 19.

91. House of Commons, *Further Correspondence*; House of Commons, *Report from the Select Committee*.

92. Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, 2:210.

93. Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, 1:28.

94. TNA, FO 407/9, *Correspondence Respecting the Finances of Egypt, Part I 1876–7*, "Mr Vivian to the Early of Derby," March 12th, 1877, No. 212, 163.

95. TNA, FO 407/106, *Further Correspondence Respecting the: Affairs of Egypt*, "Sir Evelyn Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury: Machinery of Government in Egypt," April 7th 1891, No. 64, 53.

96. Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives*; EzzelArab, *European Control and Egypt's Traditional Elites*; Fahmy, *In Quest of Justice*, 22.

97. Fitzgerald, *Rapport sur l'Organisation*.

98. Derr, *Lived Nile*, 70.

99. Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, 1:104.

100. Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, 1:104.

101. Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, 1:103.

102. Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, 1:103.

103. Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, 1:109.

104. Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, 1:109.

105. TNA, FO 407/12, "The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir A. Paget," No. 538, Foreign Office, June 7, 1879, in *Confidential Print: Further Correspondence Respecting the Finances of Egypt, 1879*.

106. TNA, FO 407/12, "Mr. Vivian to the Marquis of Salisbury," No. 543, Alexandria, June 1, 1879, in *Confidential Print: Further Correspondence Respecting the Finances of Egypt, 1879*.

107. Cuno, *Pasha's Peasants*.

108. TNA, FO 407/12, "Mr. Vivian to the Marquis of Salisbury," No. 543, Alexandria, June 1, 1879, in *Confidential Print: Further Correspondence Respecting the Finances of Egypt, 1879*.

109. TNA, FO 407/12, "Mr. Vivian to the Marquis of Salisbury," No. 543, Alexandria, June 1, 1879, in *Confidential Print: Further Correspondence Respecting the Finances of Egypt, 1879*.

110. TNA, FO 407/12, "Mr. Vivian to the Marquis of Salisbury," No. 577, Alexandria, June 8, 1879, in *Confidential Print: Further Correspondence Respecting the Finances of Egypt, 1879*.

111. TNA, FO 407/12, "The Marquis of Salisbury to Lord Lyons," No. 582, Alexandria, June 17, 1879, in *Confidential Print: Further Correspondence Respecting the Finances of Egypt, 1879*; emphasis original.

112. These included the Corporation of Western Egypt which was cultivating land in the Western Desert. He also sat on the board of British New Egyptian Company, whose chairman was Prince Hussein Kamel, and which received a concession to build the Egyptian-Ethiopian railway. "The Ethiopian Railway," *African World and Cape-Cairo Express*, December 16, 1905; "The New Egyptian Company," *Egyptian Gazette*, January 10, 1900; "Company Meetings," *African World and Cape-Cairo Express*, December 16, 1905.

113. House of Commons, "Select Committee on Navy Estimates: Second Report, Proceedings, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix," 1888.

114. TNA, Admiralty Files (ADM) 1/6794, "Petition: Appointment of M. Fitzgerald in Succession to the Present Accountant General reported in the Public Newspapers," February 20, 1885.

115. TNA, ADM 1/6777, "Recommendations as to Punishments, &c.," January 12th 1886; TNA, ADM 1/6777, "Evan Macgregor to Accountant-General," 28 September 1885; TNA, ADM 1/6777, "Memorandum as the Establishment of an Independent audit at H. M. Dockyards, &c.; and of Instruction to the Inspector of the Yards," 14 January 1886.

116. TNA, ADM 1/6774, "Minute by the Earl of Northbrook on the Administration of the Navy from 1880 to 1885 with Appendices," 3 July 1885, 21; TNA, ADM 1/6777, "At the Court at Windsor: The 18th day of November, 1885, Present: The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council"; TNA, ADM 1/6777, "Second Report of a Committee appointed to inquire into the Financial Arrangements at the Admiralty," 5 October 1885, 146.

117. Prakash, *Another Reason*.

118. The Egyptian government's refusal to allow Britain the importation of armored cars and licensing them without paying customs, for example, was part of an attempt to decolonize accounting and drain the coffers of the British. TNA, FO 407/204, "Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain," Cairo, March 21, 1927; TNA, Records of the Ministry of Defense (DEFE) 6/2, "Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Planning Staff: Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936—Enforcement of Terms," April 18, 1947.

119. Thus, one can state that it was not only sexuality that was produced in the colonies, but government as well. See Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*.

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